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CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Dick Taver'shima Andzenge, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 1991

The study examines the extent to which social and economic
development might be related to crime.

Modernization theory of crime

posits that the process of social and economic development involves
changes in the society which are criminogenic.

These changes include:

urbanization, industrialization, longevity or increased life expectancy,
increased manufacturing and gross domestic products.

According to this

theory these characteristics alter social tendencies to stability and
conformity, and therefore result in increased deviance and crime.
This study tests the theory by using longitudinal data collected
over a 25-year period from 54 countries.

A sample of these data

representing 34 countries from 6 regions of the world is analyzed to
test the various hypotheses that the above changes are causally related
to crime in general and to the specific crimes of theft, homicide and
fraud.
The study found that though there appears to be a strong
correlation between development and crime, this relationship is not
consistent throughout the regions and countries studied.

The rate of

increase in crime does not seem to be consistent with the rate of
development.

In areas like Asia, development may have actually

contributed to the decrease in crime.
The conclusions from the study are that though there appears
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to be a correlation between development and crime this relationship
seems to differ from one region to another.

This suggests that some

cultural and regional factors may contribute to the relationship.
The fact that there is actually a negative relationship between the
two in other regions also means that development can actually help
in reducing the incidence and rates of crime.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Development and Crime:

A Comparative Analysis

All human societies tend to encourage progressive change.

This

change, also known as development or modernization, is society's
continuous effort to improve the quality of life of its people.

One

of the major tasks of development is to encourage creativity and
productivity which are aimed at reducing the pain and suffering of
everyday life and therefore enabling people to fulfill their potentials.
While development has made our lives better and easier, it has not
eradicated social problems.

While some of these problems are natural

to humanity and therefore not easily changed by social processes of
modernization and change, others are actually the products of modern
ization itself.

To understand the society in which we live, and others

in which we do not live, but with which we must relate and interact, we
must be able to vmderstand universal social phenomena and processes.
These phenomena and processes become the bases upon which we compare
societies.
Development influences not only the quality of life, but also
the total way of life of the people.
cult social problems.

It provides solutions to diffi

Successful cure and even eradication of di

seases such as small pox and yaws are good examples of how change in
lifestyle and advances in medicine, both of which are characteristics

1
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of development, have benefited humans.

Technological developments have

also increated our ability to fulfill our

potentials.

Modern trans

portation and other communication systems such as the telephone have
drastically reduced social contact limitations due to physical dis
tances.

Humans are now able to go into space, talk over the phone to

people thousands of miles away and watch on the television events tak
ing place in several places all over the world.

Even biological

limitations are controlled by scientific interventions which regulate
growth, gestation and other biological processes.
Although these developments are clearly visible and benefi
cial, human suffering has not been eliminated.
increased.

In some ways it has

Many social problems are directly linked to social and

economic development.

Increases in social problems associated with

modernization have been of major concern to sociologists since the
early development of the discipline.
The emergence of cities has brought large populations together
enabling the establishment of public utilities and amenities such as
electricity, schools, water supply, hospitals and industries which
benefit people. Today's cities have enabled governments to reach large
populations effectively.

Public services such as government offices,

schools, markets and hospitals are located in cities where vast
populations live, bringing governments and these services closer to
the people.

Cities also serve as market centers making it easier for

people to buy needed goods without having to travel long distances or
wait several hours for market days.

Cities serve as basic infra

structural units which contain much needed public goods and services.
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Modern cities are enriching cultural, ethnic and industrial centers.
The cultural and ethnic diffusion of various groups of people who
need each other and who together need things they must share greatly
enriches the society and individual lives.
Despite their great advantages, cities are also a source of
major problems.

Cultural diffusion requires a break from tradition

and original cultures, and the development of new ones.

The move to

cities bring people close to each other, who may have nothing in com
mon and therefore choose to live as strangers to each other, often
including those living very close to them.

This anonymity can create

insensitivity and a sense of detachment making random criminal beha
vior much more likely.
The pull to cities results in exposure to many goods and ser
vices which are often available at a financial cost.

Money which

is necessary for the purchase of these attractive things is not easily
available.

Although cities attract many people and seem to promise

them jobs and income they are usually not able to hire and pay every
one who responds by moving to the city.

As a result, "a population

emerges of people who need things which are available, but which they
cannot afford" (Fisher, 1987, p. 25).
Though people in cities live closer to each other, and may often
be crowded, they are not emotionally close to one another.

Most of

them lack a support system and traditional informal controls which
are necessary for social and moral conformity.

Anonymity, inadequate

social and moral control, increased social and physical mobility,
improved mass and public communication all increase opportunities
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and likelihood of criminal behavior by people with inclination towards
deviance (Clinard & Abbott, 1973; Sesay, 1977; Shelley, 1981).
The desire to develop is universal, so also is the concern with
crime.

Evidence of increased crime associated with increase in

development leads one to wonder whether development causes or simply
increases the evidence of crime.

To understand the relationship

between the process of development and crime there is a need for
global and comparative study of both.

A look at some benefits of

comparative studies of both development and crime is appropriate.

Some Benefits of Comparative Criminology

The benefits of comparative criminology cannot be overstated.
Criminality is one of the classes of social deviance that expresses
the qualities of a particular population, the workings of its social
institutions and social systems, its levels of economic and social
development, and the rate of its industrial and urban growth (Johnson
& Barak-Glantz, 1983).

Criminal law, on the other hand, reflects the

fundamental values and concerns of a people as it is one of the most
faithful mirrors of a given population (Edgerton, 1976; Johnson &
Barak-Glantz, 1983).

This means that criminality and criminal law

reveal the most important characteristics of any society.

To under

stand criminality in any society is to understand the society itself.
Since a comprehensive understanding of human society requires a
comparative study of different human societies, such a study must
include a comparative study of criminality.
Comparative studies of crime provide empirical foundation for
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tests of theories about crime, law, demography, and social change
and therefore, strengthen criminological theory (Archer & Gartner, 1984;
Johnson & Barak-Glantz, 1983).

For criminological theories to

be valid they must have sufficient generality to be applicable in
different societies.

Comparative criminological studies enable the

development of theories which meet these requirements and are broad
enough to assist in the universal understanding of criminality.
Cross-cultural studies reveal the relative importance of
specific social, political and economic conditions which, though
not directly related to crime, may be helpful by providing a general
understanding of the environment in which crime occurs.

Such

environmental factors may influence not just the amount of crime but
also the forms in which it manifests itself.

In this way comparative

studies of crime can add to our knowledge of the social origins of
crime (Archer & Gartner, 1984; Johnson & Barak-Glantz, 1983), which
is necessary in understanding and preventing crime.
Comparative criminological studies are helpful to scholars and
policy makers.

They provide insight into the problem of crime.

Those who make policies are able to apply preventive, corrective
and rehabilitative measures which have worked in other societies,
under conditions which may be similar.

They are also able to avoid

investing into ineffective policies which have failed elsewhere.
Proper utilization of comparative studies enables policy makers to
foresee potential impact of social factors (such as rapid urbaniza
tion and industrialization) on crime and regulate them to minimize
possible negative consequences.

Data that show much lower rates
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of crime in some societies and higher rates in others may suggest the
relevance of specific cultural differences to crime.

Policy makers

and criminal justice practitioners can learn from different societies
and therefore increase their effectiveness in their own efforts to
deal with crime.
Cultural characteristics of some societies are particularly
relevant to the incidence and rates of crime.

In Islamic cultures

or among orthodox Jewish communities social goodness is claimed to
be sustained and social evil resisted through a nomos based on divine
law and a spiritual commitment to social decency.

In Saudi Arabia,

(and other Islamic nations) "Shariah law is used both as a moralizing
instrument, as well as a preventive agent" (Souryal, 1988, p. 5).
The system encourages compliance by encouraging citizens to assist
each other.

The significance of social, political and cultural

(including religious) philosophy makes the need for comparative
criminology very compelling.

Even if comparative criminology does

not increase the understanding of crime itself, understanding
cultures with low crime rates may assist in adopting cultural aspects
which have negative effects on crime.

Modernization and Development

Modernization has been defined as "the process of moving towards
the idealized sets of relationships or characteristics posited as
modern.

Development on the other hand, as the process of achieving

parity with the worlds most economically developed states in the
production of goods and services" (Palmer, 1980, p. 24).

These
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views of development and modernization are shared by many scholars
(Bendavid & Bendavid, 1974; Chirot, 1977; Gant, 1982; Webster, 1984).
The problem with this definition is that it assumes that there is
a terminal developed stage, which has been achieved by some nations
but not other nations who must struggle to achieve parity.

Countries

which are said to have reached this stage have become standards used
to evaluate the status of other countries.

No country can claim to

have reached a terminal stage of development.

Since every society is

capable of moving at a different rate and in a different direction
based on its resources and priorities which are not the same, the
notion of a universal parity is not appropriate.
at the same stage in the process.

No two countries are

Scholars who accept this definition

are not able to identify the exact boundaries which differentiate
chese countries from each other and from the rest of the world.
The definition is ethnocentric, as it assumes or implies that
some characteristics of certain societies are ideal and therefore
"superior" to those of other societies.

In fact, advocates of this

view of development claim that "for a society to develop, significant
numbers of its members (its population) must come to despise their
own current cultural state and to believe that progress (in a Western
sense) is both possible and desirable" (Ray, 1970, p. 307).

They

must believe further that the superior state of development is
achieved by adapting to specific new cultural values, attitudes and
behaviors.

There is sufficient evidence however, that not every

"developed" or "developing" country is going in the same direction
or is developing at the expense of its traditions (Archer & Gartner,
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1984; Bierne, 1983; Blazicek & Janesksela, 1978; Norstrom, 1988;
Souryal, 1988).

Japan comes to mind as an example of a country that

is modern and developed but also traditional.

Development may not

require despising one's culture and adopting a new one.
The position that modernization or modernity applies to a move
ment towards specific idealized conditions or characteristics also
needs some further examination.
up-to-date.

To be modern means to be current or

The question is what one is current or up-to-date about.

The above definition implies the existence of idealized character
istics.

Every society has idealized social, economic and political

characteristics which are unique to it and not universalistic.
The position of the writer is that this view of modernization is
right if "idealized characteristics” are assumed to be unique for
each society and not universal.

Every society has or should be

allowed to have things it considers to be ideal and evolve ways of
achieving those.

These should depend on the total characteristics

unique to the society and resources available to it.
Development is a process, not towards parity with other "devel
oped" societies, but rather towards the achievement of a country's
own goals.

Such goals are determined by the specific needs of each

country and reflected in its national policies.

Each country's

definition, determinants and goals depend on situations within the
country and not by the status of other nations.

If development is

the process towards achievement of a particular society's goals,
modernization is the extent to which the means used are appropriate,
effective and current.

Modernization and development are closely
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interrelated.

In fact, one implies the other.

It is not possible

to develop without being modern or to modernize without developing.
For this reason the two are used synonymously throughout this study.

Crime

The concept of crime has prominence in all the social sciences.
People who make social policies, those who enforce them and all who
live in every society are concerned about the presence, the possi
bility, the experience and the extent of crime.

Social scientists

are interested in crime as a social phenomenon which exists in every
society and as a major problem which needs to be understood and con
trolled.

Every society attempts to control crime.

Beccaria believed

that crime was any behavior which was harmful to society.

Since

committing crimes offended and was harmful to society, it was most
important to prevent criminal behavior (Void & Bernard, 1986, p. 22).
Durkheim (1966) on the other hand, argued that crime was normal.
Criminal behaviors represent differences in attitudes, values, beliefs
and behaviors which are necessary for social progress (Durxheim, 1966;
Void & Bernard, 1986).

In fact, Durkheim (1966) suggested that a

society without crime is not possible.

The designation of criminality

according to Durkheim is the way a society defines the nature of its
moral principles.

If in any society at any time all members decide

not to engage in any acts determined to be criminal at the time, the
same society would designate new behaviors as criminal which were not
considered criminal previously.

Crime is a necessary measure of a

society's values and moral tolerance.

According to Durkheim, crime
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is a social fact which contributes to the social dynamics of the
society.

The difference between the two is that while one sees

criminality in the effect particular behaviors have on the society,
the other (Durkheim) sees criminality in the nature of a society's
social or public morality which may or may not have anything to do
with the effects of the behavior on the society.
The reactive perspective defines crime as "acts which are re
acted to distinctively by legal officials" and that an "individual
is only a criminal if he or she is reacted to distinctly by legal
authorities" (Gibbs, 1985, p. 824).

According to this perspective,

the behaviors themselves and their effects on the society are not
important in determining criminality.

The reaction of those in

authority is the only important factor in determining criminality.
This view of crime defies the social science emphasis on objectivity.
A fair measure and study of criminality are only possible if an
objective definition of crime is used.

The above definition is not.

The most acceptable view of crime usable in social science research
is one that sees crime as the violation of previously stated law
(Lopez-Rey, 1986).

This definition assumes that a fair, logical,

rational, and unemotional consideration go into the predetermination
of acceptable and unacceptable behaviors.

Unintended behaviors may

have as harmful effects as intended ones but may not be considered
criminal.

A rational and logical predetermination enables a valuable

social consideration of all relevant factors such as intent, amount
of damage and cost to society.

This is the definition used in this

s tudy.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

11

Statement of Problem

The primary problem for this study is to explore the effects of
development or modernization on rates of crime.

The advent of

industrial revolution had great hope for all societies.

It was hoped

that with industrial revolution and subsequent development most social
problems would be solved.

It was hoped, for example, that increase in

productivity would make available all goods and services needed for
comfortable living.

This would result in improved quality of life

enabling people to be their best.

The industrial revolution and

development which has followed it have not reduced crime and other
social ills.

Rather, the advent of industrial revolution has resulted

in increased social problems.

Durkheim (1966) observed "that the

earlier years of industrial revolution in France were accompanied by
more than 300% increase in crime in general and even greater increases
in the rate of suicide" (p. 66).

Though he saw and described a general

breakdown of traditional collective values (anomie), Durkheim predicted
that the new society will evolve a new collective conscience based upon
individual values of people who, for their own personal interests, would
seek to do good, leading to improved social morality.

The increases in

crime suggested that industrial revolution did not make the society
morally better as Durkheim's idea of conscience collective implied.
The process of development has been shown to occur with rapid
increase in all kinds of crime in many societies.

Robbery, a major

property and personal crime, like many other crimes, has greatly
increased in industrialized countries of Europe and the United States
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(see Table 1).

The rate of increase in robbery is not the same in all

countries, but each of these nations shows significant increases.
The rate of robbery increased by 25% in Switzerland and 425% in Sweden
between 1960 and 1978.

Other countries such as Australia, England,

and the United States have also shown much increase in rates of robbery.
During these periods these countries enjoyed a sustained high level
of industrial development and modernization.

The general quality of

life in these societies also remained high or even continued to im
prove so that they maintained among the highest quality of life in
the world.

Table 1
Robbery Rates in 1960 and 1978 in Selected
Western Industrialized Countries
Rate/100,000

COUNTRY

1960

1978

Australia

5.3

22.1

+317

England/Wales

5.6

27.0

+382

United States

50.1

191.0

+281

Sweden

8.0

42.0

+425

Switzerland

1.2

1.5

+ 25

Source:

CHANGE (%)

Andzenge, D. T.
(1985;. Robbery: Toward a multi
dimensional approach. Unpublished master's thesis.
Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo.

The United States has continued to experience a persistent in
crease in both violent and property crimes.

Increased affluence,
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sophistication of investigative techniques and a continuously improved
criminal justice system have not succeeded in reducing the rates of
crime.

All forms of crime and vice have continued to increase in

the United States despite the above developments and much progress in
behavioral sciences.

Some scholars have suggested that industrial

development may improve the quality of life of a society but that it
is also conducive to crime, especially property crime (Clinard &
Abbott, 1973; Messner, 1982; Sesay, 1977; Stack, 1982; Winslow, 1977).
In the United States the rates of all property crimes have continued
to increase (see Table 2) despite sustained development and continuous
progress in criminal justice processes and research, general emphasis
on civil rights, public assistance for the poor and abundant social
and economic opportunities.

The rates of all forms of crime are in

creasing faster than the rate of population growth.
robbery,

Table 2 shows that

burglary, larceny and motor vehicle thefts have continued to

increase at a rate much higher than the rate of population growth.

Table 2
Number of Property Offenses Known to Police
in 1970 and 1987 in the USA

CRIME

Population
Robbery
Burglary

.

1970

1987

%CHANGE

203,235,298

243,400,000

+20

349,860

517,700

+48

2,205,000

3,236,200

+47
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Table 2--Continued

1970

CRIME

Larceny
Motor Vehicle
Theft
Source:

%CHANGE

1987

4,225,800

7,499,900

+78

928,400

1,288,700

+39

Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics.
(1989). Washington, DC: U. S. Government
Printing Office, p. 427.

It is not only the rates of property crimes that have continued
to increase.

Violent personal crimes have continued to increase

even more rapidly (see Table 3).

The same reasons that cause

increases in property crime may also contribute to increases in per
sonal crime.

This is contrary to argument by some scholars that

modernization contributes to a rise in property crime rates but "have
no such effects on violent personal crimes" (Messner, 1986, p. 38).

Table 3
Total Number of Arrests of Offenders for
Violent Personal Crimes in USA

CRIME

1970

1987

%CHANGE

203,235,298

243,400,000

+20

Murder

16,000

20,100

+26

Forcible Rape

37,990

91,110

+140

Population
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Table 3--Continued

1970

1987

%CHANGE

Aggravated Assault

334,970

855,090

+155

Total Violent Crime

738,820

1,484,000

+101

CRIME

Source:

Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics.
(1989). Washington, DC: U. S. Government
Printing Office, p. 427.

During this period when both property and personal crimes have
rapidly increased in the United States, the population has increased
only from 203,235,298 to 243,400,000, (or by 20%).

The disproportional

increase in rates of all forms of crime compared to increases in popu
lation rates suggests that increases in crime may not simply be due
to population increases or that the changes simply reflect population
dynamics.

These continuous increases have been a pattern in the

United States through its history as a modern industrial country.
Between 1960 and 1963 "the national rate of criminal homicide in
creased by 35%, the rate of forcible rape by 65%, aggravated assault
by 67% and robbery by 119%" (Winslow, 1977, p. 178).
Social, economic and industrial changes associated with develop
ment have not succeeded in reducing crime and other social problems
in most of the developed and developing countries either.

Data from

both the industrialized and developing countries suggest that the
process of development has been frustrated by increases in all forms
of crime.
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International crime statistics reveal that criminality has
increased steadily in the United States, Europe, and the British
Commonwealth in the period since World War II (Shelley, 1981, p. 68).
These crime patterns in the industrialized countries are seen by many
scholars as a natural outgrowth of the process of social and economic
development.

Some criminologists claim that industrialization leads

to increased productivity in the society which in turn results in the
greatly increased availability of goods that become targets for crim
inal activity,

(Cohen & Felson, 1979; Devine, Sheley, & Smith, 1938;

Fisher, 1987; Henry, 1982; Stack, 1982).
Increases in crime are also evident in most developing countries
today.

This leads some scholars to conclude that the increases show

a repetition of patterns experienced by today's developed countries
during their own periods of development.

According to these scholars,

the developing countries of today are merely repeating what those
countries which are now developed had experienced when they were
going through their own process of development (Clinard & Abbott,
1973).
In their study of crime in developing countries Clinard and
Abbott (1973) found that•the increases and changes in rates and pat
terns of criminal activity in today's developing countries are very
similar to the patterns which existed when today's developed coun
tries were experiencing their own process of development.

This posi

tion is shared by many scholars; for example, Hemley and McPheters
(1975) have concluded that crime is an "externality of economic
growth."

They suggest that increased levels of criminal activity
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are direct indicators of modernization or development.
The pressure and general desire to develop or modernize, and
the

desperate attempts used by societies to achieve this makes the

exploration of the phenomenon an imperative task.

Another fact that

makes development such an important subject of study is the fact that
it may have specific and different impact on specific societies which
may in turn influence other societies.

The process of modernization

in the United States has influenced the society differently than the
process of development in Japan.

Because of these differences, the

influence these countries have on other nations is very different.
Modernization in America has made it a military super power.

The

non-military orientation of Japanese development has made it an eco
nomic superpower whose global economic influence differs from the
military influence of other countries such as the United States of
America on other countries.
The desirability of development as a process which improves the
society's ability to meet its own needs would suggest that develop
ment results in a positive change in quality of life and of human
behavior.

This change has been associated with increase in crime and

other problems in some societies, as discussed earlier, but with much
less increase in other societies.

Shelley (1981) suggests that some

societies, while they experience changes usually associated with
development, they retain some of their traditions which are not
criminogenic.
Studies have shown that some societies while experiencing rapid
social and economic development have succeeded in maintaining low
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rates of crime (Adler, 1983; Chang, 1988; Clinard, 1978; Rogers,
1986).

Clinard (1978) argues that social and political character

istics such as maintaining community responsibility, youth inte
gration, political decentralization and emphasis on conformity in
Switzerland, have made the rate of crime in that country much lower
than in other equally developed countries.

Other countries, such as

Ireland, Japan, Peru, Algeria, and Costa Rica, have also succeeded in
maintaining low levels of crime while they experience social and
economic development.
Though many criminologists and available data have suggested a
link between rapid industrialization and crime, there are exceptions.
"No country has developed faster than Japan since the Second World War,
yet most recent statistics indicate that its crime and delinquency
rates are remarkably lower

than those of other countries" (Chang,

1988, p. 140).
What, then, is responsible for increases in crime in some socie
ties but not in others?

Odekunle (1978) suggests that it is the

capitalist system of economic development which is criminogenic.
According to Odekunle, the capitalist economy creates the "economic
man," who accumulates wealth and property at the expense of others,
and fosters unemployment, marginal and meaningless employment result
ing in obvious and relative unacceptable poverty (p. 88).

In their

experience with development, socialist countries have much lower
increases in the rates of crime compared to their counterparts in
capitalist countries.

The fact that Saudi Arabia, Japan, and

Switzerland are capitalist countries with low crime rates despite
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increasing capitalist socio-economic development suggests that the
capitalist mode of development may not necessarily be the culprit.
In some countries (especially the Third World), the increases in crime
seem to be faster and greater than increases in development.

In some

of these societies political and economic development appear to be
permanently sabotaged by corruption and crime.

In some countries,

such as Nigeria, things are so bad that the public lives in permanent
fear due to the unpredictable corrupt governments and the overwhelming
presence of street crime.
The major questions then are what exactly is the nature of the
relationship between crime and development, and why is it that some
societies experience much development with little crime, some much
development with much crime and others have little development with
much increase in crime?

These questions can only be adequately

addressed by comparative analyses.

The Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the popular assumption
of a causal relationship between social and economic development and
crime.

The tendency of the two to occur together has led many scho

lars to conclude that one may cause the other.

By claiming that crime

patterns that exist in the developed countries are the natural out
growth of the process of social and economic development, proponents
of modernization theory of crime suggest that increases in crime are
inevitable consequences of socio-economic development (Clinard &
Abbott, 1973; Fisher, 1987; Messner, 1986; Sesay, 1977; Shelley, 1981;
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Stack, 1982).
There seem to be adequate data which show increases in criminal
activity in societies experiencing development.

Proponents of modern

ization theory of crime share the general orientation of modernization
theory.

This is the perspective which (among other things) argues

that "there is one universal, unilinear pattern of development which
all nations go through.

Consequently, there is a single pattern of

crime associated with modernization as exemplified by the history of
advanced western nations" (Horton & Platt, 1986, p. 118).

These

scholars often ignore the fact that some societies which have comparable
levels of development do not have the same pattern of criminal activity.
Some societies with lower rates of development may actually have higher
rates of crime.
The purpose of this research is to explore the extent to which
social and economic development occur together with increases in
crime.

This is done by examining the process of development and

crime rates in various countries over a period of 25 years.

Develop

ment is indicated by the presence of social, economic, political, and
structural elements indicative of a society's ability to use its
resources or produce goods and services needed for the welfare of its
people.

It is also indicated by general actual changes in the society

which can be seen in results of the social changes such as increase in
life expectancy.

These indicators are considered to indicate the

process of development though it is not assumed that they are the
only indicators of development, neither is it assumed that they are
the most effective in indicating development.

They are used because
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they seem to be the most measurable and the most universal upon which
data are available.
The rate of criminal activity in the same countries, during the
same period, is examined to show how changes in the rates of criminal
behavior in these societies compare to the process of development.
The study assumes that behaviors defined and reported under specific
criminal designations meet the universal broad definitions of those
crimes such as homicide, theft and fraud.

No attempts are made to

question the definition of individual crimes by specific societies.
This is because studies have shown that the use of controlled
definitions and data collecting techniques have not produced data
that are much different from data collected and reported by indivi
dual countries (Bennett & Lynch, 1989).

Even when there is a consensus

on the definition of criminal behavior in a particular society, the
judicial process in the same society, through the adjudication process,
does not always arrive at either the same verdicts or sentences.
It is correct and convenient to accept the records of criminal activity
in each society as defined and documented by that society.

It is what

each society defines as criminal behavior that it passes laws against,
prosecutes, convicts and punishes.

The classification of total crime

includes behavior which may not be criminal in some societies at all
but which may be in others.
The study assumes that there may be a significant relationship
between specific socio-historical and geo-political factors in every
society which either affect the rates of crime in general or which
influence the effect of development on crime.

No attempt is made to
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identify those and test them in this study.
subsequent study.

That may be done in a

Such an endeavor is a major task which is beyond

the scope of this study.

If the study confirms co-relationship between

development and crime in these diverse societies, the attempt
to find relevant socio-cultural and geo-political factors will be
irrelevant.

The need for such a search will be indicated if the

relationships are either non-existent or are inconsistent.
Another purpose of the study is to explore the basis for a better
explanation of the dynamics of both development and crime.

Such an

explanation, it is hoped, will help criminologists to evolve compre
hensive theories which are better able to explain the two phenomena.
The findings of the study could also be helpful to people who have
responsibility of planning for social and economic development in
various societies.

If crime is found to be a result of other factors

rather than the dynamics of development, one would suggest that crime
control mechanisms be focused on such factors if they are known.

If

they are not known both research and planning would emphasize efforts
in seeking to identify them.

On the other hand, if the study finds

that development is indeed criminogenic it would be suggested that
both researchers and policy makers invest more of their energies in
finding ways of accommodating crime rather than attempting to control
it.
The study also purports to underscore the significance of vigor
ous comparative research on both crime and development.

Though

criminologists have long recognized the importance of comparative
studies, insufficient efforts have been put into studies which result
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in adequate understanding of the nature of criminality.

In doing

comparative studies it is not enough to simply examine the different
rates and typology of crime in different societies.

We must assess

the similarities and differences between and among nations.

We must

try to establish the relevance of those similarities and differences
as contexts of specific social processes, such as development, and of
major social phenomena such as crime.
Efforts must be made to determine what specific social character
istics make societies truly similar or different.

Characteristics of

the physical environment may define both economic and political potent
ials of a society, and, therefore, determine their rate and direction of
economic development.

A country's physical location determines its

neighbors and strategic importance in the world community which in turn
shapes its potential and actual alliances.

The location of many Middle

East countries and their role in world events demonstrates this point.
The history and culture of all societies affect their political
and economic developments, but most of all they shape a society's
political ideology upon which laws and social norms are based.
and other Asian countries are good examples of this.

Japan

One needs to

know whether historical and cultural similarities influence the
experience of societies with processes of change and development.
Religious beliefs also affect and influence social and political
ideologies:

A recognition that shared ideologies and religious belief

systems can make societies different, which in many other ways are
similar, may be a very important one.

Current comparative studies

have tended to emphasize trends in western European countries and
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America as cross-cultural and international studies.

These societies

may be more similar than different, so that similar patterns in crim
inal trends may be due to their inherent similarities rather than the
nature of crime itself.
This study acknowledges common concerns about the definition of
the concepts of crime and modernity, and the accuracies of official
data and recognizes that crimes may be influenced by political interests
(Bennett & Lynch, 1989).

However it is the feeling of the author that

the concerns are exaggerated since studies have shown that objective
data collected by criminologists have not been found to be any more
accurate.

The question of definition is not relevant either, since it

is logical to see that social meanings of common crime tend to be
universal.

The concern with crime does not need to be a moral exercise

by criminologists, who tend to disregard what ruling governments
consider as crime and impose their own definitions, in a desperate
search for objectivity.

Societies define crimes.

Our concern as

criminologists should be with those behaviors that representatives
(governments) of such societies consider as criminal and not what we
ourselves do.

It was Durkheim (1966) who said, "What confers the

character of criminality on any behavior is not the intrinsic quality
of the act but that definition which the collective conscience lends
them" (p. 70).

Durkheim went on to argue that if all people in a

given society decide not to commit any acts currently considered
criminal, those with the power to legislate public morality will
define new acts as criminal capable of producing equally high moral
outrage.

Even objective definitions lend themselves to subjective
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interpretations by those doing surveys, those responding to surveys,
and those analyzing the data.

Summary

The fact that every society desires progress in the form of
development and modernization is evident in the national policies of
all nations.

The extent to which this progress is achieved differs

from one country to another.

The hope that progress would improve

the quality of life and make social life better has not been realized
in most societies.

The process of development itself has succeeded

more in some societies than others, putting some societies ahead of
others if one assumes that all are going the same direction.

The

history, geography, politics, and culture of societies makes them
very different from one another.
The differences among societies makes the use of comparative
studies to understand human society highly desirable.

The shared

desire for progress, the varied degrees of both success and failure
in this pursuit in different countries, social and economic problems
they each encounter and the inevitable dependency of countries on one
another all make comparative studies not only desirable but imperative.
Attempts to compare societies must consider the foci of the
comparisons being made.

One must assume the existence of the pheno

mena and their characteristics.

In this study development or mod

ernization and crime are the phenomena of concern.

The assumption

is that all societies desire and pursue the process of development or
modernization.

The success rate of these societies in the process
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of development is not the same.

Problems encountered in the pursuit

of progress differ from one country to another.
for development also are not the same.

The resources available

Consequently, even for countries

presumably going the same direction in the pursuit of development, some
succeed more than others.

All societies at all stages of development

experience some levels of criminal activity.

However, as they modernize

or develop even more, attempting to improve the quality of life and
other social processes, the societies may be confronted with even more
crime.

To some of these societies the levels of crime are high enough

to become a major concern for those who make policies and those who
live in such societies.
The failure of modernization to curtail crime and the tendency of
crime to actually increase despite rapid social and economic development
has led to a rather popular belief that the relationship is not coinci
dental, but that the process of development itself is criminogenic.

The

attempt made in this study is to explore the relationship between socio
economic development and crime.

If there is a direct relationship

between the two the correlation will be sustained in a simi' .r pattern
in all societies.

If the pattern varies with a dir

”"T .e in cultures

and for geographical regions, it must be assumed that the causes for
increases in crime must be sought in cultural, regional or other social
facts unique to each society, or that the relationship is spurious
suggesting a need for further exploration of possible intervening
factors.
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CHAPTER I I

REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE

Introduction

The impact of development or modernization is a major concern
for scholars of various disciplines.

Hence, there is an abundance of

literature on the history, the causes, the process, the benefits and
the problems of development.

There are scholars who are concerned

with the process of development in general and some who are concerned
with the kinds of development.

Some scholars are satisfied with the

view of development as inevitable social processes while some see
development as a social phenomenon needing carefully articulated theo
ries to explain.

Some see development as a state of being exemplified

by societies which are

models for the rest of theworld which must

also seek to achieve. Others see it as a continuing
completely achieved by any one.

process, never

As a process which affects the

society by its emphasis on change, development is expected and is
often beneficial and usually desirable.
inate social problems;

However,

it does not elim

in fact, it may contribute to them.

With the abundance of literature on development and on crime,
which is itself a phenomenon of major concern to sociologists, an
exhaustive review of literature on both phenomena is not possible
in this study.

Since the study is only concerned with relationship

between the two, the literature reviewed includes only those that

27
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deal with each phenomenon as it relates to the other.

The theories

discussed are ones that either apply in the attempts to directly
correlate the two or which provide explanations subsequently rele
vant in the explanation of the correlations between crime and develop
ment providing a basis for further explorations.

The literature

reviewed also includes scholarly works which provide specific and
broad discussions of the phenomenon of development and crime.

Such

discussions contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the rela
tionship between crime and development.

When they do not establish a

link, the literature used here provides meaningful insight into the
nature of both crime and development independently.

This is important

because in order to adequately understand the relationship between crime
and development it is important to understand the nature of these
phenomena independent of each other.

This is particularly helpful in

attempts to explain the trends in either when there is no clear
indication of a link between the concepts of development and crime.

Theories of Development

Development as a Natural Process

Development is the process by which a society makes use of re
sources available to it to achieve its goals.

In other words, devel

opment is the process by which a society tries to maximize the poten
tial of its social and natural resources to achieve individual and
public goals (Wilber, 1973, p. 6).

Usually these goals include en

hancement of the human potentials of its citizens, solving problems
which threaten them, and fulfilling fantasies and dreams of both its
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leaders and its citizens.

Durkheim (1966) saw development as an

inevitable normal evolutionary process.

He saw development as a pro

cess in which the major mechanisms which hold the society (or its
social institutions) together undergo changes to better perform their
roles (Durkheim, 1966).

According to Durkheim, the evolutionary pro

cess involved in development is one in which traditional mechanical
social systems give way to modern organic systems.
Theoretical considerations of development proposed by Durkheim
(1966), acknowledged possible problems associated with the evolution
ary process.

As they become more aware of their creativity, their

loyalty to traditional values and norms may breakdown, resulting in
a state of normlessness he called anomie.

However, the new society

would be more efficient and productive, the new social institutions
productive and effective, and the new society will develop a new
collective conscience which will control individual tendency towards
deviation.
This view of development as a natural evolutionary process is
demonstrated by Rostow (1962) in the book The Process of Economic
Growth.

Rostow argues that societies evolve through five stages of

economic growth.

The first of this he calls the traditional stage

with characteristics of traditional or primitive societies.
this stage growth is a discontinuous and dialectical process.
it is not sustained, life is very unpredictable.
depending on chance.

During
Since

People adapt by

Gradually people start questioning this depend

ency and exploring their potentials and resources.

This dissatis

faction leads to the second stage Rostow referred to as preconditions
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for economic take off.

At this stage traditional barriers to change

or progress are denounced in favor of new and alternative ideas.
Essential characteristics of self-sustained growth evolve.
ous industries emerge for production of needed goods.

Indigen

This leads to

the third stage, the take off stage (the period of self-sustained
growth).

During this stage the foundations laid in the second stage

begin to bear fruits.

Economic products and resources are reinvested

into the economy making the society increasingly self-sufficient.
With surplus dividends, the society is able to push to the fourth
stage, the drive to economic maturity.
With resources to meet its immediate needs, and the ability to
cope with unexpected social and economic problems, the society begins
to assume a responsible, mature position in world affairs.

Econo

mic and political alliances are formed for the marketing of surplus
goods and to assert political, social and economic interests.

The

mature society gradually grows into the final stage of mass con
sumption.

With wealth and prosperity, sustained economic resources

and industrial and technological productivity, the society can afford
high consumption of raw materials (to feed industries) and natural
resources to meet human demands.
Rostow (1962) sees each stage as requiring social changes and
social adaptation.

The more willing a society is to realize the need

for progression, the more rapidly it would develop.
problems associated with this progression.

He also sees many

It often involves devia

tion from acceptable norms, which is frustrating due to difficulties
in predictability, and which is essential for planning and policy.
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However, for a society to develop, these problems must be overcome,
not avoided.
With few variations the Rostowian approach to development as a
natural process is expressed by various scholars.

Palmer (1980) sees

development as a progressive move towards an idealized set of charac
teristics.

Some of these may be seen in other societies and others

evolved through social cultural change.

Bendavid and Bendavid (1974,

p. 10) see development as progression due to education and appro
priate attitudes with no need for major infrastructural change.

The

position that development is a natural progression from a more primi
tive, less than modern way of living to more modern way of living is
a rather common position among many social scientists.

Development as Strategy

Another perspective on development is the view that development
is an economic strategy.

According to this perspective, Meadows (1975)

states:
Development consists of activities which bring shifts in the
total national income, or shifts in the composition of the
total output, or shifts in the per capita income or in the
Gross National Product, or shifts in capital accumulation, or
in some other directly relevant economic category, (p. 19)
Since development is a strategy oriented toward accumulation and
distribution of resources, it is a planned social, political, and
economic process.

Prospects and problems are seen within the context

of their economic impact.
The Rostowian model suggests that since development is patterned
it can be encouraged or stimulated by removing obstacles to the take
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off stage.

The view of development as economic strategy, emphasizes

economic planning at the expense of social and other non-economic
forces.

Meier (1985) observed that though developmental ideas and

technology can be imported the process itself can only occur if it
is carefully planned and implemented using indigenous forces and
resources.

This strategic planning, according to Meier, results in

the emergence of a modern personality among citizens with parapher
nalia of industrial nature, social and institutional practices con
ducive to change and a new intellectual perspective of culture.
The view of development as a strategy has had great appeal to
nation builders, many of them in the Third World.

In many of those

countries powerful civilian and military dictators have engaged in
Draconian policies to develop the people and societies based on
national development plans.

They make promises to their countries

of infrastructural and economic development.

They pass laws or

decrees to force conformity or change.
The strategic view of development often assumes specific results
to specific actions. The tendency to force people to comply with
decreed change has a tendency to cause resistance and rebellion,
hence, constant military takeovers in these countries.

The promises

made in strategic planning often are made to sound good, but are
often not as easy to fulfill, resulting in mass dissatisfaction,
social discord and many social problems.

Development as an Inevitable Result of Social Inequalities

The radical approach takes issues with the tendency to view
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development from the western perspective.

According to Bendavid and

Bendavid (1974), the basic conception of development as:
A process through which a society moves from a particular
(underdeveloped) socio-economic condition to another, a more
desirable (developed) socio-economic condition as a conse
quence of education in appropriate attitudes and skills,
technical assistance and basic infrastructure.
(p. 10)
is not right.

To the radical theorist, this tendency to see development

from a Western perspective is misleading.

True development is based on

each society determining what its unique needs are, and defining the
means of meeting those needs which are based on the society's own unique
resources, political, social and economic circumstances.
Developed countries see underdevelopment in social and economic
inequality, unemployment, lack of human dignity and poverty (Seers in
Wilber, 1973, pp. 6-7).

These problems, according to Bendavid and

Bendavid (1974, p. 12), may be as much or even more of a problem in
the developed as in the underdeveloped countries.

The traditional

view of development imposes on poor societies a Western view of
development.

Given a real choice, people in poor countries may not

be interested in emulating the characteristics of rich and indus
trialized societies (Bendavid & Bendavid, 1974, p. 12).

This view

of development, also referred to as the critical or Marxist approach,
sees the relationship between the developed and less developed coun
tries as a new form of colonization called imperialism.

Proponents

of this position disagree with the tendency to see societies as inde
pendent of each other in their pursuit for development.
of Third World is questioned.

The concept

The general perception of Third

World countries as poor emerging countries riddled with poverty and
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political instability is questioned.

The most developed countries

have large quantities of poverty and unstable conditions.

The desig

nation itself is seen as masking the true nature of imperialism.
Chilcote (1984) defines these as "countries that are exploited
and oppressed, have less technology and development, whose underde
velopment is brought about by colonialism and imperialism, and de
pendency upon the dominant capitalist system and outside influences"
(PP. 1-2).
The Marxist approach challenges the notion that the flow of capital
and technology from advanced capitalist nations to the backward nations
destroys feudalism and inequalities leading to capitalist development.
“Many Third World countries are shaped largely by the needs of the
industrialized capitalist countries" (Chilcote, 1983, p. 7).
Imperialism is seen as a particularly "rapacious stage in the history of
capitalism which intensified the exploitation of the imperialized
formations while augmenting the process of accumulation by the more
advanced bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries" (Ahmad, 1983, p. 33).
In summary, the Marxist approach sees development and underde
velopment as consequences of social and international inequalities.
Developed countries have achieved their position at the expense of
the less developed countries which remain poor as a result of exploi
tation by the rich and developed nations.

The process of development

is seen as the result of the dynamics of imperialism.

Summary

The Marxist or Imperialist views of development are seen as one
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since both approaches emphasize dependency and exploitation of both
individuals and governments of underdeveloped countries.

They both

argue that the process of development is brought about by the growth
of working class political and economic consciousness and independent
organizations which benefit both the working class and the bourgeoisie
(Howe, 1982).

The Marxists see this as ultimately not benefiting the

lower class or the underdeveloped countries as they continue to be
perpetually exploited.

To them development would only occur with the

development of a national consciousness, revolutionary in character
to change the equation (Edelstein, 1982; Henfrey, 1982; Howe, 1982;
Johnson, 1982).

Non-Marxist imperialists see the exploitation as

benefiting the rich and poor in the developing countries, as being
responsible for social and economic dynamics in both developed and
developing countries and between or among them.

Since every one

benefits, development could occur through negotiations which will
increasingly improve the benefits of these countries leading to capi
talist development which the benefit to the poor and helps developing
the countries without a need for nationalistic revolutions which
often tend to be misguided and corrupt (Ahmad, 1983; Howe, 1982;
Johnson, 1982).

Dependency Theory

The end of colonization and the emergence of the new world order
have resulted in various theoretical attempts to explain political,
social and economic processes in, between and among various nations.
One of these is dependency theory which sees the end of political
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colonization as the dawn of economic and social dependency by former
colonies on former colonial master nations.

Dependency theory em

phasizes the extent to which this relationship affects the former
colonies.
The many years of colonization subjected the colonized nations
to laws, economic, social and political systems reflecting those of
the nations which colonized and ruled them.

Some of these former

colonial masters are also economic, military and industrial giants
who control the world's financial, military and industrial markets.
Poor countries depend on the richer and industrialized countries for
access to the world market systems.

Dependency theorists also claim

that the wealthier nations also control the raw materials which are
abundant in the Third World, as they control world markets.

Develop

ment in these countries is molded after the industrialized nations
out of choice or necessity (Johnson, 1983; Petras, 1982; Weeks, 1982).
Dependency theory originated in the 1960s through the work of a
number of academics and development economists who were particularly
concerned over the continuing economic failure of Latin American
countries (Webster, 1984, p. 84).

It has become a prominent theory

especially among academicians from the Third World.

Proponents of

this theory argue that the massive and persistent poverty in the
Third World countries is caused by exposure to the economic and pol
itical influences of the advanced countries.

They reject the

diffusion thesis of modernization theory which sees the impact of
advanced societies as progressive.

They also reject the imperialism

thesis of Marxist theorists (Chilcote, 1984; Edelstein, 1982;
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Henfrey, 1982).

A major spokesperson for dependency theory is Andre Frank
(1974) who claims that the persistent poverty of the Third World is
a reflection of its dependency.

Frank argues that the periods of

merchant capitalism and colonialism forced a specialization of pro
duction on Third World countries that was primarily export oriented,
of limited range and geared to the raw material needs of imperial
powers.

The Third World elites were incorporated into the system

and could do little to establish a more diverse, independent form
of economic activity.

They became the mere intermediaries between

the rich purchasers and the poor producers.

Frank describes their

(the elites) lifestyles and wealth as more and more tied to and so
heavily dependent on the activities of the economic elite in the
developed countries (Angotti, 1982; Chinchilla & Deitz, 1982).

While

the Third World elites enjoy a high standard of living from this rela
tionship, the masses experience chronic deprivation as their surplus
production is taken from them in the local rural region and trans
ferred to the rich farmers and merchants in their own country and
then on abroad.

Frank argues that there is a chain of dependency

running down from the highly advanced centers of the world down to
the rural merchant in the poorest countries.

While countries of the

advanced center can develop through self-growth, others since they
are dependent, can only possibly expand if the dominant interpel
expands.
Dependency theory is actually a very broad, eclectic school
of thought whose only common ground is the assumption that
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underdevelopment has causes external to the underdeveloped nations.
Thomas Angotti (1982, p. 124) presents four major perspectives under
the theme of dependency:
1.

The critique of dualism, whose major position lies in the

criticism of the traditional view that all social history is explained
as gradual transition from a traditional underdeveloped society to a
modern developed one.
2.

Core/peripheral position which presents the notion that the

world is divided up into core and periphery.

The core is made up

of affluent advanced countries and the periphery of poor underdeveloped
countries.
3.

The unequal exchange advocates who argue that underdevelopment

is related to the disadvantage of peripheral nations on the world
market.
4.

Dependent bourgeoisie theorists regard bourgeoisie in

the periphery as entirely dependent on external forces and therefore
unable to play a progressive role in their countries (Edelstein,
1982; Howe, 1982; Johnson, 1982).
The major implications of dependency theory are that:

The pro

cess of development in the Third World is not only modeled after the
first world, but is actually controlled by the developed countries.
The problems of underdevelopment are also to be blamed on direct or
indirect actions of the developed countries.

Social and economic

problems in these countries can be better explained by understanding
the dynamics in the developed countries which influence social and
economic.policies in the poorer or less developed countries.
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Summary

Dependency is a popular perspective because it tries to locate
the origins of current patterns of relationships among nations and
the dynamics of such relationships.

The problem of underdevelopment

is seen as a result of unequal exchanges between the developed coun
tries and the developing or less developed ones.

The developing or

less developed countries, most of which were colonies of now indus
trialized countries, are said to continue to depend on those indus
trialized countries.

The experience of colonization left these coun

tries with a value of dependency, which include a need to model their
development after the development in developed countries.

Some of

these include constitutions and political ideologies with no basis
in the countries' traditions or cultures.

Economic, political and

social elites in some developing countries are seen as attempting to
emulate the values and lifestyles and may actually act as agents of
the elite in industrialized nations, often at the expense of their
societies' resources.
Dependency theorists see underdevelopment as both direct and
indirect result of the relationship between these countries and the
developed ones.
dependency.

The industrialized countries benefit from this

Underdeveloped countries act as emptying grounds for

the surplus production of industrialized countries and a source of
raw materials for them.

Since the elite in the Third World countries

who make politics try to emulate the elite of industrialized coun
tries, the policies they make both for development and governing of
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their countries tend to be inappropriate for those societies (Adeyemi,
1980; Angotti, 1982; Henfrey, 1982; Johnson, 1982; Webster, 1984;
Weeks, 1982).

Hence, many problems associated with both under

development and development are seen as the product of the influence
of the developed countries (Chilcote, 1984, pp. 1-2).

World Systems Perspective

In recent years the world systems perspective has become a major
theoretical attempt to explain the nature of economic development and
underdevelopment.

The perspective has also been used to explain the

nature of international relations and to classify the world community.
Developed by sociologists, economists and political scientists, mostly
from the Third World the approach can also be seen as a Third World
perspective of the world.

As a descriptive model it attempts to show

the dynamics of development in the industrialized countries and of
underdevelopment in those not developed.

It also shows the process

of development or progression from the underdeveloped (or peripheral)
stage through developing (or semi-peripheral) to the developed (or
core) stage.

The world systems approach unlike dependency theories

suggest that the peripheral nations need not be dependent on the core
nations.

In fact, they may perceive of their dependency as independ

ence and consider it alignment which benefits them as much as or even
more than the core countries.
The world system perspective was introduced by Immanuel
Wallerstein (1980) who describes the world system as a "network of
unequal economic and political relationships among the developed and
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less developed countries" (p. 53).

According to Wallerstein, the

modern world comprises a single capitalist world economy which has
emerged historically since the 16th Century and which still exists
today.

National states are not societies that have parallel histor

ies, but parts of a whole reflecting that whole.
the world as comprised of three parts:

This theory sees

The core societies, the

peripheral societies and the semi-peripheral spcieties (Chirot,
1977, p. 13).

The core societies include the rich and powerful

societies that are relatively independent of external controls.
The peripheral societies which include the relatively poor and under
developed societies which are manipulated and controlled by the core
powers.

The semi-peripheral which are countries midway between the

core and the peripheral which are trying with modest success in
diversifying and developing their economics (Frank, 1984; Waller
stein, 1974) .
Proponents of world system perspective argue that "the hall
mark of capitalism is the fact that is has displayed 'growth' as a
system over its history.

That there are five areas in which this

growth shows itself" (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1982, p. 106).

The five

areas, according to Hopkins and Wallerstein, are mechanization, contractualization (free social and economic association through which
people or parties make contracts protecting their interests and
guiding their relationships), commodification (transfer of land and
labor into commodities), interdependence (division of labor and
interdependence of productive forces), and polarization (increasing
awareness of unevenness of development in different zones of the
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world).

Development is seen as the process of change in these areas.

The whole world community is structured as an interrelated system of
units at different stages of development or change in the five areas.
According to world system theorists, the present well being of
advanced states is due to the advantageous relations they have with
less developed states (Frank, 1984, p. 183; Hopkins, 1982, p. 10).
The natural resources of the poorer (peripheral) nations exported to
the more advanced (core) nations.

The advantaged position of profit,

interest and capital accumulation oriented core countries' results
in their manipulation of social, economic, social and political pro
cesses in the peripheral nations resulting in stagnation in these
areas.
The ability of core nations to manipulate the peripheral
nation's results in their ability to control the process of develop
ment in these areas.

They can only develop in the directions under

conditions favorable to the core nations.

Since the inequality bene

fits the core nations, they only pay lip service to the desire for
development in peripheral countries.

The offer of economic aid often

includes loans with conditions which undermine the conditions neces
sary for repayment such as devaluation of currencies, flooding the
markets of peripheral nations with goods made in core countries which
guarantee the outflow of capital and infiltration of political insti
tutions causing instability and often expensive investment in mili
tary activities.

The peripheral countries are kept in the situation

of permanent dependency export dependency, the debt trap and the
corruption and exploitation by multinational corporations (Veltmeyer,
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1983).

Proponents of world system perspective argue that true develop
ment in the core nations can only be achieved through the liberation
of their economics, social and political institutions.
True autonomy is seen as their only hope.

This can be achieved

by renegotiation of relationships and assertion of control over their
resources (Wallerstein, 1974).
World system theorists see some social problems in peripheral
countries as the product of the dynamics of the relationship with
the core nations.

They also see some problems as resulting from

practical difficulties in coping with social, economic and politi
cal realities in their societies, also caused or influenced by the
core nations.

Summary

World system perspective is a theoretical attempt to explain
the phenomenon of development by looking at the nature of societies
in the abstract (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1982, p. 41).

The modern

world is seen as comprising a single capitalist world economy which
has emerged since the 16th Century and which still exists today.
This abstract world is seen as consisting of states which do not
have parallel histories, but rather as parts of whole intercon
nected systems.

The system consists of three groups of nations;

the core (the developed), the peripheral (the underdeveloped),
and the semi-peripheral (those seen as evolving visible signs of
development) which interact and benefit from each other, though

*
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the core countries have an unfair advantage over the peripheral.
The development in the peripheral is controlled by the core coun
tries .

Social (including criminal), economic and political problems

in the peripheral nations are seen as a result of the influence of
the core countries.

Development and the control of social, economic,

and political problems will be achieved only when the imbalance is
corrected giving the peripheral countries more control over their
destines.

Major criticism of the world system's approach are that

it fails to recognize or trivializes the significance of indigenous
forces in the peripheral nations and fails to explain the causes of
social, economic, and political problems in the core nations.

Modernization Theory of Development

Modernization theory has its roots in the work of early social
thinkers such as Emile Durkheim, August Comte, Max Weber and Karl
Marx.

These and other classical, sociologists were concerned with

the progress which led to industrial revolution but also a major pro
duct of it.

Modern modernization theory became prominent in the

1950s and 1960s and attempted to draw from the works of Durkheim
and Weber to explain rapid social development.
Modernization theories assume that societies progress from tra
ditional to modern types by changing ways of thinking and behaving.
These modern ways of thinking and behavior are considered better,
more desirable and beneficial to the society.

The change includes

alteration in the structure of societies involving a transition
from traditional mechanical type societies to modern organic type.
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This results in new patterns of morality and system of norms which
are much less rigid than those of traditional mechanical societies.
This means that modern individuals have much more freedom to be crea
tive and to act.

The new society also leads to other structural

changes such as urbanization, division of labor, industrialization
and formalization of education and other institutions (Webster, 1984).
Formalization of life, of social and economic activity adds purpose
to life.

People invest and engage in more productive activities.

What results is a more productive and efficient society.
Modernization has problems (or potential problems) as the emphasis
on change may be destabilizing making life less predictable.

Scholars

have linked many social problems (including crime) to the process and
dynamics of modernization.
Modernization theory is traced to the work of early sociologists,
especially Emile Durkheim and Max Weber.

In his work, The Division

of Labor in Society, published in 1893, Durkheim proposed that there are
two types of societies, the traditional and the modern, which have
different social characteristics.

The traditional society is the more

backward type held together by mechanical solidarity.

This type of

society, according to Durkheim, is stable and predictable because of
control mechanisms.
less productive.

However, it is less progressive and generally

The other type of society, the modern one, is held

together by organic solidarity emphasizing and in fact exploiting the
diversity of its members, hence, encouraging individuality in the
form of division of labor to maximize creativity and productivity.
Durkheim saw the unsatisfactory nature of the traditional societies
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as establishing the basis for change to modern types.
Max Weber, in his now famous text, The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism, argued that the distinctive care, calculation
and hard work of Western business was encouraged by what he referred
to as the Protestant work ethic, a value system which came to pre
eminence in the 16th Century, promoted most forcefully by the doctrines
of Calvinism.

According to Max Weber, the religious commitment to hard

work and deferred gratification helped to create highly productive and
investment oriented societies, characteristics which are necessary
for development.

The major contribution of Max Weber in this regard

was his pronouncement of the significance of particular values, life
styles and behaviors in social, economic, and political development
which transformed certain societies.
As a theory, modernization evolved following the decline of
the old colonial empires.

Talcott Parsons and other Western socio

logists started proposing a developmental process for the Third
World, molded after Western democratic and capitalist systems rather
than the socialist one (Webster, 1984).
In recent years scholars, especially from the developed and
industrialized but also some for the Third World, most of whom have
been educated in the West, see modernization theory as best able to
explain lack of development in the Third World.

They also see the

theory as providing the best hope for the process of development.
Some of the major tenets of modernization theory include the
following:

Lack of development is a condition prior to rapid and

high levels of industrial development.

Gross National Product
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(GNP) is used to indicate economic development.

Other indicators of

development include perceived quality of life, basic needs and rates
of consumption (Webster, 1984).
Lack of development is the result of the socio-economic condi
tions in these societies that create obstacles to modernization.

As

a result of this perception, modernization theorists argue to that
development would occur only if "significant numbers of the population
must come to despise their current situation and must come to the be
lief that progress is both desirable and possible" (Ray, 1970, p. 307).
This means that in order to develop some cultural characteristics of
these societies must change or be abandoned in favor of modern and
progressive ones.
Development is a relatively straightforward process of efficient
social adaptations to periods of strain (Webster, 1984).

During these

periods, when there is pressure to change traditional behaviors,
attitudes give way to new values and behaviors.

This process may be

strenuous to the society as major traditional characteristics which act
as stabilizing factors are forced to give way to these new values and
behaviors.
Modernization theorists claim that development must proceed in the
Third World along similar lines as it has in western societies (Webster,
1984, p. 55).

They see the history of the social, economic and

political development in Western Europe and North America as a blue
print of development throughout the world.

They contend that Western

and American economics will continue to grow and develop so that they
enjoy the prosperity of high mass consumption.

This development can
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spread by diffusion, encouraging the evolution of features such as
urbanization, literacy, mass media, a heightened political awareness
(or democracy), capitalism and the replacement of irrational tradition
with rational culture.

Proponents of this theory also assume that

the evolution of capitalist development along the linear path toward
modernization associated with the practices democracy, constitution
alism, electoral participation, and competitive politics are the only
way to real development (Chilcote, 1983, pp. 9-10).
Modernization theorists claim further that for development to
occur, the culture must experience three major transitions.

First,

there must be changes in the values or desires for traditional things
to values and desires for new things and ways of acting.

This means

that there must be a change in social attitudes which involves increased
curiosity and actual exploration for new and foreign ideas.

Second,

the kinship system must change or be replaced by an achievement oriented
system.

This means that there must be the introduction and enforcement

of a merit system in all major aspects of social, economic and political
life for the society.

Thirdly, that the view of the world must change

from the emotional, superstitious, fatalistic and a naive sense of
individual and public content to one that encourages looking forward
to an open world to be conquered and sees problems as obstacles to be
explored and resolved.

Development is therefore a psychological process

requiring the mental capabilities to be curious and the creativity to
solve problems.

Both individuals and the public have to evolve a new

progressive mind set.
Proponents of modernization theory recognize the potential
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upheaval of the kind of change they consider necessary for develop
ment to occur.

Durkheim (1933) had earlier recognized the impact of

this when he introduced the concept of anomie.

Many social problems

are seen as potentially or actually associated with this process of
change and development.
Critics of modernization theory have suggested that the primary
concepts of traditionalism and moderninity are too vague, as all
societies contain elements which can be construed as being both.
Societies may also be considered, by some critics, as to not stop
being traditional because they are developed.

Japan is a good exam

ple of a society which is developed as much as or more than many, yet
the Japanese society can be considered a traditional society by almost
any definition of the word.

Kinship ties, which are generally consi

dered as a primary primitive characteristic, persist in many modern
and developed societies.

Summary

Modernization theory is a descriptive theory of modern social,
economic and political development with its roots in classical
sociology, especially in the works of Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Max
Weber (1864-1920).

Both saw development as the evolution of primitive

societies to modern type societies.

The process, they both argued,

involved the breakdown or major changes in both structural and cultural
aspects of societies and adoption of values and attitudes considered
progressive.
Proponents of this perspective see industrialized, capitalist
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and democratic countries of Western Europe and North America as models
of this development.

They see underdevelopment as the result of cul

tural and social characteristics in those societies which prevent them
from adopting values, attitudes, and behavior necessary for change.
Change has to be a highly desired and pursued phenomenon.
Those who propose modernization theory recognize it as poten
tially being very problematic as it challenges all major social char
acteristics which hold the society together and as responsible for
stability.

However, they contend that for development to occur those

problems must be overcome, not avoided.

Theories of Crime

Introduction

The field of criminology is replete with theories which attempt
to explain the phenomenon of criminality.

The theories can be clas

sified into different categories based on their main focus as they
try to explain criminality.

There are theories which focus on the

characteristics of offenders.

These theories emphasize what person

ality characteristics might contribute to tendencies and actual crim
inal behavior.

Some of these theories have emphasized physical and

biological abnormality as the distinguishing mark of the criminal
(Void & Bernard, 1986, p. 47).

These theories contend that biologi

cal inferiority may produce in criminals certain physical charac
teristics.

Personality theories also consider mental deficiency as

possible cause of criminal behavior.
Other theories see crime as learned behavior, similar to other
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forms of behavior.

They are, therefore, interested in the processes

by which these behaviors are learned.

Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904)

claimed that people imitate one another if they have close contact
with one another (Void & Bernard, 1986, p. 208).

Edwin Sutherland

(1883-1950 in Void & Bernard, 1986) extended Tarde's ideas, arguing
that criminal behavior is learned, if one interacted closely, over an
extended period, with people they look up to who consider those
behaviors as acceptable.

The above theoretical orientations are help

ful in explaining specific criminal behaviors and for doing misociological analysis.

They are, however, not effective or adequately

applicable for macro-sociological analysis or for cross-national
comparisons.
Other criminological theories are more suitable for macrosociological analyses and for cross-national comparisons.

Some of

these (ecological theory, conflict and Marxist perspectives, struct
ural strain, control and modernization theory of crime) are discussed
as they provide theoretical basis for generality necessary in com
parative and macro-level analysis.

Particular attention is paid to

the modernization theory as it is the theory upon which this study is
based.

Ecological Theories of Crime

Many criminologists have tried to look to the environment of
criminal activity to explain the phenomenon of crime.

The attempt

to link crime to specific ecological factors is credited to the works
of Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay (1979) who, in Social Factors in
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Juvenile Delinquency and Juvenile Delinquency In Urban Areas
constructed a series of spot maps of Chicago, pinpointing the resi
dences of juveniles involved in various criminal activities (Void &
Bernard, 1986, p. 165).

Shaw and McKay used these maps to conclude

that there are specific areas, often located within industrial zones,
with high crime rates.

The highest rates of delinquency were found

in the areas with lowest economic status.

Areas of high delinquency

were areas occupied by lower socio-economic class, foreign born,
recent immigrants and Black families.

Their argument was that the

socio-economic status and specific areas in urban centers were re
lated to criminality.

Since these studies, many other studies have

been done to explore the inner city phenomenon and its relationship
to crime and delinquency, especially since change in ethnic and indi
vidual or cohort compositions of these areas does not change signi
ficantly the rate and character of crime in them.
Urban and poor neighborhoods consist of some characteristics
seen as conductive to criminal behavior.

These include high density,

(ensuring anonymity) poverty (often in the presence of much wealth
since most of these areas are adjacent to industrial and business
zones), transience (or lack of stable family and social relation
ships) , dilapidation (deteriorating buildings and infrastructures).
All of these lead to moral cynicism, diminished social control, de
creased motivation to conform to values of the dominant society and
generally increased opportunities for crime and deviance (Bursik,
1988; Sampson, 1989; Stark, 1987).

The economic and social condi

tions in specific neighborhoods are seen as being conductive to
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criminal behaviors or nonconforming tendencies.
In recent years, Peter M. Blau has done many studies on the re
lationship between urban structures and criminal behavior.

According

to Blau (1977) heterogeneity increases the probability of fortuitous
contacts between members of different groups promoting high rates of
inter-group association and less crime.

In typical American cities,

however, there are social inequalities due to race, economic and
social status which depress the rates of intergroup association lead
ing to hostilities of personal and economic crime.
The emergence of geographical zones tied to ethnic and socio
economic groups lead to social disintegration and the development
of subcultures, many of them unadaptive to standard social norms.
Structural conditions which hinder the development of integrated role
patterns may lead to increased delinquency and crime (Friday & Hage,
1976).

This may be responsible for high rates of delinquency in var

ious social groups such as juveniles who need role models and minority
and immigrant groups who also need to be integrated into the society.
A dominant theme in ecological theory is the concept of social
disorganization.

This refers to the inability of local communities

to realize common values of their members or to solve their problems
enabling them to integrate into the mainstream (Bursik, 1988, p. 519).
Social disorganization results from lack of investment in members
which is characteristic of people living in poverty and very diffi
cult social and economic conditions.
Environmental factors have been linked to criminal behavior by
many criminologists of modern times.

In proposing the routine activity
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approach, Cohen and Felson (1979) argued that criminal behavior re
sults from structural changes in routine activity patterns in a
society which effect the convergence of in time and space suitable
targets, motivated offenders and the absence of capable guardians.
Scholars who have linked urbanization to crime all emphasize struc
tural and social conduciveness determined by anonymity, availability
of goods that can be stolen, easy access and departure from crime
scenes and absence of or insufficient law enforcement and informal
social controls (Fisher, 1987; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Shelley, 1981;
Stark, 1987).

Criminal acts are seen as likely to occur if environ

ments are conducive to their occurrence.

The major argument of the

ecological approach is that most human beings are capable of commit
ting crimes.

If exposed to environments which provides the opportun

ity for crime with perceived likelihood of avoiding detection, most
people would commit crimes.

Summary

Ecological theorists of crime emphasize the importance of
environment in criminal activity.

The theory is linked to the work

of Henry McKay, Clifford Shaw and other criminologists who observed
in Chicago and other American cities that some districts continue
to remain high crime areas over decades despite the fact that
demographic characteristics change.

Racial groupings may change,

delinquency cohorts may outgrow delinquent acts and leave, social
and economic mobility may move residents to new areas, who may (and
often do) change their lifestyles.

The new residents, who may have
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no social, ethnic or cultural links to the previous ones, may be as
delinquent as the former residents.

These observations have led to

the contention of ecological theorists that it is environments and
their socio-economic characteristics and structural factors which
are responsible for criminal behavior and high or low rates of
crime.
Ecological theory is appropriate for comparative analyses both
within and between or among nations.

If it is structural factors

rather than specific cultural, ethnic or demographic factors which
cause crime, one would expect that all societies with similar envi
ronmental. characteristics will have similar patterns of crime.

The

approach enables comparison and generalization.
Ecological theory is also important because of its implication
for social policy.

If it is environment rather than general social

processes or individuals that are

responsible for crime, then crim

inal justice policies would be directed towards environmental factors.
This would be particularly relevant in comparative studies and bene
fit those who would understand and make policies in different socie
ties .
The major shortcoming of ecological theory is that it ignores
the processes by which delinquency or criminal areas are created (Void
& Bernard, 1986, p. 183).

Ecological approach has continued to be a

potent theory in criminology.

It is very helpful in understanding

the impact of specific social structures and other factors on social
behavior enabling us a reasonable level of generality.
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Structural Strain Theory

Structural strain theories propose that certain pressures or
forces which are socially generated drive people to commit crimes
(Void & Bernard, 1986, p. 185).

The approach is structural because

it also proposes that these pressures or forces are not evenly dis
tributed in the society.

They tend to be highest among social groups

with higher crime rates.
Strain theories also have been linked to the work of Durkheim
who, in introducing anomie, suggested that the breakdown of tradi-.
tional norms (in mechanical societies) during the transition to or
ganic societies results in forms of social strain (Messner, 1982;
Void & Bernard, 1986).
Robert Merton (1967) extended the notion of anomie.

He proposed

the first strain theory by arguing that societies induce some social
appetites culturally while their social structures limited the abil
ity of certain groups to satisfy those appetites.

As an American in

multi-cultural and multi-racial society, Merton argued that in
societies that are so diverse it is easy for certain groups to be
disadvantaged in their ability to have access to certain desired
goals.

These difficulties, according to Merton, result in different

coping mechanisms or modeled of adaptation (see Table 4).
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Table 4

Merton's Typology of Modes of Individual Adaptation

Modes of Adaptation

Cultural Goals

Institutional Means

I - Conformity

+

+

II - Innovation

+

-

-

+

IV - Retreatism

-

-

V - Rebellion

+

+

III - Ritualism

*Key + signifies "acceptance", - signifies "rejection", and
+ signifies "rejection of prevailing values and substitution
of new values."

According to Merton (1967) every society has specific cultural
goals and institutionalized means of achieving them.

If a society

is stable and structurally equal and fail, most persons will choose
to conform to both goals and means since both are shaped by the dom
inant values of the society.

However, according to him, structural

imbalance and social unfairness leads to the other forms or modes of
adaptation which are considered deviant or even criminal.

Conformity,

according to Merton is the adaptation to standard goals and institu
tionalized means.

Innovation is adaptation to standard goals, but

failure to adapt to institutionalized means of achieving those goals.
This Merton assumed was due to structural conditions and might result
in differential socialization which does not include a mental commit
ment and appreciation of acceptable institutionalized means, but a
general appeal to attractive social goals.

Structural differentiation
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can also lead to discrimination which reduces availability of accept
able means to achieving social and cultural goals.

Innovation also

results because the institutionalized means are not the only means
of the achieving the goals even if they are the only ones acceptable.
In fact, other

unacceptable means can be as or even more affective,

efficient and attractive.

Insufficient commitment to or lack of

access to institutionalized means can lead to the tendency to resort
to other innovative means.
Ritualism, according to Merton (1967), was another deviant form
of adaptation by people who want to play it safe.

This involves

the rejecting possibility of ever achieving cultural goals, but re
taining institutionalized means as a form of allegiance to norms.
Feeling inadequate and structurally trapped, these people do not want
to rock the boat.

They accept their inferior position as safe.

They may not commit any crimes as they are committed to values of
conformity such as hard work and honesty.

Merton also identified a

fourth mode of adaptation, retreatism, which he defined as failing to
adapt to both cultural goals and institutional means.

Some of these

people simply surrender to their structural inferiorities and engage
in behaviors that perpetually exclude them from the mainstream and
what is considered normal life.

Psychotics, outcasts, transients,

addicts, vagrants, vagabonds and tramps are examples of people in
this category (Void & Bernard, 1986).

According to Merton this lack

of adaptation is necessarily due to a lack of commitment to the goals
or means, but rather the fact that structural conditions in the socie
ty makes the possibility of achieving success unreal to them.

They,
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too, have dreams and the desire to succeed.

These people tend to

engage in self-destructive behaviors.
The fifth mode of adaptation, according to Merton (1967) , is
rebellion.

Here the persons respond to their frustration by replacing

the values of the society to new ones.

These new goals and means may

be political for example, the goal might be the achievement of a
socialist state and the means a violent revolution.

To these people

the dominant values of their society may become acceptable as they
consider them bad or generally unfair.

Since values shape norms,

cultural goals and institutional means rejecting these values also
means rejecting the goals and means.

These people might engage in

acts which challenge existing order and rules and consider their
criminal acts as necessary actions to correct a bad existing order.
Though strain theories have been used to explain delinquent
characteristics in America and have focused on characteristics of of
fenders, their major emphasis is not on offenders.

The major assump

tion of strain theories is that structural conditions cause strain
which result in nonconforming behavior.

Albert Cohen (1955) saw delin

quency as occurring mostly among gangs, rather than individual kids,
who saw the acts as providing them with status among their delinquent
peers.

Structural conditions enable the development of subcultural

groups with a differential system of values, some of them delinquent.
According to Cohen, school and other forms of behaviors are generally
middle class values.

Social structures and processes which exclude

segments of the population from them force the differential values
and behaviors.
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Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin (1960) also linked social
structure to delinquency and crime by suggesting that social struc
tures determine opportunities.

The structure in the society according

to them, resulted in a feeling of general hostility towards those who
have made it.

When pressures towards delinquency arose among young

boys, they centered on reactions against the middle class values in
which they may also believe, but consider themselves unable to conform
to due to social structural pressures.
Structural strain theories have continued to be very popular in
the attempt to explain criminal behavior.

Data that continuously show

higher crime rates among ethnic minorities and lower socio-economic
classes continue to call attention to the significance of social and
economic inequalities in crime.

A look at structural variations in

society shows the existence of subcultural groups who differ by age,
race, ethnicity, socio-economic class and other factors.

The sub

cultural identity implies that there are value judgments or a social
value system which is a part from and part of the larger value systems
of the dominant society.

"The values of the subculture set it apart

and prevent a total integration and therefore result in discrimination
and often hostilities.

Such groups often engage intentionally or

unintentionally in behaviors considered criminal by the dominant
society" (Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1969, p. 75).

Many studies have

shown that economic and social inequalities which result from sub
cultural differentiation and discrimination results in increase in
criminal activity (Clinard & Abbott, 1973; Devine, et a l . 1988;
Liebow, 1967).

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

61

Conclusion

Structural strain theorists assume that people generally may want
to do good and conform to publicly accepted goals of the society and
to the means of achieving those goals.

Structural differentiation

results in the development of subcultural differentiation and differ
ential opportunity of access and adaptation resulting in social and
economic inequalities.

While the structure provides pressures to con

form in the majority of the population, the minority have the pres
sures to not conform.

Non-conformity results in engagement in de

viant and often criminal acts.
Social strain theories are very helpful in the attempt to ex
plain crime in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies, especially
when crime rates differ so much.

They emphasize a strong need for

social integration to control crime and to enhance social and eco
nomic development.

It assists in policies to improve the status of

disadvantaged groups in such societies.
Structural strain theories are very helpful in cross-national
studies.

Structural characteristics show similarities and differences

among societies.

The extent to which specific structural character

istics affect criminal and other social trends can help in understand
ing the effects of similar characteristics in other societies.

Some

scholars have insisted that comparatively lower levels of crime in
Scandinavian and other countries are a result of ethnic and cultural
homogeneity and higher levels of social and economic equalities (Adler,
1983; Clinard, 1978; Norstrom, 1988; Stack, 1982).

Other multi-ethnic

and multi-cultural societies which have succeeded in controlling crime
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and delinquency can contribute to enable societies similarly struc
tured who have major problems with suggestions on how to solve these
problems.

Control Theories

Control theories assume that the motivation to commit crime is
natural to all humans and that everyone would commit crimes if left
alone or given the opportunity.

Since the inclination to commit crime

is universally inherent in all people, the responsibility of the soc
iety is to restrain or control people.

Criminal acts occur when re

straining or controlling mechanisms fail.
Like most sociologists and criminologists, control theorists
also trace their reasoning to the work of Durkheim.

Durkheim (1966)

suggested that anomie, the breakdown of traditional informal control
mechanism inherent in traditional mechanical societies which occurs
during the transition to modern organic societies was conducive to
deviance.
Jackson Toby (1957) suggested that the strong tendency towards
deviance and crime are only controlled if individuals perceived
themselves as having a stake in conformity.

People were better

controlled, according to Toby, if they were made to see what they
would gain by conforming to specific social expectations.

If not con

vinced that they would benefit from conformity and compliance, they
were more likely to commit crimes.
Walter C. Reckless (1961) proposed the theory of containment.
He argued, as did Toby, that there were always strong tendencies
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towards deviance (and criminality).

These tendencies, which he refer

red to as social pulls, draw individuals away from accepted norms of
living and of behavior.

These social pulls include bad friends, a

criminal subculture, deviant groups, mass media and other evil or bad
social forces.

Besides these social pulls are biological or psycho

logical pushes from within the individual that drive him or her to
wards crime.

These psychological pushes include restlessness, dis

content, anger, hostility, aggressiveness, and need for immediate
gratification.

These social pulls and psychological pushes makes

the tendency to commit crimes very intense.

Aligned against these

forces are interna], and external control forces Reckless (1961) refer
red to as containment forces, both internal and external.

External

containment includes factors such as family life, support group, dis
cipline, institutional reinforcement and other social pressures to
conform.

Inner containment includes factors within the individual which

enables them to resist the urge to commit criminal acts.

These include

self-control, conscience, ego, strength, superego, tolerance, and
patience.
Modern control theories are linked to the work of David Matza
(1964) and Travis Hirschi (1969).

Matza (1964) maintains that "de

linquency neutralizes conventional moral values, makes them unable
to control people, so that they can commit crimes and excuse them
selves" (cited in Void & Bernard, 1986, p. 240).
proponent of control theory is Travis Hirschi.

The most outspoken
According to Hirschi

(1969) humans have the motivation to commit criminal acts and will do so
under suitable circumstances.

Since this tendency is so strong and
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natural, it can only be controlled through strong and effective
institutional controls (Hirschi, 1969; Void & Bernard, 1986).

Hirschi

proposes that four elements are important in controlling the behavior of
individuals in order to prevent them from giving in to the urge of dev
iance.

The elements of bond are attachment, commitment, involvement

and beliefs.

Individuals who are strongly attached to the society's

significant social institutions and to other conforming members of
the society are less likely to be involved in criminal behavior.

Com

mitment to conventional lines of action, involvement or engrossment in
conventional activities and the belief in ■‘-he society's values or con
ventions result in conforming behavior and therefore reduces chances
of engaging in criminal activity.
Hirschi (1969) argues that these elements function as informal
forms of control.

Individuals who are not committed to social groups

such as families, groups, peers, school or other social institutions,
or attached to others in order of experience, affection, a sense of
closeness or positively involved in conventional activities and who
does not share the society's beliefs about values and attitudes is
more likely to violate them.

Control theories attribute criminal be

havior to our innately aggressive, selfish and violent criminal heri
tage (Void & Bernard, 1986, p. 247).

Conclusion

The major assumptions of control theory is that human being have
strong tendencies to engage in criminal behavior.
need for control.

This creates a

This control is achieved by different mechanisms
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which ensure conformity.

According to Hirschi (1969) there are four

elements of conformity or bonding.

He identifies these as attachment

to others, commitment to conventional lines of actions, involvement
in regular and approved social processes, and sincere belief in the
society, its values and norms.

Social institutions are seen as ex

isting to enhance these four elements.

Criminal activity is the re

sult of an individual's failure in any of these areas.

High, crime

rates in any society are a result of social institutions whose respon
sibility is to enhance them among members of the society.

Control

theorists are interested in the process of socialization through in
dividuals development in these areas.
Since control theories emphasize social integration as the es
sence of conformity and obedience to laws, it is also useful in com
parative analyses.

Factors which contribute to the success or failure

of social integration among societies can be assumed to be responsible
for different rates of crime among them.

Clinard (1978) observed that

societies with low crime rates are highly integrated societies.

From

Adler (1983) in her study of nations not obsessed with crime, found
that countries with little crime have the following characteristics:
Ethnic homogeneity (cultural conformity), cultural commitment to tra
ditional institutions such as family and religion, a scrong evidence of
religiosity or encompassing belief system, emphasis or moral and in
tellectual education and strong social commitment and involvement in
ensuring conformity.

Samuel Souryal (1988) also found that there is

low crime rate among Muslim and Orthodox Jewish communities which are
established on the basis of divine law and general social commitment
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to neighborliness and social decency.

A look at factors which influ

ence commitment in some societies to law abiding but not in others
may be very helpful in comparative analysis.

Conflict and Marxist Theories of Crime

Conflict Theory of Crime

The conflict perspective is traced to Karl Marx (1818-1883) who
argued that "the organized state in capitalist societies represents
the economic interests of the people who own the means of production"
(Void & Bernard, 1986, p. 269).

Marx' view that the history of all

societies is the history of the struggle between two social classes;
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is not shared by all scholars who
subscribe to the view that conflict is an essential characteristic of
societies.

These people see sources of conflict in other factors such

as different and often conflicted social and cultural values and in
terests .
Thorsten Sellin (in Void & Bernard, 1986) presented a theory of
crime based on the conflicts between different cultural groups in
society.

He argued that "different cultures have different conduct

norms, that is, rules that require certain types of people to act in
specific ways in certain circumstances" (p. 270).

According to Sellin

these social and cultural expectations or norms are enacted into laws in
simple homogeneous societies.

As these

more complex, the expectations among

societies develop and become
different groups, that are also

different, overlap when such people interact.

This results in "primary

cultural conflicts" (Void & Bernard, 1986, p. 270).
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Selling saw this kind of conflict as occurring where there are
high rates of immigration and large populations of people move into
another area or society whose prevailing values are considerably
different.

These conflicts can also occur at border areas between

two or more divergent cultures; or, in the case of colonization, when
the laws of one culture are extended into the territories of another.
Acts which were not criminal in such instances among large segments
of the population suddenly become crimes.
Conflicts can also develop in societies that do not have sudden
population change as described above.

Sellin refers to this as

"secondary cultural conflict" (Void & Bernard, 1986, p. 270).

This

results when subcultures evolve in the society, each having its own
conduct norms.

Laws used in these societies may reflect a value

system which is alien to the people who live in it.
Void and Bernard (1986) presented a conflict theory based on
"conflict of interests" (p. 270) .

According to Void, groups are formed

out of situations in which members have common interests and common
needs that can best be served through collective action.

New groups

continue to be formed as new interests arise and existing groups weaken
and may even disappear when they no longer have a purpose to serve
(p. 271).
Since groups exist for particular purposes when they fail to
serve any purpose, they disappear.

Groups that endure are effective

units through the direction and coordination of the activities of its
members.

Participation becomes so important that self-identification

with and loyalty to groups become psychological realities.

Groups
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come into conflict when their interests and purposes overlap, en
croaching on one another and becoming competitive.
conflict which intensifies loyalty.

This results in

To sustain this loyalty laws are

passed against behaviors which threaten the integrity of the group.
According to Void, "The whole process of lawmaking, lawbreaking and
law enforcement directly reflects deep seated and fundamental con
flicts between group interests and the more general struggles among
groups for control of the police power of the state" (Void & Bernard,
1986, p. 274).
Void argued that a great deal of criminal behavior is carried out
by groups rather than individuals and represents a collective resist
ance by those at odds with those in power.

Other forms of criminal

behaviors result from conflict among those groups struggling over con
trol of power in the political organization of the state.

The ulti

mate form of political struggle is rebellion and revolution.

If per

petrators lose they are considered guilty of treason, if they succeed
they make criminals out of government officials previously in power.
Many other criminologists consider themselves conflict theorists
by their emphasis on intergroups, value, subcultural and social dif
ferences which contribute to the labeling of particularly behaviors
as criminal or for engaging in non-conforming behavior (which is con
sidered criminal) to protest a prevailing social system.

Richard

Quinney (1970) argues that "The reality of crime is constructed by
those in power to carry out actions which best promote their inter
ests" (Void & Bernard, 1986, p. 180).

Austin Turk (1969) argued that

social order is based on a consensus-coercion balance maintained by
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the authorities.

The process of criminalization enables authority

figures to coerce dissenting members in order to maintain social sta
bility.

Conclusion

Conflict theories argue that behaviors of relatively powerless
people are more likely to be considered criminal.

Powerlessness is

also seen as a possible key structural characteristic associated with
the development of patterns of behavior that are likely to be con
sidered criminal.

Conflict theories also suggest that powerlessness

and crime seem to be positively related.

This means that behaviors

associated with those in power tend to be legitimated and those of the
less powerful to be made or declared illegal.
Though most conflict theories have their roots in the assertion
that social, inequalities result in criminalization of certain beha
viors many modern conflict theorists do not share Marxists' views
that the source of this inequality is in economics.

Conflict theor

ies do well in describing social dynamics causing actual criminal and
labeling of behaviors as crime.

This makes them generally broad and

abstract enough for comparative and cross-national studies.
The vast difference among conflict theorists on the concept of
crime, some suggest that criminal acts are actually acts that
purposefully contradict those in power and some as the designation of
criminality as actions of those in power in order to exercise control,
makes the conflict perspective itself subject to criticism.
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Marxist Criminology

There is much disagreement among criminologists and sociologists
as to whether there is or should be a Marxist criminology.

This is

because Marx did not research or develop a specific theory of crime.
Proponents of Marxist criminology argue that it is a specific form of
conflict theory.

They claim that "crime is an ideological and poli

tical category of behavior generated by state practices" (O'Malley,
1988, p. 70).
The theory is based on general Marxist theory which emphasizes
the significance of the conflict between material forces of production and the social relations of production.

Marx saw a polariza

tion of capitalist societies into two social classes.

The bourge

oisie who controlled the means of production and therefore economic
resources and processes.

They used these to establish further con

trol over the proletariat, who through alienation, have no control
over even what they produced.

The bourgeoisie also control political

and other social processes and social institutions.

The polarization

results in conflicting groups, the exploiters and the exploited.
Marxist criminologists focus on the distribution of power, economic
processes and the capitalist processes to explain crime.

Capitalism

is seen as being criminogenic because "the capitalist economic system
encourages people to be greedy and selfish and to pursue their own
benefits without regard for the welfare of their fellows" (Void &
Bernard, 1986, p. 303).

A similar view is expressed by many scholars

who see capitalist development as encouraging behaviors and attitudes
conducive to criminal behavior (Odekunle, 1978; O'Malley, 1988).
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class conflict involves unequal distribution of power in which the
legal authorities criminalize the greed of the lower classes while
encouraging that of the rich and powerful resulting in the concentra
tion of crime in the lower classes.
Marxist criminologists also focus on the structure and behavior
of criminal law, especially in capitalist societies.

The state is seen

as the tool of the ruling class which is used to control the behavior
of the lower classes, therefore protecting the power and economic in
terests of the ruling class.

The state passes laws which protect what

is considered right and desirable.

Usually what is considered right

and desirable depends on the interests and values of the elite.

Laws,

which are instruments of the state for regulating behavior, are
actually passed to regulate those behaviors which threaten the life
styles, values and interests (political, social or economic) of the
elite (the ruling class).

Marx had argued that true state would

uphold the rights of all citizens but the laws, as he saw them,
defended only the rights of land owners (Void & Bernard, 1986,
p. 312).
Pat O'Malley (1988) recognized the fact that Marxist theory has
generated various theoretical positions.

Even among Marxist crimi

nologists there is a wide variety based on different points of in
terest.

There are existential Marxists, economic Marxists, neo-

positualist Marxists, structuralist Marxists, phenomenological
Marxists and many other orientations that use the Marxist designa
tion to attempt to explain criminal behavior.

According to O'Malley

there are central concepts in what is considered as Marxist
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criminology.
First, there are theories which focus on the concepts of class,
the cellular relations of capitalist exploitation, the labor theory
of value, the state and political ideology.

These concepts are ap

plied in the attempt to explain the operations and functioning of the
state, political, economic and other social institutions and of
various social phenomena (such as crime), and how the public reacts
to them.
Another central theme in Marxist criminology is the development
of a dialectical analysis in order to explain contradictions which
are seen as inherent in the political economy and how these are link
ed to the incidence and distribution of criminality (O'Malley, 1988,
p. 73).

The implication of this theme is that Marxist criminology is

not simply a focus on the social structures and their interrelational
dynamics to explain crime.

It is also an intellectual and philoso

phical theory which utilizes a specific form of methodology (the dia
lectical approach) to explain the phenomena of crime (as well as other
social phenomena).
The purpose of a dialectical approach is to thoroughly explore
opposing views of a phenomenon by analyzing concepts and how the
opposing views of the concepts are applied in order to evolve a theses
which is encompassing.

The concept of crime, for example, means a

different thing to different people.

The definition of crime generated

by bourgeois legal intellectuals is not universally acceptable to some
intellectuals without the bourgeois orientation.

To effectively apply

the concept an intellectual synthesis is necessary.

The concept of
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crime itself is seen as an "open-ended construct with ambiguous
boundaries" (O'Malley, 1988, p. 75).

A conceptual of criminality

associated the nation of social disconformity is not the same with
one that sees crime as acts forbidden by authorities which may in fact
be normal and engaged in by the majority of the citizens such as driv
ing above the speed limit.

While the first is concerned with the

function or operations of specific concepts in society, the second
focuses on the philosophical and theoretical validity and applicability
of those concepts.
Marxist criminology can be seen as a theoretical perspective
which provides a fruitful theoretical insight (as it focuses on ap
plicability and operations of specific concepts) and research direct
ives (as it is also concerned with the synthesis of the concepts used)
by theorizing in its own terms "these processes (both parentheses are
mine)" (O'Malley, 1988, p. 82).
Marxist criminologists in focusing on social processes emphasize
two views of crime.

One is that crime is real and reflects the rebel

lion of those exploited.

The second is that crime may not be real,

but rather a product of bourgeois laws which are used to intimidate
and control the oppressed.

The first (the view of crime as rebellion

against conditions of exploitation and oppression) is now widely
rejected by Marxists (Void & Bernard, 1986, p. 305) due to the fact
that changing societies and controlling exploitation and oppression
through Marxism has not eradicated crime.

They now look for more com

plex explanations of crime within the Marxist theory of history and
social change.

Greenberg (1981) sees crime as a result of social
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and economic conditions under capitalism.

Class is defined in terms

of the relationship to the means of production.
is taken by other Marxist criminologists.

A similar position

Quinney (1970) for example,

describes street crime as crimes of accommodation to capitalist-social
relations.

He sees street crime as actions of people who have been

brutalized by the conditions under capitalism.

Conclusions

A review of Marxist criminology suggests a theoretical orienta
tion whose proponents differ on as many themes as they agree upon.
It is, therefore, very difficult to state conclusively what Marxist
criminology is.

Vigh (1985) identified five most important character

istics of Marxist criminology as:
1.

That universal regularities of causability and determinism are

present in criminal human behavior.
2.

That crime is a social phenomenon. Social conditions prevailing

in the country, and the different forms of social injustice within them,
that play the most important role in the existence and changes in crime.
3.

That prevention of crime on a social scale, the reduction or

possible elimination of the reasons for crime and the conditions of
crime are the most effective means of combatting crime.
4.

That it is necessary to consistently enforce the determinist

concept in the administration of penal justice, and
5.

That Marxist criminology must be guided by the endeavor to

enforce its views in both criminal and social policies.
Crime is seen as a product of total social processes and result
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from social failings of the system.

Marxist criminologists argue,

therefore, that crime cannot be adequately controlled simply by
addressing crimes and criminals through laws and punishment.

Since

crime results from social injustices and economic inequalities, crime
can only be controlled by correcting these injustices and inequali
ties.

This must be done nationally, by policies teaching and enforcing

fair and equal standards of social life.
Variations in themes of Marxist criminologists and similarities
between their points of interest (especially those dealing with social
conditions) makes some scholars question the singular label of Marxist
criminology.

In socialist countries where Marxist criminology is

practiced there seems to be a contradiction in the theory of crime
causation and of the reaction to crime.

Friday (1988) takes issues

with the fact that though socialist countries practice Marxist
criminology, which explains crime as socially determined, the re
actions to crimes are focused on the individual rather than on
the society.

This is particularly important to Marxist criminology

which has consistently argued that since the capitalist system causes
crime, crime can only be controlled by changing or reforming the cap
italist system.

The fact that socialist societies, which are not cap

italistic, also have crime, suggests that the assumption that crime is
the product of capitalist social and economic characteristics may not
be correct.

This does not meair that Marxist criminology is completely

useless; its emphasis on social and economic determinism provides a
useful basis for understanding behavior.

Friday sees the major bene

fit of Marxist criminology in its emphasis on thinking comprehensively
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and contextually.

This means "placing crime and criminality within

the wider historical and societal context, for it is this historical
and societal context which gives the concepts cause, effect and deter
minism special meaning" (Friday, 1988, p. 138).

This is particularly

helpful in comparative analysis which deals with total societies.

Modernization Theory of Crime

Modernization theory of crime is also traced to the writings of
Emile Durkheim.

Durkheim (1966) suggested that man social maladies

such as crime resulted from a breakdown in social norms and rules as
sociated with industrial revolution.
anomie.

He referred to the breakdown as

Durkheim saw development as a process of transition from one

form of society (mechanical society) to another, a modern one (organic
society).

Traditional societies had unique characteristics.

Members

of each society were tied together by what he referred to as mechan
ical solidarity, which emphasized conformity to traditional norms and
values.

This collectivity included both a general cultural and value

identity he referred to as conscience collective.

This collective

conscience (or conscience collective) was conforming and functioned
to solidify the community.

Crimes occurred in these societies because

every society has the tendency to express its collective morality by
designating particular behaviors as criminal.
flects moral standards and not social concern.
in these societies.

The designation re
He saw crime as normal

As societies evolved to modern organic type there

is seen to be a breakdown of the conscience collective.

The society

becomes individualistic with increased tolerance or even encouragement
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of change.

Crime no longer reflects a moral expression of society,

but assumes pathological characteristics (Durkheim, 1966).

It

represents a rebellion against society and a manifestation of path
ological traits in individuals in the society and communities or
groups.
The basic assumption of modernization theory of crime is "that
there is one unusual unilinear pattern of development which all na
tions go through, consequently there is a single pattern of crime as
sociated with modernization as exemplified by the history of advanced
western nations" (Horton & Platt, 1986, p. 118).

With its roots in

Durkhemian view of social evolution from mechanical (or traditional)
to organic (or modern) societies modernization theories see this
process as being desirable, beneficial, and in fact inevitable.
is achieved at a price.

It

The price includes social and structural

change in societies requiring adjustment to such changes and social
problems associated with the changes.

Modernization theorists see

the process and experience of development as related to crime because
of structural and behavior (and attitude and believes) changes asso
ciated with it.

Structural Influences of Modernization

One of the major influences of modernization on society is seen
in the structural changes it creates or in the influence it has on
them.

In linking modernization to crime, Shelley (1981) emphasizes

two major areas in which the modernizing influence on the society is
felt most:

The industry and population aggregation or urbanization.
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The role of industry on rates and trends in criminal activity is
unquestionable, especially in the attempt to link the two.

One of

the major effects on industries on the society is to change routine
activity structure.

The productivity of surplus goods, the high

mobility, intensified desire (generally socially approved) to accu
mulate or acquire wealth or properties generally easily accessible,
the emphasis on creativity, liberty and individuality (which makes it
difficult for enforcement agencies) result in what Lawrence Cohen and
Marcus Felson refer to as the convergence of three factors necessary
for crime to occur.

These include motivated potential offenders,

suitable targets and the absence of capable guardians (Cohen & Felson,
1979, p. 289).

Industrial societies, according to Cohen and Felson

provide both incentives and opportunities for criminal activity.
Industrialization, especially capitalist industrialization, re
sults in surplus production and encourages increased consumption.
Stack (1982, p. 57) found that "the greater the consumer expenditures
the greater the major larceny or theft rate."

The view that increased

productivity and availability of goods and services actually leads to
crime is demonstrated by many studies (Clinard & Abbott, 1973; Sesay,
1977; Shelley, 1981).
Industrialization is said to be criminogenic not only because it
provides goods that can be stolen, social anonymity conducive to can
descence behavior and a competitive individuality, but particularly
because it provides unequal opportunities for social and economic
benefits.

Odelcunle (1978) asserts that "it fosters unemployment,

marginal and meaningless employment, and obvious, relative and
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unaccepted poverty" (p. 88).

This is because "it attracts far too

many people than it can absorb" (Fisher, 1987, p. 25).

The society

ends up being affluent with many rich or wealth people who can offer
most luxuries available of products and an over-increasing number of
people who can neither afford the same luxuries or even the conven
ience decent regular provisions.
Modernization and industrialization are expected to reduce
social inequalities and to promote greater levels of economic equal
ities (Messner, 1986, p. 39).

In real life, however, modern indus

trial development has not made people more equal.

The industrial

structure of modern capitalist societies is one that rewards dispro
portionately people considered more important to industries at the
expense of those concerned less important.

To maximize profits from

investments fewer people are employed and overworked in jobs where
more people could have been hired.

This makes unemployment and poverty

rates high despite general affluence in the society.
deprived become potentially criminal.

The relatively

Unequal access to affluence can

result in reactionary subcultures and intensify criminal tendencies.

Urbanization as a Criminal Factor

The urban environment has been a bastian of criminality for cen
turies.
pand.

With modernization more new cities emerge and older ones ex
The process of transition from rural to urban society has great

social, economic and cultural impact on the society.

It produces

similar crime patterns in countries with very different cultural, eco
nomic and political histories (Shelley, 1981, p. 35).
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Cities and urban areas in general tend to create social condi
tions very different'from rural areas.

The breakdown of traditional

values and rural lifestyles which result in changing characteristics
of life and social values can breed criminal subcultures (Sesay,
1977).

Urban centers contain characteristics which are specifically

criminogenic.

Some of these are:

High population density which

creates social anonymity; poverty which (especially in the presence
of relative affluence creates frustration, anger and jealousy; tran
sience or high mobility which destroys a sense of belonging and dilap
idation which produces social disgust, lack of price.

All these, ac

cording to Stack (1982), result in moral cynicism among citizens or
residents, increased opportunities for crime, increased motivation
to deviate and diminished social control, all of which result in gen
eral increases in crime.

These factors are considered criminogenic

enough that they make the proceeds of urbanization itself a predictor
of crime rates and trends (Fisher, 1987; Schnaiberg, 1971; Shelley,
1981).
Cities, like industries, provide opportunities for crime.

If

industries contribute to crime by making available things that can be
stolen, tempting by exposure to those products, hiring and not hiring
people, paying those hired different amounts, therefore establishing
a class system of those who have and those who do not have cities do
the same.
ple.

Cities contain all classes, groups, and categories of peo

They contain goods that can be desired, by providing anonymity

and rapid transit and a sense of apathy among city dwellers crime be
comes not only easy but very tempting.
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Modernization theorists see crime as resulting not only from
industrialization and urbanization but from the process of moderniza
tion itself and from the experience of trying to cope.

To modernize

the society must tolerate or encourage deviation or law violation
(crime).

Modernization depends on the originality of idealists.

In

order that this originality, which transcends popular thoughts, be
expressed, it is necessary that the originality of the criminal who
is below the level of his time also be expressed (Durkheim, 1966, p.
71).

In fact, Durkheim (1966) argued that crime actually plays a

useful role in progressive social evolution (or modernization).

Crime

implies that "the way remains open for necessary changes" (p. 71).
"Where crime exists," Durkheim continued, "collective sentiments are
sufficiently flexible to take on a new form and crime may help to de
termine what form they will take" (p. 71).

Many great thinkers who

contributed to major social, economic, and political development of
their time were considered, and prosecuted, as criminals.
Modernization theorists of crime recognize real existence and
increase in crime as a reflection of problems in attempt to cope with
inevitable social changes associated with modernization.

In many

countries, especially those based on capitalist form of development,
modernization is seen as the presence of high technology and service
institutions and infrastructure.

To boast the process of development

and modernization countries go in debt to "modernize" roads, provide
schools, hospitals, telephone, electricity television and public
amenities and institutions.

Often these are done not so much to meet

specific needs of nations, but rather to convey the cherished Western

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

82

notion of modernization.

Just like the governments bury borrowed

monies in such ill afforded projects (commonly referred to as "White
Elephants") their citizens, especially the elite, also engage in in
dividualized "ivory tower" or "white elephant" building.

Assuming a

borrowed western style of living they develop a taste for western
goods and lifestyles.

To live these lifestyles they borrow beyond

their means, embezzle, steal, and engage in several forms of crime
and corruption to raise money.
Western scholars have a tendency to measure development in terms
of freedoms and consumption.

Emphasis on personal rights and free

doms, self-indulgence, conspicuous consumption (the consumption of
energy and other natural and industrial resources) are seen as land
marks of economic development for nations and as signs of affluence
for individuals.

Even in the so-called developed countries much of

this is borrowed or financed with debts encouraging the thinking that
it is acceptable to own many things we might not be able to afford.
In Nigeria, as in many developing countries, some embezzlers, thieves
and robbers see their crimes as their way of getting their piece of
the National pie.
In their attempt to develop a universal theory of crime, propo
nents of modernization theory of crime perceive of a world that must
inevitably experience similar patterns of development and its crimin
ological consequences.

The criminological consequences of 20th cen

tury developing countries (Third World) in many ways parallel the
experience of 19th Century developing countries (the First World)
(Clinard & Abbott, 1973; Horton & Platt, 1986; Shelley, 1981).
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relationship, these theorists insist, is demonstrated in coun
tries very different in their social, economic and political char
acteristics, including countries developing under socialist ideology
(Horton & Platt, 1986).

Summary

The ideological basis of modernization theory is ideologically
procapitalist and imperialist, according to some critics (Horton &
Platt, 1986, p. 119), because it sees the rest of the world as
inevitably developing on a similar pattern as the Western capitalist
and democratic societies.
The implication and assertion of modernization perspective are
that development best occurs under democracy and capitalism.

Democra

tic principles encourage freedom to be innovative and progressive.
Durkheim saw the changes as resulting from the transition from tra
ditional (mechanical) societies to modern (organic) ones.

Capitalism

as a social, economic and political philosophy encourages individual
ism and productivity.

These together change the society and create

criminogenic contexts and individuals.

For these reasons moderniza

tion in all societies is associated with general increases in crime.
Critics of modernization theory of crime do not subscribe to
the notion that development is always related to crime.

In fact,

some have observed that the process of development or modernization
has occurred in some societies with decrease or no change in rates of
crime.

The major criticism of modernization theory of crime is that

the theory "has not been able to explain variations in world wide
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crime rates" (Horton & Platt, 1986, p. 121).
Even in the capitalist Western industrialized and other develop
ing countries modernization and its characteristic urban growth have
not necessarily increased criminality.

According to John Rogers

(1986) despite rapid and sustained modernization, English homicide
rates have declined steadily since the 13th Century.

Between 1850

and 1941, during the earlier years of industrial revolution, when
the population of Britain doubled, urban population tripled, national
income more than tripled and the country was rapidly developing, ser
ious crime, including both theft and violence fell by one third.

Even

in America, homicide rates declined in many cities during the 19th
Century, though this was the period of rapid industrial development,
growth and extensive migrations (characteristics of modernization often
blamed on rapid increases in crime.
No country has modernized faster during this century than Japan.
Yet, despite its rapid industrialization and the modernization, rates
of various crimes have declined or remained the same (Adler, 1983;
Clifford 1978) .

Other Western countries like Switzerland, Ireland,

Sweden have sustained increasing development while at the same time
keeping rates of crime low (Adler, 1983; Clifford, 1978; Clinard,
1978; Norstrom, 1988).

The same inconsistency exists in the Third

World, today's developing countries.

"Analysis of crime patterns in

Sri Lanka do not support the claim of a general relationship between
crime and the various socio-economic changes implicit in the concept
of modernization" (Rogers, 1986, p. 322).

Other developing countries

have also demonstrated ability to continue to develop with little
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increases in crime.

Countries such as Bulgaria, German Democratic

Republic, Peru, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Costa Rica are good examples.
According to Clifford (1978) and Adler (1983) we can only maintain that
every society is condemned to follow a similar pattern of development
and experience with crime if we ignore what is happening in these
countries.
There is still adequate evidence to support the major assertions
of modernization theory of crime, especially if one looks at the pat
tern of development and trends in criminality in industrialized
Western countries, the United States of America and in some Third
World countries such as Nigeria.

There is also sufficient evidence

that the relationship between development and crime is not consistent,
especially when one looks at other highly industrialized countries
such as Japan, Sweden and Switzerland and some Third World countries,
such as Costa Rica, Saudi Arabia and Peru where the rates of crime
have remained low despite the relatively high rate of social and
economic development.

Clifford (1983) suggests that it

is necessary

to know as much about the areas of the world that are untroubled by
crime, as well as those that are, to explain crime.

Clifford (1978)

argued that specific cultural characteristics such as religion, legal
institutions and other geopolitical and historical characteristics are
related to trends in criminality.

In her study of nations not obsessed

with crime, Adler (1983) found that these countries share specific
characteristics, such as emphasis on the preservation of valid tradi
tions despite modernization, evolution of judicial systems capable of
accommodating traditional and modern social characteristics, group
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orientation, strong family systems with emphasis on norms and social
cohesion and an emphasis on religious or religious like values and
commitment, which might explain the comparatively lower rates of crime
in these countries.
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CHAPTER III

THE WORLD COMMUNITY

The goal of social science theory is to explain a given phenom
enon (such as crime) as accurately as possible, as it relates to
every social system (Przeworski & Teune, 1970, p. 20).

This means

that for a phenomenon with a universal significance such as crime,
theories which attempt to explain it must have explicit universal
applicability.

This causes a problem, since, though crime itself

is a universal phenomenon, behaviors which are defined as criminal
differ from one society to another.

Even crimes by the same name

may not necessarily refer to the same act.

Yet for theories to have

universal applicability, they must assume an extent of universality.
A true universal theory of crime must acknowledge the true nature
of crime.

Crime is a concept that does not apply to any particular

acts indiscriminately.

Though the concept may refer to certain acts

it may only be applied to the acts if the society chooses to do so.
The crime of murder refers to the act of wilfully taking a human life.
It's occurrence however does not automatically result in the con
viction of offender for the crime even if the perpetrator is known.
States allow the behavior during wars, it is used by the state as
punishment for specified serious crimes, it is allowed as self-defense
or may be excused if the offender is considered mentally incapable of
discovering right from wrong.

Since states have the power to determine
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whether an act has actually occurred and to determine whether the act,
when it occurs, qualifies for criminal designation, it would seem that
the reaction of the state may be as important (or even more important)
as the act itself.
Social behaviors, including crimes, are products of factors unique
to the general social contexts in which they occur.

Durkheim (1966)

argued that crimes represent the nature and extent of the moral toler
ance of a particular society.

It is the nature of all societies to

determine, by definition, acts they consider unacceptable and, there
fore, criminal.

Factors leading to the occurrence of criminal acts and

to the definitions of criminal behaviors are cultural and unique to
specific societies.

To understand why certain acts occur and why the

societies consider them criminal, the culture of each society needs to
be understood.

Societies differ culturally.

Their values, norms and

other characteristics determine behavior patterns.

The culture of any

given society is also shaped by the resources available to it.

Geogra

phical and other related factors such as the amount and nature of raw
materials, proximity to land and water, amount of land and water
available, weather conditions, and the nature of neighboring nation
states all influence the national self-image of every country.
When we talk of the world community it is tempting to think of
the United Nations General Assembly, or of a universe of nations
divided into the seven major continents, or the political and mili
tary alliances of Europe and North America (NATO) and Warsaw (PACK)
nations with the rest of the world barely relevant.

The world

community can also be viewed as industrial Europe and America leading
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the rest of the world in unilineal progression towards development or
modernization.
vities.

The community of nations is more than these collecti

It includes a family of nations who differ in their cultures,

administrative and political ideologies, in their access to critical
resources transcending the classifications mentioned above.
phical barriers and boundaries separate the nations.

Geogra

Historical and

political characteristics shape and separate nations.

Geographical,

historical, and political characteristics do not only separate nations,
they can also bring them closer to each other.

In grouping nations,

geographical boundaries and regions should always be considered as well
as history and cultural characteristics.
In this study the world community includes all those nations from
whom data were available through the sources used.

This includes

nations which have chosen to make these data available to the United
Nations.

This, unfortunately, excludes many nations from the socialist

block and other nations of Europe, Asia, America and Africa.

The

countries from which data are available and on which this study is
based, are grouped together based upon what are considered histocultural and geo-political similarities.

Attempts are made to recog

nize cultural and historical circumstances which make the
each region unique.

countries in

Specific political factors may make some countries

fit better with others outside of their region than those in the same
region.

For example, though Israel is in the Middle East, and is deeply

involved in regional politics and conflict and is presumably theistic
like other Middle East countries, it is so different socially and poli
tically that it does not fit in with its neighbors.

It is, therefore,
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excluded from the group of countries in that region in the study.
Most Israelites are immigrants from Europe and so, though they share
the Middle East, they share Western European cultural traits and
maintain a culture, very different from other Middle East countries.
New Zealand is not Scandinavia.

It is far from Scandinavia.

It also

differs culturally, yet its political ideology and social and economic
orientation and other characteristics make it similar enough to
countries in this region to warrant a classification with that region.
Six regions are identified.

These are:

1.

Western World (Western Europe and North America),

2.

Asian Societies (all Asian countries both on mainland and the

islands),
3.

The Middle East (all countries in the Middle East and the

Mediterranean region, except Israel),
4.

Sub-Saharan Africa (Africa South of the Sahara Desert excluding

the Republic of South Africa),
5.

Latin America (includes all countries south of the United

States of America, both on the main continents and the Caribbean
region), and
6.

Scandinavian countries and New Zealand.

Lack of data from Australia, the Socialist countries and other
countries has made it impossible to include them in the study.

The Western World

The term the Western World refers geographically to Western
Europe.

In the post-war era the term has been applied to countries
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which share a similar history, culture, political, economic, and
social philosophy.

Historically these are countries or societies

which have developed rapidly due to the direct experience of the
industrial revolution, which resulted from cultural and industrial
materialization of rationalism and enlightenment.

These are societies

which have reached beyond their boundaries not only to trade for raw
materials, but to conquer territories and establish ownership over
them during the period of colonization.

Following the end of colon

ization they have continued to influence the whole world with their
military, economic, technological, and histo-cultural superiority.
The combination of rationalism, enlightenment, and JudeoChristian thought in these societies resulted in a unique set of
values and attitudes towards work and life in general.

Max Weber

referred to this as "the protestant work ethic and the spirit of
capitalism" (Giddens, 1978, p. 124).

According to Weber, the Pro

testant religion, especially as taught by John Calvin and Calvinism
emphasized hard work and acquisition of more and more money but also
a strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment.

This resulted in high

productivity and investment resulting in accumulation of capital which
are responsible for rapid industrial and economic development.
The work ethic and capital accumulation in these societies has
been helped greatly by the development of a free market system.

Adam

Smith (1976) had argued that "free market systems have more effective
regulatory mechanisms than political ones" (p. 18).

The free market

systems, the work ethic and the capitalist spirit have resulted in
high levels of economic and industrial development in these countries.
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Political developments in these societies emphasize popular and
representative democracy.

These nations emphasize popular electoral

processes, resulting in publicly elected popular government with po
tent popular political oppositions, who are accountable to the public
who elect them.

The political processes in these democratic nations

discourage the use of its military on its own citizens but encourage
aggressive military preparedness for national defense.

This leads to

massive production of military hardware and intelligence, and techno
logical development in defense industries.
Among the characteristics distinctive in European and American
development are "the existence cf rational law, a modern capitalist
enterprise, which demands rational calculation of profits and losses
(emphasizing accountability) and the development of efficient bureau
cratic institutions" (Giddens, 1978, p. 178).

Also central to Western

industrial development and modernization is the emphasis on individual
ity and change.

Durkheim observed that the emerging industrial society

with its emphasis on individuality required compromise as "individuals
differ from the collective type" (Durkheim, 1966, p. 70).

To continue

to develop, the society changes from traditional emphasis on conformity
to a new emphasis on individuality with perpetual demands for sacri
fices.

According to Durkheim the new modern "society cannot be formed

without individuals being required to make perpetual and costly sacri
fices" (Void & Bernard, 1986, p. 147).
According to Durkheim this emphasis on individuality and division
of labor, which are characteristics of the modern society, held together
by organic solidarity is highly productive.

Success is measured and
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roles in the society defined by specific quality and quantity of con
tributions made by individuals.
Innovations or creativity involve new ideas, some of them good,
others bad, some acceptable and others deviant and not beneficial to
society.
progress.

However, the risk of deviance is a necessary sacrifice for
According to Durkheim (1966, p. 66) "progress requires

changes in behaviors and engagement in behaviors, some of which may
be considered deviant."

Many progressive ideas are considered absurd

and their initiators ridiculed or even persecuted.

Durkheim (1966,

p. 66) correctly observes that "people whose ideas were considered
most progressive, by future generations, were treated as deviants,
social misfits and criminals during their time," even though progres
sive societies encourage creativity and change.

The emphasis on

change and creativity has greatly accelerated opportunity structures
in the Western World.

The European industrial policy emphasizes the

establishment of effective large markets and industrial institutions
to provide opportunities for trade.

For example, the Commission of

the European communities adopted a memorandum on March 18, 1970 which
emphasized as a first requirement of industrial policy.

"To enable

all firms and industries to take advantage of large markets.

This

has entailed the removal of barriers to progress allowing individual
and public growth opportunities" (Keesing's Report, 1975, p. 46).
Opportunities for personal and industrial growth are also major fea
tures of the American society.

The American industrial policy promotes

"innovation, research and the creation of new industries and markets"
(Sewell, 1980, p. 35).

To encourage creativity, productivity,
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opportunity and the use of opportunities, the American policy also
emphasizes a focus on man power policies which "Provide training for
new skills, facilitation of occupational mobility, distribution of
the burdens of unemployment and assisting in reemployment of displaced
workers" (p. 35).
Another characteristic of Western and American societies is
their high rates of consumption of both local products and raw mater
ials from the less developed world.

The United States depends heavily

on the raw materials it imports from many Third World countries.
85% of its tin consumption is imported.

About

Of all the tin imported into

the USA, about 82% comes from developing countries.

Ninety-eight per

cent of its manganese consumption is imported; more than half of it
comes from the Third World (Sewell, 1980, p. 176).

Though

Western

Europe and North America produce only 14.2% of the world's petroleum,
they consume 51% of total world production (Sewell, 1980, p. 186).
This tendency towards high consumption applies to many other commo
dities.

Western Europe and America consume 31% of the world's coal

and manganese, 57.5% of natural gas and 49.5% of hydro and nuclear elec
tricity (Sewell, 1980).

These high ra. s of consumption are social

and economic results of affluence.

Many scholars have suggested that

the capitalist system fueled by access to abundant wealth results in
increases in crime (Odekunle, 1978).

There is much that can be stolen

and there are social pressures to have as much property as the next
person.

The pressure to accumulate is high and the opportunities

including illegal ones are abundant.
The centrality of the individual in the Western world also leads
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to the tendency to look for the causes of problems outside the indi
vidual, rather than within.

This achieving society evolves a general

psychological profile of individuals the majority of whom are driven
by the mind set that winning is everything.
tive (McCleland, 1961).

People become very competi

Institutions that evolve are individualistic

and competitive with winning as always the goal.

Adversarial system of

justice which is characteristic of all this societies is a good example.
So much emphasis is placed specifying the victim by a vigorous legal
battle to prove the offender as so bad to become useless to society.
According to Adeyemi (1980) the process may result in greater cost and
harm to the society.

According to Durkheim,

(in Giddens, 1978) the

individual self-centered modern person would tend to be selfish and
uncompromising except when doing so would be to his or her benefit.
Another major characteristic of the post-industrial Europe/America
is the pervasiveness of secularized thought and the devaluation of trad
itional beliefs and social institutions in favor of scientific thought
and secular institutions.

Herman Dooyeweerd (1980) refers to this as

"spiritual nihilism, whose motto is, let us eat and drink, for tomorrow
we die” (p. 62).

This secular scientific culture enables people to

question and to use scientific and objective processes to arrive at
answers.

This "rediscovery of nature" (p. 65) has evolved in the use of

human knowledge to achieve levels of development never achieved before.
This development has been achieved at a price, the loss of "the norm of
continuity" (p. 101).

Psychologists and other behavioral professionals

have influenced the role of traditional social institutions such as the
family and influenced traditional process of discipline and decisions
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making.
According to Dooyeweerd (1980), the emphasis on modernity results
in the tendency to abandon tradition for the sake of new ideas, even
if the new ideas are not necessarily better.

The emphasis on creativity

encourages the evolution of new ideas and ways of doing things which
may be harmful to the society.

Change is good if it improves and has

inherent and sustaining value.

However, many changes in modern Western

societies have appeal only because they break the monotony of tradition
and may have immediate appeal, but no sustaining value.

The high rates

of crime and deviance result from the breakdown of traditional social
institutions such as the family, the school, and religion.

Dooyeweerd

(1980) concludes that though Western nations have high rates of social
and economic development, they suffer from moral decay leading to
various social problems such as crime.
Despite its problems, the Western world still appears to be the
model for the world.

Third World countries which received their

independence, some following a lot struggle with much loss of blood,
still depend on the Western world to achieve their dreams of social and
economic development.

Recent social, economic and political development

in Eastern Europe is another example of how the West and America appear
to be the model of the world.

These countries that have for many years

based their political, economic and social systems on the principles of
socialism are all struggling to change to Western style democracies and
free enterprise market economies.

These revolutions seem to confirm the

belief in the superiority of democratic and free enterprise systems.
When modernization theorists propose a persistent relationship
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between development (or modernization) and crime it is Western Europe
and America they see as enduring examples.

They predict that the

experience of these societies will necessarily be repeated in all
societies as they, too, experience development (Clinard & Abbott,
1973; Shelley, 1981).

Asian Societies

The continent of Asia includes a unique group of nations and
cultures.

Among them are China, India, Pakistan, Korea, Japan,

Malaysia, Taiwan, Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Thailand, and others.

Asia is the largest and most populous conti

nent.
The nations of Asia differ remarkably from the nations of other
continents in their history, geographical circumstances, socio-political
ideologies, cultures and religions.

Despite their internal differences

one still finds similarities among Asian peoples ranging from socialist
totalitarian China, World showcase democratic India to
republic of Malaysia.

the Islamic

Asian societies have long histories of civiliza

tions, of contact with the rest of the world and even of colonization
by West European countries.

Despite such contacts, the influence of

foreign cultures on these societies is comparatively limited.

These

societies have always maintained a cultural independence from
foreigners.
This independence is due to the fact that Asians see themselves
as Asians first and therefore unique from the rest of humanity (Welty,
1976) .

The geographical limitations of the continental mass has led to
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unique historical experience by Asians.
in these areas.
populated.

There are few raw materials

All habitable areas in Asia have always been over-

"Whenever there is arable land in Asia, the land is also

always crowded" (Welty, 1976, p. 25).

Because of these geographical

limitations, Asians themselves have to be particularly adaptable to
survive.

They do this by protecting and preserving everything they

have, hence, there is culturally little emphasis on change (in fact
there is deep suspicion for change), greater emphasis is placed on
conformity and loyalty to traditions which have held the societies
together.

Whether Asia's political systems are socialist or

democratic they maintain great emphasis on preserving traditional
institutions.
All histo-cultural factors point to the uniqueness of Asian
societies.

They tend to emphasize deep religious commitment

and practice, a commitment to traditional social institutions such
as:

family, community, work, religion, and educational processes

which emphasize hard work and social conformity.

With little or no

emphasis on change, development becomes a tool for supporting the
status quo rather than for changing it.

These societies tend to be

deeply religious with commitment to religious life, which is central
in their social and political ideology.
is often total and fundamentalist.

Religious commitment in Asia

Their religions from Hinduism and

Islam in India to Shintoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism in China and
Japan all emphasize living the faith one confesses.
to be able to improve the person and the society.

This is believed
Transcendental

idealism is a dominant religious orientation in Asia.

There is very
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limited secularization all religions practiced in Asia.

In Communist

China the socialist ideology (though Marxist) encompasses religious
philosophies of Confucianism, Taoism, and Legalism which see the
universe and humans as centers of all reality and as having potential
for earthly happiness.

In China traditional religions are not seen

as contradictory to communism.

They focus on the earth and humans

not only as potentially good but as having the ability, responsibi
lity, and the mandate to seek and maintain good, which accommodates
political ideology of Marxism very well.

The individual is seen as

responsible to the community which, in turn, owes him or her support
and protection.

Communalism is central to the society which emphasizes

the significant role of social institutions of family, work, the com
munity and religion.
emphasized.

Conformity and stability rather than change are

Faithful religious life, no matter what religion, is seen

as improving the quality of individual and public life.
couraged and generally not scrutinized (Welty, 1976).

It is en
The recent crack

down of democratic movement demonstrates strong desires to maintain the
status quo.
The ideology of the people of India is the result of a long and
continuing search for the origin and meaning life.

To them "thought

is more important than action; meditation is valued over the inces
sant search for material goods" (Welty, 1976, p. 65).

Wealth and

power are important goals, but spiritual realization and selfcontemplation rank higher in the scale of cosmic values.

One of the

results of this philosophy and the search for ultimate truth and reason
is the three major religions of India:

Hinduism, Buddhism and
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Islam.

Both Hinduism and Buddhism emphasize contemplative life

concerned with the process of change which appears to be character
istic of the universe.

Islam accepts the existence of a supreme

deity and creator of the universe who blesses when pleased, but
curses and destroyed when crossed.

As

a contemplative society,

these religions all required pure hearts and the sacrifice of the
body and material goods in honest sacrifice to superior living
(Welty, 1976).
In Japan the social ideology is based upon Buddhism, Shintoism
(ways of the gods) and other traditional beliefs.

Shintoism, the

most common religious tradition, is a collectivity of all religious
lives. Shintoism appeals to a unique spiritual quality of the mind
which demands a deep reverent feeling for the universe.

This rever

ence must be shown by the tender and patient care given to land, people
and universe.

All universe is seen as Divine, so all that is in it

must be treated as divine (Welty, 1976, pp. 200-269).

These cultural

conditions in Japan are responsible for the fact that despite its
rapid development, industrialization and urbanization, Japan's rates
of crime and delinquency are comparatively low (Chang, 1988).
Geographical limitations separate some Asian countries from the
rest of the world.

Their history and culture make them unique.

Despite some differences in geo-political circumstances of countries
within, they all share

a deep commitment to religious and social

ideologies which encompass all of life, emphasize conformity to
traditions rather than change, a slow approach to change if change
is inevitable, and community orientations with much demand for

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

101

maintaining the significant role of traditional social institutions
in faith and livelihood.
The historical and cultural traditions of Asian societies
include:

(a) sustained public attitude which support traditional

structures including authority and other social institutions; (b)
emphasis on respect and conformity; (c) individual and public
traditional sense of responsibility to the community, even in non
socialist countries such as Japan; (d) emphasis on family honor-many of them still practice arranged family marriages;

(e) emphasis

on social harmony and unity; (f) emphasis on interdependency, moral
ity and gentleness; (g) they discourage high and rapid social and
geographical mobility, therefore, sustaining a sense of community;
and (h) strong emphasis on a sense of personal responsibility, honor
and shame (Chang, 1988).
Such a tradition has resulted in cultures with very few crimes
despite severe poverty in some cases such as in India, and rapid,
development and material abundance as in Japan.

Political unrest

has existed in these societies often as a result of ideology,
ethnicity, and religious fundamentalism (e.g., India, Pakistan,
Srilanka, and Malaysia), changed the Asian nature of the societies,
but usually not.

The Middle East

The societies in this region include countries from North
Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and the Mediterranean Sea.
this region include:

Counties in

Egypt, Morocco, Kuwait, Turkey, Iran, Lebanon,
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Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Libya, and others.

Besides

Israel, all these societies are predominantly Muslim and live by
Islamic cultural traditions and may be governed under Islamic law.
Most of them also have been colonies of Western societies and may have
inherited some western influence, similar to those of Sub-Saharan
Africa.

Some of them have been major powers with international influ

ence in the past (e.g., Egypt, Turkey, Greece, and Iran).

Most of

these countries have smaller national ethnic populations but have
enormous wealth from large oil reserves which generate much revenue.
These countries may have experienced political instability like
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Political instability in these

countries may be similar to that in other developing countries.

Pov

erty is not a problem in most of these countries because of their
wealth from oil.
The geo-political impact on these societies is a result of
several historical, economic and political factors.

Though some of

them have comparatively small populations, small land area and poor
agriculture lands, they are endowed with large deposits of petroleum.
In a modern industrial era which depends on oil, this region has become
very important.

The wealth affords them extensive contact with the

industrialized world, modern industries and products of modern
technology.
Possession of the world's most valuable commodity has made them
very important to the rest of the world who must court them, interact
with them and give or take with them.

Countries like Saudi Arabia,

Kuwait and United Arab Emirates have foreign populations closely
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equal to or even more than that of their indigenous natives.

Since

these foreigners do not own any of the land and wealth under it,
their influence on indigenous populations and local culture may be
limited.

Though, they may contribute to social problems in some

areas.
The Mediterranean region is strategically important, not only
because of its oil reserves, but because of its centrality in world
affairs.

It is the home of three of the most important religions in

the world (Judaism, Christianity and Islam).

The three all worship

one divine God who is perceived to be the maker of heaven and earth,
and whose followers have a mandate to live what they teach, therefore
shaping values and behaviors of people all over the world.

The Jews,

who practice Judaism, claim the region as their homeland, promised and
given by God.

Christians claim the area as the birthplace of Jesus

Christ, the Father of Christianity; Muslims, who practice Islam, claim
the area as home of their forefathers.

The disputes on land, reli

gious dogma and history have resulted in sympathies and resentment by
different peoples and nations.
Religious fundamentalism as found in this region, shapes tradi
tion and cultures.

Strict adherence to religious dogma, for example,

and the traditional way of life of its followers influences the culture
of these people, their relationships with each other and with the rest
of the world.

Their approach to development, crime and other social

phenomena are also shaped by their faith.

Islam (which means surren

der) is a religion which demands the total surrender of one's body
and soul to their faith in Allah (God).

This means that their total

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

104

life should reflect this faith.

Islam is a religion, which when

faithfully followed, is both spiritual and cultural for the indivi
dual and society.

Many Islamic societies have laws and legal systems

which are based on Islamic (Shariah) law.

Shariah Law is used both

as a moralizing instrument as well as a preventive agent.

According

to Souryal (1988), it is effective by use of a five-prong approach:
1.

It constantly endeavors to reform and purify individuals.

2.

It warns people against crime by reminding them of its

consequences.
3.

It commands other muslims to assist each other.

4.

Prevents crime by blocking temptation through prohibition and

separation, and
5.

Prepares Muslims against sin and crime by encouraging certain

behaviors and practices (Souryal, 1988, p. 5).
By using these, Muslim societies encourage a total social order
of faithful conformity.

Studies have shown that religious fundamen

talism increases intolerance to crime and sin (Evans, 1984).

These

societies emphasize religious fundamentalism, which encompasses all
of life and which requires, through the five point prong, total
social responsibility to resist crime and deviance.

Secularization

or retreat from fundamentalism may result in increases in various
social problems.

Kuwait experienced sharp increases in crime when it

reorganized its legal system in a 1959 decree to conform with modern
Western standards (Al-Thakeb, 1978).
Judaism is also a religion which controls and directs the total
life of individuals and the community.

This is based on Mosaic law
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which includes the twelve commandments and many other laws in the
Bible.

These laws were prohibitions, codes of conduct and regula

tions on how the Jewish people are to live as individuals, as com
munities and in relationship with other nations.
points

Like the five prong

in Islam the twelve prong laws in Judaism represented a way of

life which provides

the basis for social morality.

Christians claim faith in the Jewish God and while they subscribe
to the

twelve prong laws they also believe in a Christ who fulfilled the

Mosaic

law on their behalf.

Freeing them from the law he gave them two

which are based purely on the principle of love.

Instead of emphasizing

faithful conformity like Judaism and Islam, Christianity emphasizes
forgiveness and redemption in Christ together with individualism.
makes religion for them a personal experience.
fesses a global God rather than a regional one.

This

Christianity also pro
Christians claim that

the coming of Christ fulfilled all the promises which made the Jews a
special nation and the Middle East the center of the world.

The global

view of Christianity, its emphasis on individualism and grace makes it
more likely to be permissive and secularized.

All these have led to

the fact that the influence of Christianity in this region is limited.

Sub-Saharan Africa

This includes all countries south of the Sahara desert and north
of the Union of South Africa.

These are countries that were for many

years colonies of various European countries.

In fact, most of them

were actually created by European colonial empires, who in some cases
forged together tribal kingdoms they conquered to create new political

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

106

units which they ruled as colonies or protectorates.

Eventually

these became nation states, most of them as a result of protracted
nationalist struggles against the colonial powers.

The only identity

of these nations was in reference to the colonial masters, despite the
claims of nationalism.
Political, economic, and educational systems which were set up
reflected the values of the colonial powers (Adeyemi, 1980, p. 17).
Social systems which evolved in some of these societies are very dif
ferent from traditional African institutions which existed before
colonization.

Unlike the democratic, free enterprise, political and

economic cultures which existed in Europe, the superior attitudes of
the Europeans in these colonies resulted in the development of an
elitist class of educated natives who sought not just to be independ
ent of the Europeans but to replace them in positions of political,
social and economic advantage.

European education which many of them

acquired overseas, and attitudes towards that education created in
these elite a feeling of superiority towards their fellow countrymen,
whom they regarded as uneducated, primitive and inferior.

A culture

evolved in which, though supposedly independent from Europe, these
nations have continued to depend on European values to define the
social, political, and economic goals of their homelands.

The penal

system of every African country is molded after that of its former
colonial ruling country, though the majority of people in the country
often do not know or understand many of the laws, nor can they read or
relate to them.

Some of the laws do not even reflect the values of the

people or are so contradictory to the cultures that no one even tries

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

107

to enforce them.

Traditional African societies, for example, empha

size settlement of disputes rather than enforcement of rights.

"To

the traditional Africans, the invocation of judicial proceedings is
virtually tantamount to a declaration of enmity, hence the need to
reconcile the parties, since enmity cannot be tolerated in communal
societies" (Adeyemi, 1980, p. 17).

According to Adeyemi, the intro

duction of adversarial system of law, and the judicial process (EuroAmerican form of justice) associated with it is very unfortunate.
"These approaches to justice are culturally very incompatible with
African approach to the judicial process" (p. 17).
Since the elite of these countries seek to replace their Euro
pean role models, the national and individual goals they set seems to
be aimed at being like Europe or the European, rather than
the basic and specific needs of the people.

meeting

There is great emphasis

on having European products such as cars, radios, VCRs, televisions
and stereo sets, even when individuals are not able to meet some of
their basic needs such as food and shelter.

Governments also see

development as the presence of electricity, telephones, radio and
television stations, sometimes at the expense of roads, schools and
hospitals.

Good markets, sewage systems, roads, medical and educa

tional facilities, and other more critical needs are often passed in
favor of new television and satellite communication systems.

Besides

the fact that there is little or no emphasis on the basic and most
critical infrastructure and these public luxuries or amenities are
concentrated in cities and urban areas where the elite live.

The

elite of these countries set standards for their countrymen by
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developing the same tastes for luxury similar to those in indus
trialized countries.

Since this creates the impression that people

who have access to these luxuries and who own these technological
gadgets are superior, many impressionable young people flood to the
cities with no jobs, often with no support system or meaningful income
but with strong desires to "become" modern.

Unequipped to afford these

luxuries through legitimate means they become criminals.
Third World countries, especially Sub-Saharan countries, are
under considerable pressure to become developed like everyone else.
Most African countries, which under colonial rule had international
recognition on the world market for the sale of raw materials, lost
those positions when they got independence.

As colonies their markets

were controlled by market institutions in the home country of the
colonial powers.

Though politically independent, economic independence

has evaded these countries.

They have continued to depend on European

and American market forces.

They have no control over the cost of their

raw materials as their market institutions did during colonial periods.
They have no control over their currencies either.

Since they cannot

determine the value of their products, they cannot determine the value
of their money.

This results in constant and extreme

fluctuation in

the value of their currencies which sometimes drop by over 80%

within

very short periods.

Such sudden changes often make legitimate enter

prising impossible.

As purchasing power diminishes, increases in

illegal economic activity becomes inevitable.
Attitudes towards and the relationship with the developed
nations and the reciprocal attitudes of these nations towards the
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developing countries contribute to many social and economic pro
blems.

The general lack of confidence in the Third World political,

social and economic institutions by their own elite contributes to
the lack of commitment to their own society by their youth people
also.

Some of the most valued commodities and ones stolen most in

Nigeria are not the locally produced commodities, but imported tech
nological gadgets such as VCRs, television sets, air conditioners
and automobiles.

These are European produced goods, which in indus-

industrialized nations are most often stolen because they are what
is desired and available (Friday, 1988).

In Nigeria and other Afri

can countries these items are status symbols.
Developed countries evolve their own political ideology, poli
tical institutions and processes, and control their relations with
other societies.

Despite political independence many African coun

tries have not been able to evolve the means of meeting the needs of
their people by using local resources.

They continue to allow them

selves to be influenced by what they see as acceptable Western
standards.

Western industrialized nations also contribute to this

dependency by their use of Western oriented characteristics to define
and measure development, e.g., development is often measured by how
the society compares or ranks on the basis of Western characteristics,
such as GNP, annual income, or the number of doctors per population.
Multinational corporations from industrialized nations exploit this
dependency by influencing economic, political and social institutions
in these countries to continue to depend on the developed countries.
As long as the Sub-Saharan African is defined and examined within the

ft
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context of Western European and American perspective, the dynamics in
African societies will show characteristics and problems similar to
those of the West European and American societies.

Latin America

National independence in most of these countries has been for
over a century.

However, the social revolution needed to dissolve the

legacy of colonialism has not been achieved, except in Cuba.

In many

ways the political and economic experience of these countries are
similar to those of other Third World countries (Worsley, 1972,
p. 215).

The region also shares two crucial features with the new

countries of Africa:

Backwardness and lack of full autonomy.

Because of the backwardness in this region foreign capital,
especially from the United States, has exercised the final vote.

A

vote occasionally expressed through the use of military power rather
than the ballot-box.

The military overthrow of a popularly elected

Ayende in Chile, to be replaced by a military dictatorship more
friendly towards the United States.

The creation and support of the

contra military organization in Nicaragua, the recent invasion and
arrest of Panama to arrest its leader, Noriega for crimes against
the United States are good examples.
Latin America was not always dependent on the United States.
Most of the countries in this region were colonized by Spain and
Portugal powers of the colonial empires of Spain and were weakened
during the Napoleonic wars (1810-1820).

This led to decreased ability

of these empires to effectively control the colonies which in turn
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resulted in increased independence and power of local "creole bour
geoisie" who controlled the principal sources of wealth (Frank, 1974,
p. 47).

Most of these countries achieved independence through the

successful rebellion of the creole bourgeoisie who represented a class
of privileged producers and land owners who also maintained ties with
the rest of Europe and America by supplying them with raw materials.
The independence of these countries was won not by indigenous
natives, with nationalistic claims to land and heritage, but rather
by economic class of land owners and merchants.

Since independence,

most of them have continued to suffer political and economic insta
bility which has resulted in perpetual sluggish economic growth.
"Stabilizing mechanisms necessary for effective social and economic
development, such as large middle class sector, and demanded for
social reforms by the public," (German, 1972, pp. 36-37) continue to
elude the region.
Over the years the United States has influenced political
developments in the region with or without the approval of those
countries.

In March, 1981, General Omar Tarrijos, the head of state

of Panama, was quoted as saying "The only country that uses our
territory against our will to interfere in El Salvador is the United
States" (LaFeber, 1984, p. 11).

In recent years the United States

has used its military to quash a government in Grenada and in Panama.
It has also contributed in electoral and military activities in
Nicaragua, El Salvador and several other countries in the region be
cause as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane
Kirkpatrick , warned in 1981, "Central America is the most important
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place in the world for the United States" (LaFeber, 1984, p. 1).
Latin America, like other developing countries is a region that
is very dependent on the United States and other industrialized
countries.

The dependency, for Latin America, includes the expecta

tion of political, military and economic support.

"The history of

the Latin American republics during the 19th Century is the history
its indebtedness to the European world of finance" (Vega, 1987,
p. 48).

In the 20th Century the indebtedness has shifted from Europe

to America and international financial institutions.

Some of these

countries were heavily in debt at the time of independence and have
continued to be.

The interests for the debts are so high that the

countries can never finish paying.
ious imperialism" (p. 45).

Vega refers to this as "usur

According to Vega, "an even more dra

matic case of a victim of usury is Haiti, whose debts first to
France and then to the USA after its national independence became
an unbearable burden and guaranteed that the economic development of
this small nation would be impossible" (p. 55).
These countries are made to depend on the United States and other
industrialized countries for sale of their raw materials, usually at
prices determined by the industrialized countries.

They are contin

uously given loans, on terms favorable to lending institutions and
interest often so high that they could never finish paying.

These

loans are usually given with conditions attached to them, such as
devaluation of local currencies and liberalization of their markets,
which reduce their ability control their economic, social and politi
cal processes.
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The process of political development in Latin America is greatly
influenced by the United States.

In countries that want to pursue

the democratic process, the constitutions which evolve attempt to
assume "the retention of political power by an economically powerful
class" (Amaya, Amaya, Avilez, Ramirez & Reyes, 1987, p. 5).

These

constitutions tend to remain basically similar, with occasional pom
pous adoptions of pseudo democratic reforms without any real possi
bility of implementation.

These democratic processes are often

undermined by the fact that they are imposed by American pressure
and not by the mandate of the people (Amaya et a l . 1987, p. 5).
Any political processes which develop for any other reason and not
for patriotic reasons has potential for many problems, the most
important of which is political development which often requires a
lot of sacrifice.
Another major problem which results from dependency is the
inability to define national interests and identify social problems
unique to the societies involved.

Criminologists have often argued

that crime in any society reflects the values of the individual
societies.

Durkheim (1966) argued that "what confers the character

of criminality upon any given act is not the intrinsic quality of the
act, but that definition which the collective conscience lends them"
(p. 70).
Recent governments of the Untied States have maintained that the
problem of drugs in the country is the result of mass production and
exportation of drugs from Latin American countries into the United
States.

To control the abuse of drugs, various American regimes have
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emphasized the destruction of drugs and the control of both pro
duction and exportation capabilities from these countries (Del Olmo,
1987, p. 29).

The determination that production, use and exportation

of drugs may not necessarily be criminal in these societies as it is
in the United States is never even considered.

If drug abuse is a

problem in America, it must also be in Latin America seems to be the
popular view in America.
The governments of Latin America, overwhelmed by an external debt
that becomes more and more unpayable, and plagued by growing social
problems which often result from the demand for drugs themselves, which
are often produced at the expense of other agricultural products, are
becoming victims of this crime which is considered by some American
politicians as a transnational crime (Del Olmo, 1987, p. 30).

Foreign

Aid Authorization Act requires the American government to suspend
foreign aid to countries which produce and export drugs.

U.S. troops

are also sent to assist anti-narcotic forces in many Latin American
countries.

This has resulted in increase in violence and other crimes

in some of these countries.

The invasion of Panama, arrest of its

leader General Noriega for trial in the United States and hundreds of
people killed and property destroyed in the process, and the current
war on drugs in Columbia, which has claimed many lives are other
examples of the cost of dependency on USA to Latin America.

Scandinavia

The term Scandinavia refers to the Nordic people in the countries
of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland.

"The twenty-two
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million people who inhabit these countries have a common cultural
tradition, have been in and out of various political combinations
with one another, and think of themselves as a group" (Scott, 1975,
p. 1.).

They have their differences, yet each is far more different

than other nations outside the group than it is from any of the
brother nations within the group.

This unity is based on geographical

position, community of culture and approach towards the issues of
political and social survival.
Scandinavians (except the Finns and the Lapps) are thought to
have been one people whose ancestors may have come from Asia Minor or
the Balkans.

Scandinavians are not blessed with much land and many

natural resources as other parts of the world.

Despite some superficial

differences the Scandinavians are very much alike.

In social customs

and outlook on wife they are closer than any other group of people.
"In religion all Scandinavians once worshipped Odin and Thor together.
They passed together from paganism to Christianity.

More than 90% of

them are Lutherans" (Scott, 1975, p. 10).
"The legal systems all come from common origins and are domi
nated by a common philosophy

from which

manymodern social laws are

formulated" (Scott, 1975, p.

10).

factis particularly important

This

in explaining Scandinavian attitude and policies towards crime and
deviance, which is more corrective than positive.
100% in all of the countries

(Sewell, 1980).

one find a higher per capita

production

(Scott, 1975, p. 10) than in Scandinavia.
ideal and practice.

Literacy is almost

"No where in the world can

andconsumption of books"
Freedom of expression is an

Scandinavians do not cherish wealth.

They live
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simple lives and tax wealth with severity.
progressive, but not greedy.

Scandinavians are very

They live better than most of the world.

They have the highest physical quality of life compared to all other
countries in the world (Sewell, 1980, pp. 160-162).

Sweden and Ice

land score highest on quality of life index at 98, Denmark and Norway
at 97 and Finland at 95.

Physical Quality of Life Index, (PQLI) is

calculated by averaging life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy.
Scandinavians value individual liberties and freedom equally with
unity.

Unity is prized but individuality is encouraged to maintain

cooperation with the group.

Cultural homogeneity enables Scandinavians

to value support of others.

"Scandinavians see the justice system as a

part of

the management of society" (Friday, 1988, p. 57).

The criminal justice policy is
threat of social harm.

used as reactive measures to the

There is emphasis on treating the offender

with respect, though punishment is often firm, in order to return
them to society.

There is strong emphasis on prevention of crime,

which is seen as threatening to society, rather than a manifestation
of individual wickedness.
crime from society
1.

Some form

The goal of the justice system of removing

is pursued through two major tendencies:
of control profile with emphasis on the view that

crime is socially produced, therefore paying more attention to social
control
2.

and prevention rather than punitive measures, and
Neo-classical approach topunishment.

This

involvesa rigor

ous attempt at "balanced retribution" (Friday, 1988; Mathieson,
and Stark, 1987).

1981;

The effect of this unique approach according to

some scholars is that the rate of criminal activities in these societies
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may be less than in other European societies with comparable levels
of development (Norstrom, 1988).
Many modern characteristics of Scandinavia either predate the
modern states or simply have been adapted to fit the culture and
traditions of the people.

Laws regulate the relationships of indi

viduals within communities based on the moral standards and ideals
of such societies and religious beliefs.
and controlled by the state.

Usually these are defined

"In Scandinavia the development of law

preceded the establishment of the state" (Scott, 1975, p. 42).

The

cultures and traditions which nave always emphasized fairness,
individuality and community, the requirements of fair representation
were already established before the development of modern laws and
nation states.
Persistent characteristics of culture and tradition also shaped
the foundations for the Scandinavian economy.

The meager resources

in these regions through history have intensified the value of coop
eration.

All Scandinavian countries practice a form of mixed economy

which encourages both free enterprise and public welfare.

Sweden,

for example, has pursued a "decentralized economy dominated by pri
vate enterprise but with a rather ambitious government policy in the
fields of public consumption and public savings, income redistribu
tion, infrastructure and stabilization--a liberal-social democratic
welfare state in the context of a mixed economy" (Lindbeck, 1974,
p. 24).
The Scandinavian societies have a political system not easily
copied by other societies--functioning social democracies.
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"Fundamental for the Scandinavians in their planning of change is
the individual and his needs" (Scott, 1975, p. 58).

They emphasize

the process and results which involve everyone and benefit all rather
than motives which lend themselves easily to suspicion or doubt.
Their emphasis on individual welfare allows these societies to meet
the needs of their total population for education, food, shelter,
health and general welfare while at the same time encourage innova
tions and hard work.
New Zealand data are combined with those of Scandinavian for
the purpose of analysis.

Though New Zealand is an oceanic island,

several thousand miles away, there are characteristics about the
New Zealandish society that makes it like Scandinavia.

The major

similarities between New Zealand and Scandinavia are social, politi
cal, and economic,
"Like the Scandinavian countries New Zealand is almost an eth
nically and culturally homogeneous society.

About 90% are British

and other European immigrant descendants who have made it their home.
The remaining 10% are native Madris” (Johnson, 1982, p. 24).

The dis

tance of New Zealand from Europe has sustained a cultural homogeneity
which makes this Island and Scandinavia unique.

Like the Scandina

vians they depended heavily on rural agricultural and pastoral life,
New Zealand even more than Scandinavians in the 20th Century.
Religion, like in Scandinavia, is a major aspect of New Zea
lander life.

They are mostly Anglicans, Presbyterians, Roman Catho

lics, and Methodists.
New Zealanders tend to be hard working, proud of their nation

%
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and work hard to defend the culture and support each other.

"New

Zealand society contains a deep humanitarian streak, one which is
reflected in the equalitarian social policies erected to protect
residents from the nicissitudes of a laissez-faire economic system"
(Johnson, 1982, p. 30).

Like the Scandinavian societies, New Zea

landers do not put much emphasis on personal wealth, hence, "there
are no substantial economic class differences within the country"
(Johnson, 1982, p. 35).

It also has a welfare state.

Fundamental

to the welfare state policy are the maintenance of full employment
and of good working conditions, good wages, and an effective social
security system to ensure good quality of life.
countries New Zealanders live very well too.

Compared to other

"Their physical qual

ity of life index is 95” (Sewell, 1980, p. 160).
The legal system of New Zealand also emphasizes public service
and maintenance of the society rather than punitive to offenders.
"The daily administration of law is in the hands of a centrally
organized police service, members of which are unarmed" (Johnson,
1982, p. 48).

Crime rates are generally low.

Summary

This discussion of the different regions of the world has
attempted to demonstrate the uniqueness of different societies.
The differences among nations suggest that the circumstances of each
society are different.

Since the historical, cultural, geographical,

and political context of each society are so different and therefore
contribute differently in causing and reacting to crime, any attempt
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to construct a global theory of crime must take them into account.
In order to explain crime and its control, it is necessary to know as
much about the areas of the world that are troubled as well as those
that are untroubled with crime (Clifford, 1983).
Geographical factors tend to give countries a shared identity,
shared cultural values, shared problems, and, in fact, contribute to
shared perspectives and coping mechanisms,

Western European and

American scholars have tended to see the whole world from their
perspective only.

They assume, therefore, that the rest of the world

is or has to be similar in their experience with social processes and
crime.

They tend to generalize assuming that theories which explain

social problems in the West will explain them in other societies as
well.

This may not be correct.

It is only by ignoring what has

happened in Muslim countries, Japan and other societies can wo main
tain that every society is condemned to follow the paths of develop
ment cut by the West and to suffer the same consequences (Clifford,
1978, p. 65).

Other cultures have general ethics which may be ex

pressed legally, religiously, culturally, or reflected harmoniously
in aspects which enable them to accommodate technological development
and social change (Clifford, 1978; Shelley, 1981) differently.
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CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH DESIGN

Introduction

The major contention of modernization theory of crime is that
the changes associated with modernization and the social pressures of
adapting to these changes are criminogenic.

The changes necessarily

involve the violation of popularly accepted norms and laws.

Durkheim

(1966) suggested that development only occurs when change, which
often is contrary to popularly held beliefs, is allowed to take place.
In fact, he observed that people who have contributed most to moderni
zation or development were considered deviant or even criminals during
their time.

Some of them were severely punished for some of their

ideas, which have become pillars of modernization.
The process of modernization is socially disruptive as it in
volves the engagement of some people in acts that are not popularly
accepted, some of which are forbidden by law.

Even when the society

reaches out to these changes it does so at the expense of existing
traditions and social norms.

The disruption of cultural and tradi

tional beliefs and behaviors is what Durkheim referred to as anomie.
The disruption created by moderiiization processes such as urbanization,
industrialization and individualism includes great changes in
individuals and communities.
source of social problems.

Adjusting to these changes can be a major
It is for these reasons that modernization
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theorists of crime see a link between the process and crime.

The

contention is that increases in characteristics of development lead
to increases in the rates of crime.
To examine the relationship between development (modernization)
and crime it is important to identify and quantify the process of
modernization.
inality.

It is also necessary to identify and quantify crim

This chapter attempts both.

Some discussion of the data

used in the study is presented leading tc the hypotheses to be tested
and the method of analyses used.

Measuring Modernization (or Development)

Modernization (or development), the process by which a society
evolves and utilizes the most effective means of meeting the goals
or needs of its people, can be measured by visible changes and results.
Determining the most effective indicators of development is not
easy.

There is a pervasive tendency to use industrialized countries

as models for development, and therefore to use economic and socio
political indicators in them to measure development in other coun
tries.

Such things as average income, rate of consumption (of

energy and other resources) and Gross National Product (GNP) may re
present characteristics of some societies which are not relevant to
others, or at least not to the same degree.

In this study develop

ment (or modernization) is measured by urbanization, life expectancy,
percentage of the population employed in agriculture and industries,
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and Gross Domestic Product in Manufactur
ing (GDPM).

These are variables each of the countries studied uses to
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show social and economic processes and change in them.

Percentage of Population Living in Urban Areas

This is important because urban centers provide industries and
modern amenities which draw people into them.
indicates modernization.

Increasing urbanization

Urbanization is the collecting of large

populations who create and utilize economic and social characteristics
of modernity such as schools, industries, hospitals, and public
utilities such as water systems, electricity and sewage disposal and
provide modern services which help in solving daily problems and
entertain.

Despite social problems often associated with urban life,

urbanization is a major aspect of modernization.

To accommodate the

large populations, urban centers must provide goods and services and
be creative (modern) in solving many problems of living.

Life Expectancy

Since modernization emphasizes higher quality of life, increased
life expectancy may indicate increase in social development.

Moderni

zation, because it provides means of solving individual problems
enabling people to live longer, will increase life expectancy.

People

eat better, live better and have better medical diagnostic, treatment
and prevention resulting in increased longevity.

Industrial Employment Percentage

Industries are products of and for modernity.

The more a

society is developed, the more industries there are, and, therefore, an
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increased percentage of the population is employed in them.

The process

of modernization involves focusing on needs and problems of humanity.
The major task of industries is to meet these needs.

Industries

also represent purposeful social dynamics in the pursuance of answers
and solutions to human needs.

Percentage Labor Force in Agriculture

In less industrialized societies, which are labor intensive, there
are more people employed in agriculture to produce food, which is
necessary for survival.

As a society becomes more modern or developed

and industrialized, more food is produced on a large scale by use of
modern technology.

This frees people to engage in other concerns.

Therefore, as societies develop and more people engage in industries
for livelihood and more food is produced by mechanization, fewer people
will be employed in agriculture.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a good general indicator of eco
nomic activity in every society.

Increases in Gross Domestic Product

are progressive as they indicate increases in the society's ability to
produce desired goods and, therefore, meet the needs of its people.
Gross Domestic Product must not be seen as necessarily giving a good
picture of a society's development.

What is produced in a society may

or may not be the most capable in solving specific needs of the society,
e.g., the massive industrial production in military hardware has not
solved the real economic problems of the Soviet Union.
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Gross Domestic Product in Manufacturing (GDPM)

This refers to the industrial or manufacturing productivity of
the society.

Unlike the GDP, which is the total productivity of the

society and may include manual and agricultural labor productivity,
GDPM is specific.

It includes only industrial productivity, which

may be a better indicator of a society's actual development or
modernization.
These indicators of modernization are useful in showing the
direction and rate at which the society progresses in its attempts
to meet its needs.

The numbers used are standard ones given by each

of the countries studied or those extrapolated and averaged from the
data each country has given during the years covered by the study.
No attempt is made to qualify, to defend or to criticize the data or
the methods used in collecting them.

They are used because the

countries themselves use them to evaluate themselves.

This writer

is convinced that they are appropriate indicators of modernization
processes in the societies, even if they are not the most effective
measures for individual countries.

In general, they provide a good

basis for comparing social and economic dynamics in societies.

Typologies of Crime

Every society has a classification of types of behavior it
considers criminal.

Some types of crime have a general meaning which

are generally understood in all societies.

Some behaviors have dif

ferent cultural impact and may be considered criminal in some societies
but not others.

Criminologists identify four types of crime which
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include:

(1) Violent personal crimes, (2) Property crimes, (3)

Victimless or moral crimes, and (4) White collar or corporate crime.
In violent crime, the personal safety of other individuals or the
group is threatened.

Homicide is a good example of violent crime.

impact of homicide is similar in most human societies.
have laws against assault and physical abuse.
are of this type.
quantify.

The

All societies

Most violent crimes

However, it is not possible to generalize and

Adults fighting each other, domestic violence and other

forms of assault are not easy to quantify and are not always considered
criminal.
Property crimes are crimes in which property owned by one indi
vidual or group is removed or threatened to be removed from the owner
without his knowledge or consent.

In property crimes the acceptable

method of distributing and acquiring economic resources and products
is interfered with, and violated in favor of other devious methods,
such as theft.
istics.

Some property crimes may assume violent character

Robbery is generally both a personal and property crime.

Property is the goal, violent personal intimidation the means.
"Victimless" crimes are those behaviors which violate common
standards of morality and decency without harming or threatening
others directly.

Prostitution, adultery, vagrancy, alcoholism or

drug use are examples of crimes in which there are no direct victims
besides the perpetrators themselves.

Some of these socially unac

ceptable behaviors may be linked to other crimes and social problems
such as violence and disease.
White collar or corporate crimes are generally behaviors engaged
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in by people who are specifically expected to act contrary to the
behaviors they may be guilty of in the position they hold.

White

collar or corporate crimes are usually property crimes in which
offenders betray public trust.

Fraud, embezzlement, cheating, and

official corruption are examples of crimes in this category.
Some form of political crime also exists in every society.
This includes all behaviors engaged in by people who are motivated
by a country's political ideology, leadership and/or political pro
cesses.

Political crimes may include vandalism, sabotage, terrorism,

assassinations or other behaviors engaged in for the purpose of
frustrating those in power or to force them to make certain deci
sions.

Political crimes by those in power may include abuse of power,

human rights abuse, nepotism and engagement in behaviors which benefit
those in power at the expense of the masses.

Governments can also

commit political crimes by engaging in unlawful seizure and destruction
of property or intrusion on personal rights, freedoms and liberties.
Vice and crimes against social morality such as prostitution,
pornography, and indecency also exist in most societies.

These are

usually difficult to quantify since perpetrators and victims are often
willing participants, and because sometimes there are no direct victims.
Often victims who are willing participants are too embarrassed to report
or to cooperate with investigators.

Vice also represents behaviors the

society sees as common but one that the society is not proud of.

These

crimes may represent private and secret lives of prominent citizens as
well as the common people.
For the purpose of this study, three major types of crimes are
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used.

These are crimes with which all human societies tend to be

concerned and on which data are more readily available.

They are:

Homicide or murder, theft (including only major theft), and fraud.
Definitions and characteristics of these crimes also tend to be
universal making it easier for generalizations about their nature.

Homicide--Murder

This is the criminal taking of life.

All societies have laws

against violence, especially murder, intentional violation of ones
life or engagement in behavior which threatens another person's life
and physical safety.

The data on homicide seem to be the most reli

able in most societies.

As used here, homicide includes any act

performed with the purpose of taking a human life unlawfully.

Theft

In general, theft is the removal of property that belongs to
another person without his consent.

Theft can be simple removal of

property physically available to the offender, breaking and entering
to remove property not physically available to the offender or robbery
and mugging in which property is removed from victim by force or
intimidation.

The motive for the crime of theft is universal, i.e., the

impulse or premeditation to acquire property.

Only major theft, which

includes a dangerous aggravating circumstance such as robbery, burglary,
and housebreaking, are included here.
and the data more reliable.

Major theft is easier to quantify

People are more willing to report and seek

adjudication.
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Homicide and theft are the major types of criminal activity
which are reported.

Other crimes such as rape, assault and some

forms of personal victimization may receive far less attention b e 
cause victims may not choose to report.

Fraud

Fraud is any act of gaining unlawful possession of another's pro
perty or of gaining unlawful benefits or opportunities by betraying
public trust.

It includes behaviors such as embezzlement, misappro

priation, forgery, false pretenses, trickery and swindling.
Other crimes are excluded from this study because the data on
them are less reliable.

This may be due to the fact that attitudes

towards those behaviors are so different that the data on them are
very unreliable.

This includes crimes such as rape, drug abuse, sex

ual abuse, child abuse, and prostitution.

There is a general con

sensus within the cross-national research community that the data on
these crimes are the least reliable (Bennett & Lynch, 1989, p. 5).
Increases in specific crimes such as violent personal and property
crimes indicate general trends in criminality in the society.

This

is because these are crimes about which there seems to be the most
concern in all societies where records are kept.

These are crimes

reported and prosecuted most.
Some behaviors constitute criminality in one society but not in
others.

Corruption is an example of this.

corruption is cultural.

The determination of

In traditional societies the positions

occupied by people in power are more personal to them and so they
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may be free to do as they want.

In such situations, behaviors which

would be considered corrupt in modern and legalistic societies may
be acceptable traditional behaviors.

Bribery is a behavior commonly

associated with official corruption.

In traditional societies the

practice of paying homage to people in power, which includes giving
gifts and honor to gain favor, is generally expected or even encour
aged.

Corruption may be defined only by the unfair distribution of

opportunities and not by the fact that officials collect gratuities.
The head of state in Nigeria who appointed a disproportionate number
of members of cabinet from one state, tribe, region or religious
orientation, would be charged with corruption and removed immediately;
the fact that he or she may have received gifts in excess of thousands
of dollars as gifts and contributions would not be the issue.

In

America, the President may not receive a personal gift in excess of
$1000.00, but may choose all his cabinet from among his personal
friends, from any state or states, one region and even a specific
religious orientation.

The appointment of Robert Kennedy, who had

minimum qualifications, as attorney general by his brother, J. F,
Kennedy, would have been regarded as a severe case of corruption in
Nigeria.
Criminal designations and definitions reflect values and trends
in particular societies.

Circumstances which lead to such designa

tions may not be shared by other societies.

In recent years the suc

cess of the feminist movement has resulted in legislation against rape,
domestic violence and other such behaviors towards women.

These changes

may criminalize behaviors which are not criminal in other societies.
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many cultures husbands cannot be accused of or prosecuted for raping
or beating their wives.

Several states in America have passed or are

in the process of passing laws which make such prosecutions possible.
In many societies any girl who reaches puberty is a woman and may be
married off.

In America, in most states children under 16 years are

minors, sexual activity with them with or without their consent is
considered rape.

Other social groups have also succeeded in influencing

the development of laws regarding behaviors and attitudes toward them.
Blacks, women, homosexuals and other "disadvantaged" groups have
contributed to the passage of anti-discrimination and civil rights laws
in America.

This is not the case in other societies.

Therefore, the

laws and judicial attitudes in other countries are different from those
in America.

Hypotheses

The modernization theory of crime is based on the hypothesis that
there is a correlation between modernization and crime.
this correlation several hypotheses are explored.

To explore

Though the vari

ables used here do not tell everything about the extent and nature of
development or modernization in any society, changes in them do indi
cate modernization processes.

The crimes discussed are also not the

only types of crime in any of the societies but are assumed to reflect
the extent and nature of criminal activity with which the society is
concerned.
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Hypothesis 1:
and Crime.

There is a Positive Relationship Between Urbanization

It is clear from the reviewed literature and above discussion
that urbanization is an indicator of modernization or development.
Urban centers result from the establishment of industrial, adminis
trative and public service units and amenities which appeal to public
needs and demands.

Urbanization may not cause modernization or

development, but is a major characteristic of those processes.

If

urbanization indicates modernization or development and if moderni
zation is causally related to crime then increases in urbanization
should lead to increases in both person and property crimes.

The

assumption of this hypothesis is that increases in urbanization would
be sufficient reason for increase crime rate.

Hypothesis 2:
and Crime.

There is a Positive Relationship Between Life Expectancy

This hypothesis deals with life expectancy.

It is assumed that

a major need of every society is good living conditions which improves
the quality of life by reducing disease and death rates enabling peo
ple to live longer.

A society better at meeting this need is farther

along in the process of development.

The lower the life expectancy,

the farther behind or slower is the process.

Since higher-life ex

pectancy is a desired goal and indicator of development societies,
with higher life expectancy would also have higher crime rates.
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Hypothesis 3: There is a Positive Relationship Between Industrializa
tion and Crime.

Industrial participation is a major indicator of development or
modernization.

Industries are modern institutions which produce

goods which make life easier.

Since the process of development or

modernization involves not only attempts to meet public and social
needs but to meet those needs in the most convenient and effective
manner, industries which produce goods needed by the society are good
indicators of the process of development.

A society which is devel

oping would establish and expand industries, therefore increasing the
percentage of the population employed in them.

The hypothesis, there

fore, is that as the higher the number of people employed in industries,
implying industrialization or development the more crime there will be.

Hypothesis 4: There is a Negative Relationship Between the Percentage
of Population Employed in Agriculture and Crime.

Agricultural participation is a major differentiating character
istic between developed and underdeveloped countries.

With

industrialization food production, the most important human industry
is mechanized leading to more efficient and effective farming methods
and mass production of food.
This usually means that fewer people need to be employed in
agriculture and therefore are employed in industry.

Societies which

are less developed have a larger percentage of their population em
ployed in agriculture.

Industrialized societies have smaller per

centage of their populations employed in agriculture.

This hypo

thesis states that countries with larger percentages of their
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population employed in agriculture are less developed and will have
lower rates of crime, however, as development/modernization occurs,
and less people will be engaged in farming while more of them employed
in industries the rates of crime will increase.

Hypothesis 5:

There is a Positive Relationship Between GDP and Crime.

Gross National or Domestic Product (GDP) is the total amount of
goods and services a society produces.

Since development is the ex

tent to which a society is able to meet the needs of its people, the
society will be better able to meet those needs if it produces more.
Increasing GDP means increasing development.

It is expected that in

crease in GDP will lead to proportional increase in crime.

Hypothesis 6:

There is a Positive Relationship Between GDPM and Crime

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) tells about the total productive
capability and activities in the society.
total output of a society.

A high GDP tells about the

Manufacturing productivity is a better

indicator of a nation's creativity and industry.

A high GDP which

is in agriculture and natural resources such as oil and underground
minerals does not tell enough about a society's actual development.
Raw materials contribute to a society only if they are transformed or
processed.

Gross Domestic Product in Manufacturing (GDPM) is a total

what a society produces from its industries by using knowledge and
technology available to it.
The research hypothesis is that increases in Gross Domestic Pro
duct in Manufacturing will lead to increases in crime.

Since GDPM
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is the most important indicator of modernity, its relationship to
crime is very important in determining the effects of modernization
on crime in every society.
The hypotheses presented above do not reflect all the theories
of development or of crime discussed in the review of literature.
They are constructed in order to examine the modernization theory of
crime.

A valid modernization theory shown to be valid in explaining

trends in criminality makes other theories which challenge the major
positions of the theory obsolete.

On the other hand, if modernization

theory does not adequately explain crime, it would be desirable to
explore the arguments presented by alternative theories.
earlier, the major purposes of this study are twofold.

As stated
One is to

examine the validity of modernization theory of crime by examining
the relationship between social and economic development and crime.
Another purpose of this study is to explore the dynamics of both
development and crime, in the hope of contributing to the search for
a comprehensive criminological theory and to the knowledge and
practice of comparative criminology.

The hypotheses presented in

this study will assist in evaluating the phenomena of development
and crime or provide a basis for further exploring the other theories.
Though the theories are not tested in the study, their relevance is
demonstrated through the testing of modernization theory.

Comparative Design

Since modernization theory assumes that there is a single uni
versal process of development with similar inevitable consequences
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(i.e., crime), the theory is supported only if the above holds true
in all societies.

This means that there should be a similar pattern

in the relationship between various indicators of modernization and
crime in all societies in all regions of the world.

This should be

true irrespective of socio-cultural, historical, and geo-political
variations.

This means also that as development or modernization

stabilizes, the rates of crime should do the same.

Countries

experiencing rapid modernization will have more rapid increases in
the rate of crime.

This is the true essence of causal relations.

Not meeting the above conditions suggests spurious or no relation
ships at all.
Unfortunately, the data available for this study do not include
countries from Eastern Europe (the socialist countries).

This fact,

though regrettable, does not negate the usefulness of this study.

If

the theory holds in the countries studied, one would expect that it
would hold in the socialist countries as well or assume that any
differences are due to basic social, political and economic differences
between the socialist countries and the rest of the world.

Any

conclusions made will provide a good basis for future research of the
hypotheses and therefore the theory is not supported in these societies,
and one might reasonably argue that is may never have been supported in
societies that are even more different.
The hypotheses presented earlier are tested using a sample of
longitudinal data collected from 54 countries covering 25 years
(1960-1985).

The countries studied are divided into six different

regions based upon their histo-cultural and geo-political character.
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It is assumed that cultural and geographical proximity makes the
countries in each region more similar than those outside of it.
Developments in any country are more likely to influence other coun
tries within the same geographical region than those outside the re
gion.

It is also assumed that with similar histo-cultural, geographical

and political orientations evolve similar views of development and
therefore may have similar approaches to it and experience similar
benefits and problems from it.

For comparative purposes the writer

assumes more similarity than diversity among countries in the same
region.
Each hypothesis is tested by the use of Pearson correlation
coefficients, a graphic presentation of 25 year trends in modernization
and criminality.
.05.

A one-tailed test is used to the significant level of

Each of the hypotheses is tested in each of the six regions so

that a discussion focuses both on the nature of a relationship or lack
of it in each region.

A one-tailed test is used because the theory

assumes a one dimensional relationship between modernization and crime.
Development or modernization are seen as a one directional process and
as having one effect on the rates of crime, increases.
.tested are one dimensional.

The hypotheses

All of them assume that there is a positive

relationships between indicators of modernization and crime.

Data

The data used in this study were made available by Richard
Bennett (1989) at the School of Justice, The American University,
Washington, D.C.

The data set is titled Correlates of Crime (COC) data
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set.

It is a sequential data archive file containing information

on 54 nations covering the period of 25 years from 1960 to 1984.
The data are extensive and come from nations that voluntarily make
them available to the United Nations, i.e., they are non-random and
include only those countries which were willing.

Therefore,

interpretations made are risky and must be read with that ?n mind.
Interpretations made in this study are based on the researcher's
perception and do not reflect the perceptions or intentions of
Bennett or the American University School of Justice.

The conception

of COC evolved as an attempt to provide a comprehensive data set of
international comparative studies such as this one.

Assuming that

the data reflect the COC defined concepts the meanings of independent
and dependent variables are the same as provided by Bennett (1989) .
Two major problems are considered by the writer and must be
considered by the reader.

One is the non-randomness of the data.

INTERPOL data and other national official data have often been
criticized because of the suspicion that they contain systematic
bias due to the reporting countries' failure to employ consistent
operational definitions of crime.

The writer's position is that

the definition of crime that any society uses is sufficient since
it reflects thee problems inherent in that particular society.
Academic operational definitions should be consistent with these
or broad enough to encompass different systems and cultures.

The

definition of theft in any society is what that society considers
as theft.

The writer also accepts the data as fair representation of

the situation in the countries providing the data because there is no
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clear evidence that data collected by social scientists using other
methods are more accurate.

In fact, Bennett and Lynch (1989) found,

in a comparison of crime data from INTERPOL, that other national
crime data and data collected using social science operational
definitions and methods to not be significantly different.
Another major concern is the fact that the data used do not in
clude non-free market systems such as the Soviet Union, China and
Cuba.
study.

The problem is regrettable though at no particular cost to the
The countries studied are diverse enough that if the differ

ences in their systems affect the impact of development on crime
differently, the theory would be rejected and the missing countries
would not have made a difference.

In fact, such a conclusion will

suggest a need for the exploration of the impact of specific insystem characteristics.

If the data show consistent relationship s

in all regions, the hypotheses are not rejected and the theory is
not rejected.

Failure to reject a hypothesis or theory is not a

proof for it, but rather a statement of its probable validity requir
ing further explorations.

A new study would then be desirable which

compares the socialist countries with the free world to see if the
differences in political, social, and economic systems, which differ
entiates the countries from which the data are available and the ones
from what data are not available, contribute differently to the impact
of modernization.

The findings from this study might provide the basis

for further directions of inquiry on the relationship between moderni
zation and crime.

0

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

CHAPTER V

DATA ANALYSES

Introduction

Though there were 54 countries from which data were available
there were not the same number of countries from each region.

Some

regions had several countries and some had comparatively fewer nations
from which data were available.

To have a fair representation of

nations, it was decided that the number of countries from each region be
approximately the same.

Since a larger sample is usually

more representative of the population than a small one, it was decided
that as many countries as were possible to be drawn from each region was
a fair size of the sample of nations.

Latin America and Scandinavia

regions each had only five nations from which data were available.

It

was decided that all five countries or nations in these two regions
would be taken as samples.

This obviously is not a random sample and it

cannot be said for certain the effect this non-randomness has on the
representativeness of these countries for the region.

The other four

regions had more countries representing them out of which a random
selection of six countries per region was made.
The non-randomness of the data as stated earlier requires that
the interpretation of the findings is made cautiously.

One might won

der the extent to which countries that make these records available
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are similar to different from the other countries that do not.

The

expectation of the study is that if the theory being examined is
confirmed by analysis of data from these nations one can assume that
there may be validity to the theory and seek further research using
more representative data.

If the study finds the theory to not be

supported by analysis of data from those regions and countries, one
might conclude that the theory cannot be supported with more repre
sentative data either and suggest that the search for a theory of
crime look beyond modernization.
The classification of countries into the six regions need to
be explained.

The regions as stated earlier are classified according

to their historical, clinical and political similarities.

The Philip

pines though actually Asian were included in Latin America because of
its similarity to the countries in the region, especially in areas
such as social, political and economic dynamics and its dependency on
the United States for development and security.

Its overwhelming

Catholicism, underdevelopment and other social, economic, and poli
tical characteristics are similar to those of Latin American countries.
Besides, the Philippines was once part of the Spanish empire and has
some histo-cultural roots with Spain, as do parts of Latin America.
Scandinavian countries represent a unique group of nations because
of their shared geography, history and political philosophies.

New

Zealand is a unique country as an island, and a multicultural society.
Colonization and subsequent membership in the British commonwealth
brought it closer to Europe.

It has developed a social democratic

process, industrialization and a socio-political stand on social,
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political, military and economic issues similar to the Scandinavian
countries.

This is most true in its emphasis on being a modern ser

vice welfare oriented society and its Scandinavian like resistance
or lack of interest in military growth.

New Zealand places much

more emphasis on social development than global military influence.
It is classified in the study with the Scandinavian countries of
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland.
The hypotheses are tested using data from each of the six
regions.

The data are averaged to obtain single scores for each of

the regions.

The regions are the units of analysis.

Modernization

theory of crime is not rejected if there is a consistent positive
correlation between indicators of modernization and the different
crimes and in all the regions over the period studied.

Averaging

data from different countries enable the use of regions as units
of analysis since the study assumes that countries in each region
are more similar than they are different and that these similarities
affect the nature of their experience with both crime and moderniza
tion.

The fact that some of the countries have larger populations,

higher rates of crime, higher levels of development, and may have
better records than other countries may skew the data by averaging.
The impact of this skewness is regrettable, but is expected to be
comparatively less than the traditional method of lumping all na
tions together to come to the kind of conclusions advocates of
modernization theory assert.
Tables are used to show changes in the rates of crimes and
indicators of modernization.

Graphic presentation of trends in
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both development and crime are presented to show both increases
and decreases in modernization and crime during the 25 years.

To

be consistent with the theory the curves for indicators of modern
ization and the different crimes would show similar gradients.
Each hypothesis is also tested using Pearson correlation coeffi
cients in one-tail tests at alpha level .05.

Multiple regressions

are also done to determine the linear dependence of crime on the six
independent variables.

Stepwise regressions are also done to show

which, if any, of the independent variables by themselves or operat
ing jointly have the greatest impact on the rates of crime.

Hypothesis 1

The first research hypothesis is that urbanization causes in
creases in crime.

This means that as a society becomes more urban

ized the rates of crime will increase.

The hypothesis implies that

since the rates of crime are responsive to urbanization, if urbaniza
tion stabilizes the rates of crime will also stabilize.

Alternative

hypothesis (HI) is that urbanization leads to increase in crime.
This is a directional hypothesis as it specifies the particular
effects (positive) urbanization has on crime.

The null hypothesis

(Ho) is that urbanization does not lead to increase in crime.

The

null hypothesis is rejected if there is a positive relationship
between urbanization and crime.
negative or no relationship.

It is not rejected if there is a

Averaged data from each of the regions

are used for analysis.
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Analyses

Region 1--Western Europe and North America

Figure 1 shows the pattern of urban population growth (X.,)
and rates of crime (Y,, Y2, Y4) in Western Europe and North America.
The percentage of the population living in urban areas has remained
fairly constant in these areas during the 25 years at about 77%.
The rates have gone up and down a little a few times, the lowest be
ing 74% in 1960, peaking in 1974 at 77%, remaining at about 77% in
1984, indicating a stabilization.

Though the rate of urbanization

has stabilized, the rate of crime has continued to increase steadily
(Figures 1, 2 and Table 5).
Homicide increased by 100%, major theft by 36%, minor theft by
464% and fraud by 259%.

In fact, average total crime including other

crimes not listed in the study increased by 335% during the period
(Table 5).
Figure 1 shows the general slope of the changes in urban popu
lation (X-,), mean life expectancy (X2) which are indicators of modern
ity and therefore independent variables and average increases in total
crime (Y.,), fraud (Y4) and major theft (Y2) , which are dependent var
iables.

The percentage of the population living in urban areas for

all the years covered and the mean average life expectancy have re
mained steady while the rates of total crime have increased rapidly
and those of major theft and fraud have shown moderate and steady
increases.

This suggests that these increases might be better ex

plained by other factors rather than urbanization.

This also seems
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Urban Population/Life Expectancy and Crime from 1960 to
1984 in Western Europe/North America.
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Table 5

Averaged Indicators of Modernization and Crime in Selected
Western European and American Countries (USA, Canada,
England, France, West Germany, and The Netherlands)
1960 and 1984

Modernization
Indicators/Crime

1960

1984

% Change

% Urban Population

74

77

+

3

Average Life Expectancy

71

76

+

7

% Agriculture Labor Force

12

5

-

7

% Industrial Labor Force

41

33

-

8

GDP Manufacturing

37,460

213,625

+470

122,137

936,613

+667

2,330

4,664

+100

Major Theft

221,888

1,036,867

+367

Minor Theft

358,770

2,024,682

+464

80,908

290,320

+259

996,716

4,331,697

+335

GDP National
Homicide

Fraud
Total Crime*

*Includes other crimes not included above.
Source:

Calculated from Correlates of Crime Data.
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to be true for homicide.

Figure 2 shows that though urbanization

(X.,) and life expectancy remained relatively stable during the
period, the rates of homicide (Y3) continued to increase rapidly.
The relationship between urbanization is further examined by us
ing Pearson Correlation Analysis.

The Pearson correlation analysis

was done on the null (Ho) hypothesis that urbanization does not lead
to increase in crime.

The Ho is rejected if there is a positive

relationship between urbanization and crime, but not if there is a
negative or no relationship.

Table 6 shows that there is a negative

relationship between urbanization and homicide, therefore the null
(Ho) hypothesis is not rejected for the crime.

This means that the

data show that there is no relationship between the amount or rate
of homicide and urbanization.

There is, however, a positive rela

tionship between urbanization and fraud.

This means that fraud may

have kept pace with the rate of urbanization.

The null hypothesis

(Ho) is not rejected if there is a positive correlation between
urbanization and any of the crimes provided the alpha level (2) is
not greater than .05.

There is no significant relationship between

urbanization and major theft.

There are no data on average popula

tion change during the period, however, this is likely to be signi
ficant.

When controlled for even the positive relationship for

fraud which is only .20 may disappear.
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Table 6

Analysis of the Pearson Correlation Independent Variable,
Percent Urbanization and Crime in Western Europe/
North America (1960-1984) and Action Taken
on Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

Major Theft
Fraud
Homicide
Total Crime

P

Action'on Ho

-.0197

.406

Fail to reject

.2091

.010

Rej ect

- .1930

.009

Fail to reject

.0247

.406

Fail to reject

.05 -- 1 Tail Test

Region 2--Asia

Figures 3 and 4 show the pattern of urban growth (X.,) and the
trends in major theft (Y2) , fraud (Y4) , total crime (Y.,) , and homi
cide (Y3) .

The percentage of urban population has increased steadily

in Asia, from 42.42% in 1960 to 56.48% in 1984, a total average of
increase of 14.06%.

The rates of crime have not kept pace with the

urban population increase.

In fact, there have tended to be decreases

in crime (Figures 3, 4 and Table 7).

Besides a modest increase in the

rates of homicide (Y3) the rates of all the other crimes and total
crime have decreased rather than increase.
Analysis of the correlation between urban growth and the differ
ent crimes show that there is a rather strong negative correlation
between urban population growth and both major theft and homicide
(Table 8) and none at all with total crime.

The null hypothesis
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T a b le 7

Averaged Indicators of Modernization and Crime in Selected
Asian Countries (India, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong,
Taiwan and Indonesia) 1960 and 1984

Modernization
Indicators/Crime

1960

1984

% Urban Population

42

57

+

15

Average Life Expectancy

55

66

+

20

% Agriculture Labor Force

51

18

-

33

% Industrial Labor Force

22

30

GDP Manufacturing

% Change

8

3,391

88,109

+2498

13,907

279,575

+1910

3,727

5,076

+

36

Major Theft

79,764

49,280

-

38

Minor Theft

237,350

224,719

5

38,588

37,995

2

791,416

695,093

GDP National
Homicide

Fraud
Total Crime*

-

12

^Includes other crimes not included above.
Source:

Calculated from Correlates of Crime Data.
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that increases in urban population growth does not lead to increase
in crime is not rejected.
The fact that urbanization in Asia occurs with decreases rather
than increases in crime (as in Europe and America) suggests that there
are other factors responsible for the increases or decreases in the
rate of crime in either society.

The positive relationship between

urbanization and fraud though the relationship is negative for other
crimes suggests that there is something unique about the nature of
fraud as a crime that makes it to react differently to urbanization,
such as opportunity of opportunities and social values which emphasize
success.

Table 8
Analysis of the Pearson Correlation Independent Variable,
Percent Urbanization in Asia (1960-1984) and
Action Taken on Null Hypothesis

Crime

Major Theft
Fraud
Homicide
Total Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

-.7823

.000

Fail to reject

.1156

.042

Rej ect

- .5040

.000

Fail to reject

.0000

.500

Fail to reject

Region 3--Middle East

Countries in this region experienced steady growth in the urban
ization. The total increase from 38% of the population living in urban
areas in 1960 to over 57% in 1984, an increase of 19% (Table 9) means
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T a b le 9

Averaged Indicators of Modernization and Crime in Selected
Middle East Countries (Egypt, Morocco, Libya,
Syria, Kuwait, and Turkey) 1960 and 1984

Modernization
Indicators/Crime

1960

1984

% Urban Population

38

57

+

79

Average Life Expectancy

50

63

+

26

% Agriculture Labor Force

51

35

-

16

% Industrial Labor Force

18

27

+

9

GDP Manufacturing

% Change

394

5,149

+1207

3,128

30,247

+ 867

771

315

-

59

Major Theft

2,824

4,050

+

43

Minor Theft

14,844

9,551

-

36

Fraud

12,391

1,010

-

92

Total Crime*

23,899

61,065

+ 156

GDP National
Homicide

*Includes other crimes not included above.
Source:

Calculated from Correlates of Crime Data.
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that more than half the population now live in urban areas.

The

rate of many crimes has not kept pace with the increase in the rate
of urbanization (Figures 5 and 6).
have been decreases.

In fact, for most crimes there

The rates of homicide, minor theft and fraud

decreased significantly.

Major theft and other unidentified crimes

have increased rather rapidly.
These increases in major theft while other crimes have signifi
cantly and consistently reduced are very unique to this region.

In

all the other regions the rates of major theft are comparable with
those of other crimes.

One can speculate as to the effect of unique

social, political and economic dynamics on this difference.

The

economy of this region depends heavily on oil which has attracted
industrial labor from many countries.

The region has lots of crude

oil underground, but lacks the technology to extract and refine it.
Therefore, it has a large population of foreigners who may contribute
to social problems.

Major theft includes crimes which involve signi

ficant loss and threat to the society.
involves a lot of risks.

It is also a crime which

One wonders the extent to which foreigners

contribute to high rates of major theft.

Minor theft includes petty

thefts which are not significantly threatening to the society.

Minor

theft is usually engaged in by people with limited power and resources.
The major percentage of urban population increase is due to large
percentage of increase in the number of foreigners.
The table shows that though murder, minor theft and fraud were
down, the rates of major theft and unclassified crimes in general
increased.

There is no record available to this study as to which
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crimes increased suggesting a more complicated picture of both crime
and development in the area.

As stated earlier, the crimes selected

in the study are not the only crimes that exist.

There are many

crimes which are unique to particular societies and may be a major
source of concern for their that are not for other societies.

Usually

this is a result of specific social and political dynamics in those
societies.

The rapid increase and influence of foreigners in the

predominantly Islam and traditional Middle East societies may have
led to increase in many non-conventional crimes.
Analysis of the correlation between urban growth and the differ
ent crimes (Table 10) shows that there is a negative relationship
between urbanization and all the crimes in the study (major theft, r =
-.30; fraud, r = -.16; and homicide, r = -.37).

The hypothesis that

urbanization does not lead to increases in crime is not rejected.

Table 10
Analysis of the Pearson Correlation Independent Variable,
Percent Urbanization in the Middle East (1960-1984)
and the Action Taken on Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

-.3067

.000

Fail to reject

Fraud

-.1577

.027

Fail to reject

Homicide

-.3737

.000

Fail to reject

Total Crime

-.5004

.000

Fail to reject

.05 -- 1 Tail Test
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Region 4--Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan African countries have experienced rapid increases
in urbanization during the 25 years covered by the study.

In the

six countries studied (Nigeria, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Tanzania
and Zambia) the total average urban percentage population has increas
ed from 11.03% to 26.81%, an increase of 15.78%.
rapid increase.
doubled.

This is the most

During the period the urban population has more than

Table 11 and the graphs (Figures 7 and 8) both show in

creases in all forms of crime.

The rate of homicide has increased

by 186%, major theft by 141%, minor theft by 69%, Fraud by 22% and
average total crime, including ones not identified above by 141%.
Analysis of the correlation between urban growth and the differ
ent crimes in Sub-Saharan Africa shows a negative relationship between
urban growth and homicide.

The relationship between urbanization and

theft is not significant, there is a positive relationship with fraud
(Table 12).

The null hypothesis that increases in urban population

does not lead to increase in crime is not rejected in the case of ma
jor theft, homicide and for total crime.

It is rejected for fraud as

there is positive relationship between increase in percentage of
population living in urban areas and rate of fraud (Table 12).
Though Table 11 shows increases in the rates of major theft, homicide
and total crime, an analysis (Table 12) shows a negative relationship
between the increases in urbanization and crime.

This is probably

because the increases in the crimes are not proportionate to the rate
of urbanization.

The hypotheses are supported if modernization trends
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T a b le 11

Averaged Indicators of Modernization and Crime in Selected
Sub-Saharan African Countries (Nigeria, Kenya,
Ivory Coast, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia)
1960 and 1984

1984

% Urban Population

11

57

+

16

Average Life Expectancy

40

63

CM

% Agriculture Labor Force

84

35

-

43

5

27

+

5

53

5,149

+1800

1,009

30,247

+1485

300

315

+ 186

Major Theft

6,424

4,050

+ 141

Minor Theft

19,175

9,551

+

69

1,225

1,010

+

22

46,835

112,976

% Industrial Labor Force
GDP Manufacturing
GDP National
Homicide

Fraud
Total Crime*

% Change

00

1960

4-

Modernization
Indicators/Crime

+ 141

^Includes other crimes not included above.
Source:

Calculated from Correlates of Crime Data.
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Urban Population/Life Expectancy and Crime from 1960
to 1984 in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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T a b l e 12

Analysis of the Pearson Correlation Independent Variable,
Percent Urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa (1960-1984)
and Action Taken On the Null Hypothesis

Crime

Major Theft

r

Action on Ho

-.0408

.310

Fail to reject

.2620

.001

Rej ect

-.1365

.048

Fail to reject

.0395

.316

Fail to reject

Fraud
Homicide

P

Total Crime

(?(= .05 -- 1 Tail Test
show proportionate changes in the rates of crime.

The changes do not

take into account population changes, which are very high in this area.

Region 5--Latin America

In Latin America, like in other regions, there have been signi
ficant increases in the indicators of modernization.

They have also

experienced their share of increases in the number of different crimes
(Table 13, Figures 9 and 10).
Like in Sub-Saharan Africa both indicators of modernization and
numbers of crime in Latin America have increased steadily over the
years (Table 13, Figures 9 and 10).

The average percent urban

population has increased steadily from 45% in 1960 to 61% in 1984.
There is almost no fluctuation in the rate of increase (Figures 9
and 10).

With some fluctuation all crime rates have also increased.
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T a b l e 13

Averaged Indicators of Modernization and Crime in Selected
Latin American Countries (Jamaica, Chile, Peru,
West Indies and the Philippines)
1960 and 1984

Modernization
Indicators/Crime

1960

1984

% Change

% Urban Population

45

61

+

16

Average Life Expectancy

55

66

+

20

% Agriculture Labor Force

46

29

-

29

% Industrial Labor Force

20

18

-

2

734

4,210

+ 458

GDP National

2,888

14,649

+ 407

Homicide

1,438

4,830

+ 236

Major Theft

4,616

23,896

+ 418

Minor Theft

10,062

16,226

+

61

3,771

4,000

+

6

35,805

89,538

GDP Manufacturing

Fraud
Total Crime*

+ 150

*Includes other crimes not included above.
Source:

Calculated from Correlates of Crime Data.
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Analysis of the Pearson correlation between urban growth and
the different crimes shows that there is a positive relationship
between urbanization and major theft, fraud and total crime.

The

null hypothesis that increase in urbanization does not lead to in
creases in crime is rejected (Table 14).

There is, however, a nega

tive relationship between increase in urbanization and homicide,
suggesting that in this region increases in urbanization does not
lead to increase in homicide.

For the crime of homicide, therefore,

the null hypothesis is not rejected (Table 14).

Table 14
Analysis of the Pearson Correlation Independent Variable,
Percent Urbanization in Latin America (1960-1984) and
Action Taken on The Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

.7565

.000

Rej ect

Fraud

.7398

.000

Rej ect

Homicide

.4134

.000

Fail to reject

Total Crime

.2619

.004

Reject

0^ = .05 -- 1 Tail Test

Region 6--Scandinavia

Scandinavian countries show increases in development as well
as increases in various crimes.

The rate urbanization has increased

rapidly and steadily from only 59% in 1960 to 78% in 1984, with
almost no fluctuation, an increase of 19%.
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The rate of crime has also increased steadily and rather rapid
ly.

The total recorded average of crime in 1960 was 154,064.

It

increased to 529,866 in 1984, a total increase of 244% (Table 15,
Figures 11 and 12).

Homicide increased by 231%, major theft by 300%

and Fraud by 217%.
Analysis of the correlation between urban growth and the differ
ent crimes shows a positive relationship between urbanization and each
of the crimes considered (Table 16).

The null hypothesis that increase

in urbanization does not lead to increase in crime is rejected suggest
ing that there is a correlation between urbanization and crime, at
least in Scandinavia.

Summary

The research hypothesis, as stated earlier, is that urbanization
leads to increases in crime.

The null hypothesis is that urbanization

does not lead to increase in crime.

Though correlations do not prove

causality, there can be no causality without correlations.

The null

hypothesis that urbanization does not cause crime is not rejected if
there is no consistent correlation between urbanization and crime.
This hypothesis has been tested using data from the six regions.
Analyses show no consistent correlations between urbanization
and crime.

In Europe and North America, though there has been steady

increase in crime, there appears to be no correlation between this fact
and urbanization, since urbanization has seemed to stabilize.

The

rapid increase in crime must be explained by factors other than
urbanization, such as social and cultural conditions in the regions.
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T a b l e 15

Averaged Indicators of Modernization and Crime in Scandinavian
Countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and New Zealand)
1960 and 1984

Modernization
Indicators/Crime

1960

1984

% Urban Population

59

78

+

19

Average Life Expectancy

72

76

+

6

% Agriculture Labor Force

21

8

-

13

% Industrial Labor Force

37

33

-

4

GDP Manufacturing

1,458

10,667

+ 632

GDP National

6,607

55,814

+ 733

71

235

+ 231

Major Theft

20,149

80,667

+ 300

Minor Theft

70,898

179,363

153

Fraud

10,592

33,618

+ 217

154,064

529,866

+ 244

Homicide

Total Crime*

% Change

^Includes other crimes not included above.
Source:

Calculated from Correlates of Crime Data.
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Figure 11.

Urban Population/Life Expectancy and Crime from 1960
to 1984 in Scandinavia.
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16

Analysis of the Pearson Correlation Independent Variable,
Percent Urbanization in Scandinavia and New Zealand
(1960-1984) and Action Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

.6322

.000

Rej ect

Fraud

.4365

.000

Rej ect

Homicide

.3267

.000

Rej ect

Total Crime

.4802

.000

Rej ect

q (= .05 -- 1 Tail Test

In Asia, also, there is no positive correlation between
urbanization and crime, except fraud.

In fact, in Asia there is a

negative correlation between urbanization and both major theft and
homicide.

The null hypothesis (Ho) cannot be rejected.

In the

Middle East region, also, there is no positive relationship between
urbanization and crime.

In this region, also, there is actually a

negative correlation between urbanization and crime.
hypothesis cannot be rejected.

The null

In Sub-Saharan Africa also there

is no positive correlation between urbanization and crime (except
for fraud).
The situation is different in Latin America and in the Scandina
vian countries.

In these regions there is a strong positive correla

tion between urbanization and crime (except in Latin America where
there is a negative relationship between urbanization and homicide).
The differences in the relationship between particular crimes and
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urbanization suggest further that each crime needs to be understood
separately as it relates to social, economic and cultural conditions.
Since the apparent relationship in region one and six is not re
plicated in the other four regions, the hypothesis cannot be rejected.
The correlation must be explained by other factors unique to those
societies.

It must be concluded that the null hypothesis (Ho) that

urbanization does not lead to increase in crime cannot be rejected1
.

Hypothesis 2

The second hypothesis is that life expectancy, as an indicator of
modernization, is related positively to crime. This is due to the fact
that modernization (or development) improves the quality of life lead
ing to longevity.

The research hypothesis is, therefore, that increases

in life expectancy would lead to higher rates of crime.

Alternative

hypothesis (HI) drawn from the research hypothesis is that increased
life expectancy is proportionately related to the rate of crime.

The

null hypothesis (Ho) is that increased life expectancy does not lead to
increase in crime.

The null (Ho) is rejected if there is a consistent

positive relationship between life expectancy and crime rates.

This

would support the alternative hypothesis that increase in life
expectancy is positively related to crime.

Region 1--Western Europe and North America

During the period between 1960 and 1984, the average life
expectancy of people in this region increased only moderately from 71
years to 76 years, an increase of 7%.

During the same period, the rates
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of all crimes have increased rapidly (Table 5, Figures 1 and 2).
The Pearson correlation coefficients of the effect of life
expectancy on crime in Western Europe and North America show modest
positive relationship for major theft, homicide and total crime but
none for fraud (Table 17).

Table 17
The Pearson Correlation Coefficient on the Effect of Life
Expectancy on Different Types of Crimes in
Western Europe and America (1960-1984) and
Action Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

.1558

.040

Rej ect

Fraud

.0880

.167

Fail to Reject

Homicide

.1935

.015

Rej ect

Total Crime

.2012

.012

Rej ect

.05 -- 1 Tail Test

Region 2--Asia

In Asia life expectancy has increased by 11 years, from 55 to
66, an increase of 20% (Table 7).

Since these societies have ex

perienced decreases in crime rather than increases, life expectancy
cannot be said to be positively related to crime.

Figures 3, 4 and

Table 7 show increases in life expectancy and decreases in total
crime and specific crimes, except homicide which increased moderately.
The Pearson correlation coefficient analysis shows significant nega
tive relationship between life expectancy and all types of crime
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(Table 18).

The negative relationship does not even take into account

the major population increase that has taken place in the region.

Table 18
The Pearson Correlation Coefficient on the Effect of Life
Expectancy on Different Crimes in Asia (1960-1984) and
Action Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

-.7980

.000

Fail to Reject

Fraud

-.3285

.000

Fail to Reject

Homicide

-.5255

.000

Fail to Reject

Total Crime

-.4856

.000

Fail to Reject

.05 -- 1 Tail Test

Region 3--Middle East

Average life expectancy in the Middle East region increased from
50 to 63, an increase of 26% (Table 9, Figures 5 and 6).

During the

same period the rate of homicide dropped by 59%, of fraud by 92%
and minor theft by 36%.

Only major theft and unspecified crimes

have increased.
Analysis of the relationship between life expectancy and crime
in the Middle East, using the Pearson correlation coefficients, shows
a negative relationship for some crimes and none for other crimes
(Table 19).

This may mean that there is actually no relationship

between longevity and crime or that the relationship is adequately
neutralized by other factors.

Whatever the case is, it seems from
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the correlation that in this region longevity, which has increased
with modernization has not contributed much to increase in crime.

Table 19
The Pearson Correlation
Expectancy on
Middle East
Taken on

Crime

Coefficient on the Effect of Life
Different Crimes in the
(1960-1984) and Action
the Null Hypothesis

r

Major Theft

P

Action on Ho

.0475

.282

Fail to Reject

Fraud

-.3734

.000

Fail to Reject

Homicide

- .2071

.006

Fail to Reject

Total Crime

-.2954

.000

Fail to Reject

.05 -- 1 Tail Test

Region 4--Sub-Saharan Africa

Life expectancy in Africa has increased from 40 to 51, an increase
of 28% during the 25 years.

All indicators of modernization and all

crimes have increased (Figures 7, 8 and Table 11).
Further analysis of the relationship between life expectancy
and crime in Sub-Saharan Africa is done using Pearson correlation
coefficients, as in the other regions.

The results show a positive

relationship for all crimes (Table 20), except that the relationship
for fraud is not significant to X.05.

In Sub-Saharan Africa there

have been increases in both longevity and crime.

This positive

correlation may or may not be causal.
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T a b le

20

The Pearson Correlation Coefficient on the Effect of Life
Expectancy on Different Crimes in Sub-Saharan Africa
(1960-1984) and Action Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

.6490

.000

Rej ect

Fraud

.1132

.084

Fail to Reject

Homicide

.3109

.000

Rej ect

Total Crime

.4312

.000

Rej ect

.05 -- 1 Tail Test

Region 5--Latin America

Average life expectancy in Latin America increased from 55 to 66,
a general average increase of 20%.

During the same period there were

general increases in all types of crime (Table 13, Figures 9 and 10).
The Pearson correlation coefficient analysis of the relationship
between life expectancy and crime in Latin America shows a positive for
crime in general, but negative for homicide and fraud.
ship for major theft is not significant (Table 21).

The relation

The hypothesis

that there is a positive relationship between life expectancy and
crime is not supported as far as this region is concerned.
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T a b le

21

The Pearson Correlation Coefficient on the Effect of Life
Expectancy on Different Crimes in Latin America
(1960-1984) and Action Taken on
the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

.0051

.480

Fail to Reject

Fraud

- .1729

.043

Fail to Reject

Homicide

- .1340

.092

Fail to Reject

.1745

.041

Rej ect

Major Theft

Total Crime

.05 -- 1 Tail Test

Region 6--Scandinavia

In Scandinavian countries which have enjoyed a high standard of
living for a relatively long time, life expectancy has increased by
only 6% during the 25 years, from 72 in 1960 to 76 in 1984.

During

the same period, the rates of crime have increased steadily and rapid
ly by comparison.

Homicide increased by 231%, major theft by 300%,

minor theft by 153%, fraud by 217% and total crime by 244% respectively
(Table 15; Figure 11, Y1, Y2, Y4; and Figure 12, Y3) .

How much of these

increases can be attributed to increases in life expectancy can be
determined by examining the relationship between life expectancy and
these specific crimes.
In this area of the world the Pearson correlation coefficients
of the relationship between life expectancy and crime show a rather
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significant relationship (Table 22).

As stated earlier a correlation

is a necessary condition though it does not prove causality.

To ex

amine and determine causality regression analysis will be done.

Table 22
The Pearson Correlation Coefficient on the Effect of Life
Expectancy on Different Crimes in Scandinavia (1960-1984)
and Action Taken on the Null Hypothesis.

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

.6892

.000

Rej ect

Fraud

.5069

.000

Rej ect

Homicide

.3768

.000

Rej ect

Total Crime

.4589

.000

Reject

Summary

The second hypothesis states that life expectancy is positively
related to crime.

This means that in societies which are developing

rapidly there will be increases in quality of life and longevity.
However, if development or modernization and crime are positively
related, there will also be proportional increases in crime.
Analyses of the data show no consistent correlations between
life expectancy and crime.

In Europe and North America and Sub-Saharan

there is a positive relationship for major theft, homicide and crime
in general, but not for fraud.

In Asia, the Middle East, and Latin

America there is either negative or no correlations between life
expectancy and crime.

In Scandinavia there is a positive
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correlation between life expectancy and all the crimes studied.
The inconsistency suggests that the rate of crime may depend
on factors other than simply improved quality of life and longevity.
In almost all societies crimes tend to be committed by young to middle
age adults.

Less developed and developing societies tend to have

higher percentages of the population in this age group, which would
suggest a negative relationship between life expectancy and crime.
On the other hand, increased development leads to increased life
expectancy.

If development as well as high juvenile population causes

crime, the relationship would be more complicated.

However, since

the theory assumes that development leads to increases in both crime
and life expectancy, we simply need to examine the relationship between
the two.

Analysis of the data does not show a consistent negative

relationship.

Europe, North America, Scandinavia and Africa show a

positive relationship between life expectancy and various crimes.
One can argue that the positive relationship in Scandinavia and the
West is due to development and in Africa due to high juvenile
population.

This, however, does not explain the negative relation

ships in Asia, which is highly developed, and Latin America which has a
high juvenile population.

The above analysis suggests that there is, at

least from these data, no sufficient evidence to suggest that longevity
and crime are indeed related.

Since the null

hypo

thesis states that they are not positively related, it cannot be
rejected.

However, not rejecting the hypothesis does not mean the

two are negatively related.

This means that the analysis has not

established the exact nature of the relationship between longevity
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(or life expectancy and crime).

Hypothesis 3

The research hypothesis is that industrialization, as an indicator
of modernization, is related positively to crime.

This does not mean

that people who are employed in industries commit crimes.

Rather,

the higher the percentage of the population employed in industry the
more the society produces that can be stolen or robbed and in general
the more opportunity there is for crime.

Industrialization is said

to create social changes, including structured time, social and eco
nomic activities which in turn create opportunities for crime, absence
of potential guardians against crime and increased desire for potential
benefits of the criminal behavior (Cohen & Felson, 1979).
to increase in crime.

This leads

This means that industrial societies or com

munities have more crime.

The alternative hypothesis (HI) is that

increase in the percentage of the population employed in industry is
positively related to crime.

The null hypothesis (Ho) is that in

creases in industrial employment is not positively related to crime.
The null hypothesis (Ho) is rejected, if there is a consistent positive
relationship between percentage of population employed in industries
and crime in all the regions.

Region 1--Western Europe and North America

Figure 13 (X3) and Table 5 show a decrease of 8 in the per
centage of the population employed in industries from 1960 to 1980.
During the entire period covered by the study the rates of all
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crimes have increased steadily (Table 5 and Figure 13, Y1, Y2, Y4) ,
including homicide (Figure 14, Y 3) .

These graphs and table suggest

that there is either a negative relationship between the percentage
of the population employed in industries and crime or that there is
no relationship at all.
The relationship between the percentage of the population em
ployed in industry and the rates of crime is analyzed using the Pear
son correlation coefficients.

The result shows that there is a nega

tive relationship between the percentage of the population employed
in industry and major theft, homicide and total crime (Table 23).
The hypothesis that there is no positive relationship between indus
trial employment and crime is not rejected.

Table 23
The Pearson Correlation Coefficient of the Effects of the
Percentage of the Population Employed in Industry
and Different Crimes in Europe and North America
(1960-1984) and Actions Taken on
the Null Hypothesis

Crime

Action on Ho

r

P

-.3200

.000

Fail to Reject

.0087

.461

Fail to Reject

Homicide

-.4228

.000

Fail to Reject

Total Crime

- .3858

.000

Fail to Reject

Major Theft
Fraud

Region 2--Asia

In Asia the percentage of the population participating in
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Agricultural and Industrial Labor Force and Crime from 1960
to 1984 in Western Europe/North America.
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industrial labor has increased steadily from 22 in 1960 to 30 in 1984
(Table 7; Figure 15, X3; and Figure 16, X3) , an increase of 8%.

During

the same period the rate of all crimes declined except homicide which
increased by 36% (Table 7, Figure 15, Y1, Y2, Y4; and Figure 16, Y3) .
The increase in homicide and decreases in other crimes do not take into
account increases in population.

It is possible that the population in

the region has increased by more than 30% during the 25 years.
The rate of major theft dropped by 38%, minor theft by 5%, fraud
by 2% and total crime by 12% (Table 7).

The Pearson correlation

coefficients of the relationship between the percentage of the popula
tion employed in industry and crime shows a negative relationship for
all kinds of crime (Table 24).

This suggests that, modernization as

indicated by increase in the percentage of the population employed
in industry is related negatively to crime in Asia, except for the
crime of fraud in which there is no significant relationship.

Table 24
The Pearson Correlation Coefficient of the Effects of the Percentage
of the Population Employed in Industry and Different Crimes in Asia
(1960-1984) and Actions Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

-.6750

.000

Fail to Reject

Fraud

-.0244

.394

Fail to Reject

Homicide

-.4445

.000

Fail to Reject

Total Crime

-.1583

.039

Fail to Reject

= .05 -- 1 Tail Test
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Region 3--Middle East

The percentage of the population employed in industries increased
by 9, from 18 in 1960 to 27 in 1984.

Though the total percentage in

crease is only 9, this is actually a very rapid increase as the popu
lation employed in industries actually increased by half (Table 9;
Figure 17, X3; and Figure 18, X3) .

The rate of conventional criminal

activity has generally not increased much (Figure 17, Y 1( Y2, Y„).
Homicide dropped by 59% (Figure 18, Y3) , minor thefts declined by 36%
and fraud by 92%.
crime by 156%.

Major theft increased by 43% and unclassified total

It is not known which particular crimes increased to

yield the 156% increase in total crime.
The Pearson correlation coefficient analysis of the relation
ship between the percentage of the population employed in industry
and different crimes in the region shows that there is a negative
relationship (Table 25).

This means that increases in crime cannot

be due to increases in industrialization in this region.

Table 25
The Pearson Correlation Coefficient of the Effects of the Percentage
of the Population Employed in Industry and Different Crimes in the
Middle East (1960-1984) and Actions Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

-.6106

.000

Fail to Reject

Fraud

-.2520

.001

Fail to Reject

Homicide

-.5524

.000

Fail to Reject

Total Crime

-.5588

.000

Fail to Reject

0 < “ .05 -- 1 Tail Test
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Agricultural and Industrial Labor Force and Crime from 1960
to 1984 in the Middle East.
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Agricultural and Industrial Labor Force and Homicide from
1960 to 1984 in the Middle East.
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Region 4 - -Sub-Saharan Africa

Industrial labor force grew by 5% in Sub-Saharan Africa during
the period covered by the study, from 5% in 1960 to 10% in 1984 (Table
.11).

The number of all major crimes has increased steadily over the

period (Figure 19, Y1, Y2, Y4; Figure 20, Y3; and Table 11).

Homicide

rates have increased by 186%, major theft by 141%, minor theft by 69%,
fraud by 22% and total crime

by 141%.

The Pearson correlation coefficient analysis of the effects

of the

percentage of the population employed in industries in the Sub-Saharan
Africa (1960-1984) on the rates of different crimes during the same
period shows a positive relationship (Table 26).

It is possible that in

the Sub-Saharan region increased industrialization contributes to crim
inality.

This relationship is explored later using regression analysis.

Table 26
The Pearson Correlation Coefficient of the Effects of the
Percentage of the Population Employed in Industry
and Different Crimes in Sub-Saharan Africa
(1960-1984) and Actions Taken on
the Null Hypothesis

Crime

Action on Ho

r

P

Major Theft

.4125

.000

Reject

Fraud

.3457

.000

Reject

Homicide

.5744

.000

Rej ect

Total Crime

.7358

.000

Rej ect

0 ^= .05 -- 1 Tail Test
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Figure 19.

Agricultural and Industrial Labor Force and Crime from 1960
to 1984 in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Agricultural and Industrial Labor Force and Homicide from
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Region 5--Latin America

In Latin America the percentage of the population employed in
industries has actually dropped by 2% during the 25 year period cover
ed by the study, from 20 in 1960 to 18 in 1984 (Table 13; Figure 21,
X3; and Figure 22, X3) .

The rates of all crimes increased during the

period, homicide by 236%, major theft by 418%, minor theft by 61%,
fraud by 6% and total crime increased by 150% (Table 13; Figure 21,
Y-,, Y2, Y4; and Figure 22, Y 3) .

This suggests that if there is any

relationship it is a negative one.
The Pearson correlation coefficient analysis shows that there
is a negative relationship between the percentage of the population
employed in industries and most crime in this region (Table 27).
The relationships between the percentage of population employed in
industry and major theft, and fraud are not significant to X.05.
This means that either industrialization reduces crime or there are
other factors which need to be explored.

Table 27
The Pearson Correlation Coefficient of the Effects of the Percentage
of the Population Employed in Industry and Different Crimes in Latin
America (1960-1984) and Actions Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

.0030

.489

Fail to Reject

Fraud

-.0593

.285

Fail to Reject

Homicide

-.4807

.000

Fail to Reject

Total Crime

-.3677

.000

Fail to Reject

Major Theft

Action on Ho

.05 -- 1 Tail Test
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Agricultural and Industrial Labor Force and Crime from
1960 to 1984 in Latin America.
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Agricultural and Industrial Labor Force and Homicide from
1960 to 1984 in Latin America.
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Region 6 - -Scandinavia

In this region the percentage of the population employed in in
dustries has dropped from 37 in 1960 to 33 in 1984, a decline of 4%.
The rate of all crimes have increased rather rapidly.

Homicide has

increased by 231%, major theft by 300%, minor theft by 153%, fraud by
217%, and total crime by 244% (Table 15).

Figure 23 (Y1, Y2, Y4) and

Figure 24 (Y3) show steady increases in the rates of these crimes.
There is a particularly rapid increase in rates of the total crime
and homicide.
According to Table 28, the analysis of the relationship between the
percentage of the population employed in industries and the rates of
crime during the same period shows that a there is no direct

Table 28
The Pearson Correlation Coefficient of the Effects of the Percentage
of the Population Employed in Industry and Different Crimes in
Scandinavia (1960-1984) and Actions Taken
on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

P

.0483

.296

Fail to Reject

Fraud

- .0035

.485

Fail to Reject

Homicide

-.2832

.001

Fail to Reject

Total Crime

-.1649

.033

Fail to Reject

Major Theft

q

Action on Ho

r

.05 -- 1 Tail Test
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relationship, but that there is a negative relationship between
industrial employment and total crime and homicide, though a weak
one, and no significant relationship for major theft and for fraud.
This relationship is also explored further by regression analysis.

Summary

The hypothesis that industrialization and crime are related is
supported if industrialization (demonstrated by increasing percent
age of the population employed in industries) consistently concurs
with proportional increase in crime.

The null hypothesis that

increases in industrial employment is not positively related to
crime is not rejected if there is a positive relationship but is
not rejected if there is a negative relationship or no relationship
between the two in all the regions.
The analysis shows that there is a negative relationship between
industrialization and major theft, homicide and total crime in Western
Europe/North America, Asia, and Middle East.

It is negative for

industrialization and homicide, and total crime in Latin America and
Scandinavia.
In all the regions, except Sub-Saharan Africa, there is either no
significant relationship or a negative one.

In Asia and the Middle

East where industrialization has been most rapid (industrialization
here is measured by increases in the percentage of the population
employed in industries) there is a strong negative relationship
between this and crime.
In Africa where development seems to be rather slow there is
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a strong positive relationship.

It seems that there are other

factors rather than industrialization that are responsible for the
rate of crime.

The null hypothesis is not rejected.

This means

that the hypothesis that modernization and crime are related posi
tively is not supported.

These relationships are later explored by

regression analysis.

Hypothesis 4

The research hypothesis is that as a society develops, large scale
commercialization and industrial productivity results in decreased
percentage of the population employed in agriculture.

The research

hypothesis is that this decrease leads to increase in the rate of
crime.

The alternative hypothesis is that decrease in the percent

age of the population engaged in agriculture is positively related
to crime.

This means that there is a negative relationship between

the percentage of the population employed in agriculture and crime.
The null hypothesis (Ho) drawn from the above is that there is a
positive relationship between the percentage of the population em
ployed in agriculture and crime, This null hypothesis (Ho) is reject
ed if there is either a negative or no relationship between the per
centage of the population employed in agriculture and crime.

It is

retained if there is a positive relationship.

Region 1--Western Europe and North America

The percentage of people employed in agriculture dropped from
12 to 5, a decrease of 7% (Figure 21, X4 and Figure 22, X4) .

The
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rates of all types of crime have increased (Table 5; Figure 13, Y1,
Y2, Y4; and Figure 14, Y3) .
alternative hypothesis.

These findings are consistent with the

This means that the null hypothesis is not

supported.
Analysis of the relationship using the Pearson correlation
shows that in Europe and North America there is a negative relation
ship between the percentage of the population employed in agriculture
and crime (Table 29).

The null hypothesis (Ho) is rejected.

Table 29
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of the Effect of the Percentage
of the Population Employed in Agriculture on the Rates of
Crime in Western Europe and North America and Actions
Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

-.4681

.000

Rej ect

.0470

.301

Rej ect

Homicide

-.3530

.000

Reject

Total Crime

-.4312

.000

Rej ect

Major Theft
Fraud

Action on Ho

cK= .05 -- 1 Tail Test

This means that in Europe and North America the decrease in the
percentage of the population employed in agriculture is related to
increase in crime.

This is true for all crimes except for fraud, where

the relationship is not significant to X.05.
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Region 2 - -Asia

,

In Asia, with recent rapid development, the percentage of the
population employed in agriculture has dropped from 51 in 1960 to 18
in 1984 (Table 7; Figure 15, X4; and Figure 16, X4) , a decrease of 33%.
This rapid change has occurred while the rates of almost all crimes
have dropped steadily (Figure 15, Y4, Y2, Y4; Figure 16, Y3; and Table
7) also.

It seems that relationships are different in Asia than in

Western Europe.
The Pearson correlation analysis of the relationship between the
percentage of the population employed in agriculture and crime shows a
strong positive relationship for major theft, homicide and negative
relationship for fraud (Table 30).

Table 30
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Effect of the Percentage
of the Population Employed in Agriculture in Asia on the
Rates of Crime and Actions Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

Major Theft
Fraud
Homicide
Total Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

.7217

.000

Fail to Reject

- .1601

.043

Reject

.4313

.000

Fail to Reject

-.0614

.256

Fail to Reject

C>^= .05 -- 1 Tail Test

The analysis shows that in Asia the higher the percentage of the
population employed in agriculture the more crime there is, the lower
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percentage the less crime.

It appears from this analysis that in Asia

the process of modernization may actually reduce some forms of criminal
activity.

The exact nature of the relationship is better understood by

doing regression analysis.

This is done later.

Region 3--Middle East

In the Middle East percentage of the population employed in
agriculture dropped from 51% in 1960 to 35% in 1984 (Table 9), a
decrease of 16%.

The rates of major homicide (Figure 18, Y3) and fraud

(Figure 17, Y4) have also dropped steadily during the period but major
theft and total crime (Figure 17, Y4, Y2) have increased.
Analysis of the relationship between the percentage of the pop
ulation employed in agriculture and crime using Pearson correlation
shows that there is a positive relationship (Table 31).

This means

that like in Asia, decrease in agricultural employment leads to de
crease in crime or at least the two variables are positively related.
The null is not rejected.

There is a rather strong positive relation

ship .
In this region the hypothesis that decreases in the percentage
of the population employed in agriculture is positively related to
increase in crime overwhelmingly rejected.

Modernization as indi

cated by decrease in agricultural labor force and crime are nega
tively related.

The negative relationship between employment in

agriculture and crime suggests that as countries in this region
develop and more people get employed in industry rather than
agriculture crime rates would tend to go down.
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T a b le

31

Pearson Correlation Coefficients of the Effect of the Percentage
of the Population Employed in Agriculture in the Middle East
on the Rates of Crime and Actions Taken on
the Null Hypothesis

Crime

.05

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

.5004

.000

Fail to Reject

Fraud

.2394

.003

Fail to Reject

Homicide

.5699

.000

Fail to Reject

Total Crime

.6664

.000

Fail to Reject

- 1 Tail Test

Region 4--Sub-Saharan Africa

In Sub-Saharan Africa the percentage of the population employed
in Agriculture dropped from 84 in 1960 to 41 in 1984, a drop of 43%
(Table 11; Figure 17, X4; and Figure 18, X4) , the largest drop in
any of the regions.

The rates of all crimes have increased in the

region (Table 11; Figure 19, Y4, Y2, Y4; and Figure 20, Y3) .
Analysis of the data, using the Pearson correlations shows that
there is generally a negative relationship between percentage employ
ment in agriculture and crime (Table 32).

The null hypothesis is that

there is a positive relationship between the percentage of the popu
lation employed in agriculture and crime is rejected.

This means

that modernization as measured by decrease in the percentage of the
population employed in agriculture is related positively to increase
in crime.

It would seem, therefore, that in Sub-Saharan Africa the
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alternative hypothesis (HI) is supported.

Table 32
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Effect of the Percentage
of the Population Employed in Agriculture in Sub-Saharan
Africa on the Rates of Crime and Actions Taken on
the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

-.4351

.000

Rej ect

Fraud

-.2575

.001

Rej ect

Homicide

-.3164

.000

Rej ect

Total Crime

-.4146

.000

Rej ect

.05 -- 1 Tail Test

Region 5--Latin America

Countries in Latin America have also experienced rapid decline
in the percentage of the population employed in agriculture, from 46
in 1960 to 29 in 1984 (Table 13; Figure 21, X4; and Figure 22 , X4) ,
a decrease of 20%.

During the same period the rates of all crimes

have continued to increase (Table 13; Figure 21, Y-,, Y2, Y4; and
Figure 22, Y3) .
The relationship between the decline in the percentage of the
population employed in agriculture and the rate of crime is further
examined by the Pearson correlation coefficient analysis.

The analy

sis shows that the relationship is negative for major theft and fraud
(Table 33), but positive for homicide and crime in general.
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T a b l e 33

Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Effect of the Percentage
of the Population Employed in Agriculture in Latin America on
the Rates of Crime and Actions Taken on the Null Hypothesis

r

Crime

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

-.3408

.000

Rej ect

Fraud

-.2972

.001

Reject

r

Crime

P

Action on Ho

Homicide

.4832

.000

Fail to Reject

Total Crime

.0021

.492

Reject

o{— .05 -- 1 Tail Test

The hypothesis that development measured by decrease in the percentage
of the population employed in agriculture does not lead to crime in
general, but may do so for theft and fraud.

Resion 6--Scandinavia

Scandinavian countries and New Zealand have also experienced
continued decline in the percentage of their populations that were
engaged in agricultural labor (Table 15; Figure 23, X4; and Figure
24, X4) .

A drop from 21% in 1960 to 8% in 1984 is a big decline and

an indicator of a rapid modernization.

The rates of crimes have

continued to increase (Figure 23, Y-,, Y2, Y4 and Figure 24, Y3) .
To further explore this relationship the Pearson correlation
coefficient analysis is done.

The results show a negative relation

ship between the percentage of the population employed in agriculture
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and crime (Table 34).

The null hypothesis is rejected.

In this

region, too, the hypothesis that increasing development, at least
as indicated by decreases in the percentage of the population em
ployed in agriculture is related positively to crime.

Table 34
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Effect of the Percentage
of the Population Employed in Agriculture in Scandinavia
on the Rates of Crime and Actions Taken on
the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

-.6416

.000

Rej ect

Fraud

-.4150

.000

Reject

Homicide

-.3063

.000

Rej ect

Total Crime

-.4470

.000

Reject

<7<= .05 -- 1 Tail Test

Summary

Industrialization is a process of developing which involves a
shift from peasant farming to mechanized agriculture and therefore
less people are employed in agriculture.

Since the decline in the

percentage of the population employed in agriculture indicates a shift
to mechanization (an indicator of modernization) it is expected that
this will consistently result in increase in crime.

In other words,

societies with small percentage of its citizens employed in agricul
ture will have more crime.
Analysis of the data does not show a consistent relationship or
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correlation between agricultural employment and crime.

In Europe,

North America, Sub-Saharan Africa and Scandinavia there is clearly
a negative relationship between the percentage of the population
employed in agriculture and crime.

The null hypothesis (Ho) is

rejected for these regions and supporting the hypothesis of a posi
tive relationship.

In the Middle East and Asia there is a strong

positive relationship between the percentage of the population em
ployed in agriculture and crime in general, but a negative one for
fraud (in the region 3).

The null hypothesis that there is a posi

tive relationship is not rejected.

In Latin America there is a nega

tive relationship for major theft and fraud but positive for homicide.
The hypothesis that decline in participation and increase in crime are
positively related is not supported in all regions or with all crimes.
It cannot be concluded, based on the above findings that there is
a consistent relationship between the percentage of the population
employed in agriculture and crime.

The fact that there is strong

positive relationship in some cases, a strong negative in others and
no relationship in others suggests that the relationship may be more
complicated and need further exploration.

Hypothesis 5

The fifth research hypothesis is that increase in Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) will lead to proportional increase in crime.

It is

assumed that Gross Domestic Product is a good indicator of productive
activity in the society.

Societies will produce more to meet the needs

of the people as they improve their means of production, knowledge and

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

210

necessary skills to utilize their resources.

The alternative hypo

thesis (HI) drawn from the research hypothesis is that there is a
positive relationship between Gross Domestic Product and crime.
The null hypothesis (Ho) to be tested is that GDP is not positively
related to crime.

The hypothesis is rejected if there is a positive

relationship between GDP and crime.

It is not rejected if there is

no relationship or if there is a negative relationship.

Region 1--Western Europe and North America

There has been rapid development or increase in modernization as
represented by average National Gross Domestic Product.

Between 1960

and 1984 the Gross Domestic Product has increased by 667% (Table 5;
Figure 25, X5; and Figure 26, X5) .

The rate of crime has grown as

fast also (Figure 25, Y1, Y2, Y4 and Figure 26, Y3) .

A look at

individual crimes shows that most crimes have also increased steadily
in this region.
The relationship is further examined by the Pearson correlation
coefficient analysis.
(Table 35).

The result shows a strong positive relationship

This analysis suggests strongly that in this region

increases in GDP may actually be related to increases in crime.
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Figure 25.

Gross Domestic Product and Crime from 1960 to 1984 in
Western Europe/North America.
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Table 35

Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Relationship Between the
Gross Domestic Product in Western Europe/America
and Crime, (1960-1984), and Actions
Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

.9215

.000

Rej ect

Fraud

.6814

.000

Rej ect

Homicide

.8851

.000

Reject

Total Crime

.9541

.000

Rej ect

.05 -- 1 Tail Test

Region 2--Asia

Asian countries experienced the most increase in GDP of all the
regions studied, an increase of 1910% (Table 7, Figure 27 and Figure
28).

The rates of almost all crimes declined during the period

(Table 7; Figure 27, Y1, Y2, Y4; and Figure 28, Y3) and fraud by 2%.
Only homicide increased by 36%.

The graphs (Figures 27 and 28) show

that whereas the increase in GDP is rather rapid the decline in crime
is gradual, not seeming to be immediate or direct response to the
increases in GDP except as a cumulative effect.
The Pearson correlation analysis of the relationship between
Gross Domestic Product and crime shows a varied relationship (Table
36).

In general, there is no positive relationship between GDP and

crime suggesting that GDP does not cause crime in Asia.

It is inter

esting to note that though the GDP has increased rapidly and most
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crimes have decreased or increased only moderately there is some
positive relationship between GDP and crime in general, except for theft
where the relationship is negative and homicide where it is not
significant.

Table 36
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Relationship Between the
Gross Domestic Product in Asia and Crime, (1960-1984),
and Actions Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

Major Theft

r

P

Action on Ho

Fail to Reject

-.2120

009

Fraud

.4778

,000

Rej ect

Homicide

.0047

,477

Fail to Reject

Total Crime

.5174

,000

Rej ect

q C=* .05 -- 1 Tail Test

Region 3--Middle East

In the Middle East there has also been a rapid growth in Gross
Domestic Product, up to 867% (Table 9; Figure 29, X5; and Figure 30,
X5) .

The rates of most crimes have dropped during the period.

Figure

29, X5 shows a rapid increase in GDP compared to the rates of total
crime (Y1) , theft (Y2) and fraud (YA) .

Figure 30, X5 shows the in

crease in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) compared to homicide (Y3) .
Analysis of the relationship between National Gross Domestic
Product and crime in the Middle East, using the Pearson correlations
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the Middle East.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

218

uooooo

4.000

3,000HOODOO

2,000

-3 Mcxtomlty Indicators

1.000
110.000

C
»s

^ U H nG xm O onaac
P ro d u atn U

Year

X5

=

GDP

Xg

=

GDPM

Y3

=

Homicide

Figure 30.

Gross Domestic Product and Homicide from 1960 to 1984 in
the Middle East.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

219

suggests varied relationships (Table 37).

There is a positive corre

lation between GDP and major theft and homicide, but no significant
relationship to fraud.

Table 37
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Relationship Between the
Gross Domestic Product in the Middle East
and Crime, (1960-1984), and Actions
Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

Action on Ho

.4564

.000

Rej ect

-.1302

.056

Fail to Reject

Homicide

.3504

.000

Rej ect

Total Crime

.2309

.000

Reject

Major Theft
Fraud

<7 ^ =

P

.05 -- 1 Tail Test

Region 4--Sub-Saharan Africa

In Africa the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown by 1485%
during the 25 years (Table 11; Figure 31, X5; and Figure 32, X5) .

The

rates of all crimes have also increased (Table 11; Figure 31, Y-,, Y2, Y4;
and Figure 32, X6) .

The trends of increase in the GDP and all crimes

are shown in Figures 31 and 32.

The graphs show that there appear to be

a positive relationship and steady increase in GDP and both total
crime and homicide.

This relationship is further examined by Pearson

correlation analysis.
The analysis of the relationship between National Gross Domestic
Product using Pearson correlation coefficients show that in Africa
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there is a positive correlation between National Gross Domestic Pro
duct and most crimes (Table 38).

The relationship is strong for

total crime and homicide, though weak for theft and fraud.

This

region may also have very high increases in population, especially
juvenile population.

The relationships have not been controlled for

either total or juvenile population.

Table 38
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Relationship Between the
Gross Domestic Product in Sub-Saharan Africa
and Crime, (1960-1984), and Actions
Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

Action on Ho

P

Major Theft

.1344

.051

Fail to Reject

Fraud

.3470

.000

Rej ect

Homicide

.4466

.000

Rej ect

Total Crime

.6567

.000

Rej ect

Region 5--Latin America

In Latin America the GDP has increased by 407% (Table 13; Figure
33, X5; and Figure 34, X5) , a small rate of growth compared to the rates
in Africa and Asia and the Middle East.

The graphs (Figure 33, Y1, Y2,

Y4 and Figure 34, Y3) show a rather rapid increase in the rates of total
crime and of some specific crimes such as homicide ann theft, though the
rate of increase for fraud is relatively low.
The relationships between the National Gross Domestic Product and
various crimes were analyzed using Pearson correlation coefficients
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(Table 39), shows a positive relationship between GDP and crime.
There seems to be a strong relationship between GDP and crime in
this region.

Table 39
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Relationship Between the
Gross Domestic Product in Latin America
and Crime, (1960-1984), and Actions
Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

.5129

.000

Rej ect

Fraud

.3809

.000

Rej ect

Homicide

.5606

.000

Rej ect

Total Crime

.6235

.000

Reject

Region 6 --Scandinavia

In Scandinavia and New Zealand the GDP has grown 733% between 1960
and 1984 (Table 15; Figure 35, X5; and Figure 36, X5) .

The rate of all

crimes also increased significantly during the period.

According to

the graphs (Figures 35 and 36) the increases in general crime (Y.,) and
especially homicide (Y3) seem to proportional to increases in GDP (X5) .
The relationships were further explored using the Pearson correlation
analysis.
The Pearson correlation analysis of the relationship between
National Gross Domestic Product and crime shows that there is a strong
and positive relationship (Table 40) between GDP and crime in this
region.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

226

600.000

>70.000

500.000

SGOJDOO

400.000

Legend
Cflma Type
□ M M ftU iio r Thtfl

300.000

>■
$30000

200.000

0 MwnReud
> M »an fo u l C rv n t

Modernity Indicators
iiiim itiia i

100.0 0 0 *

p '-

e -a

--0 0 0 0

Q

0

ft--o

y/ji

\

-» -<d— '>

1 M m h G ro ts O orrw uc
Product tmO
-

U a sn G O P

UsnuUcMrglmi)

Year

X5

-

GDP

*6

=

GDPM

=

Total Crime

Y2

-

Major Theft

y4

=

Fraud

Figure 35.

Gross Domestic Product and Crime from 1960 to 1984 in
Scandinavia.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

227

250

Legend

too-

•*40000

£ Crime Type
O MMnKsmodi

S
<*•
O Modernity indicators
e
Mwn Grou Dcmtttc
0 O Product
inO

TO

.<2

1
to

t>MMnGOp""
MnMacvnQfrni)

Year

XR

GDP
GDPM
Homicide

Figure 36.
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Table 40

Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Relationship Between the
Gross Domestic Product in Scandinavia
and Crime, (1960-1984), and Actions
Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

.7687

.000

Rej ect

Fraud

.6968

.000

Reject

Homicide

.8035

.000

Rej ect

Total Crime

.7901

.000

Rej ect

Summary

The purpose of this hypothesis was to find out if there is a
positive correlation between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and crime.
The null hypothesis (Ho) states that there is a negative correlation.
It is not rejected if there is a negative or no significant
relationship.
Analysis of the data using the Pearson correlation coefficients
shows a positive relationship, though this is not consistent in all
regions and with all crimes.

In Western Europe (and North America),

Latin America, and Scandinavia the relationship is strong and consist
ent for all the crimes studied and for total crime.

In Asia the rela

tionship though positive for crime in general is negative for some ma
jor conventional crime such as theft and homicide.

This suggests that

though some crimes may increase possibly as a result of increase in
productivity this is not always the case even with conventional crimes.
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In the Middle East the relationship is positive for crime in
general and for specific crimes such as theft and homicide, but nega
tive for fraud.

In Africa there is a positive relationship between

GDP and crime in general and for specific crimes such as homicide
though relative weak for fraud and no significant relationship for
theft.

This is interesting as modernization theorists suggest that

increased productivity is particularly related to theft as there is
more that can be stolen.
The analyses show that of all the indicators of modernization
studied so far, GDP has shown the strongest positive relationship to
crime.

The fact that this relationship differs in strength among the

regions showing strong relationships to some crimes in some regions,
a negative one in others and no significant relationship in some
regions suggests a need to explore the significance of some factors
unique to each society.

The relationship between GDP and crime is

further explored by using regression analysis.

Hypothesis 6

The sixth research hypothesis is that increases in Gross Domestic
Product in Manufacturing (GDPM) will lead to proportional increases in
crime.

In the previous hypothesis (Hypothesis 5) it was reasoned that

increased development results in a society's ability to utilize its
resources better and therefore become more productive.

Sometimes,

however, this increased productivity results from simple increase in
raw materials which are exchanged for cash but which does not involve
much industrial productivity.

Industrial productivity is a better
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indicator of a society's ability to convert its natural resources
and skills to actual products.

This is the true essence of develop

ment.
To examine the relationship between GDPM and crime an alterna
tive hypothesis (HI) was developed which states that increase in GDPM
is positively related to crime.

From this the null hypothesis (Ho)

is that GDPM is negatively related to crime.
The null hypothesis (Ho) is tested by use of the Pearson correla
tion coefficients.

It is rejected if there is a consistent positive

correlation between GDPM and crime.
no significant relationship.

It is also rejected if there is

It is not rejected if there is a nega

tive relationship.

Region 1--Western Europe and North America

During the 25 years covered by the study the average Gross Domestic
Product in Manufacturing in Europe and North America grew by 470% (Table
5).

The rates of all crimes increased steadily and rapidly during the

25 years.

Figures 25 and 28 are graphic representations of these

changes.

Increases in GDPM (X5) have been modest compared to GDP, but

steady.

The rates of crime especially homicide (Y3) have increased much

more rapidly.

Analysis of the relationship using the Pearson correla

tion

shows a very strong positive relationship for crime in general (r =

.96)

and for specific crimes such as theft (.93) and homicide (.89),see

Table 41.
Analysis of the relationship
Manufacturing and crime in Europe

between Gross Domestic Product in
and America shows a strong and
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consistent positive (Table 41).

This suggests that in this region

increase in GDPM might actually be responsible for much of the in
crease in crime.

This relationship will be further examined by use

of multiple regression and stepwise regression analysis.

The null

hypothesis is rejected.

Table 41
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Effects of
Gross Domestic Product in Manufacturing on Crimes
in Europe and North America and Actions
Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

.9322

.000

Rej ect

Fraud

.6588

.000

Rej ect

Homicide

.8865

.000

Rej ect

Total Crime

.9559

.000

Reject

Region 2--Asia

The average increase in GDPM in Asia during the period was 2498%
(Table 7; Figure 27, X6; and Figure 28, Xg) .

This is the highest and

most rapid increase of all regions during the period.
period most crimes decreased.

During the same

The graphs show that while the GDPM has

grown rapidly the trends in all crimes has been downward except hom
icide which has increased moderately, (Figure 27, Y1, Y2, Y4 and Figure
28, Y3).
The Pearson correlation analysis of the relationship between GDPM
and crime in Asia shows that though there appears to be a positive
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relationship for crime in general (.50) there is a negative relation
ship for theft and no significant relationship for homicide
42).

(Table

Though there appears to be a positive correlation between GDPM

and crime in Asia, one wonders why the relationship is so weak com
pared to region one.

This relationship will also be examined further

using multiple and stepwise regression analyses.

Table 42
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Effects of
Gross Domestic Product in Manufacturing on Crimes
in Asia and Actions Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

Major Theft
Fraud
Homicide
Total Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

-.2749

.001

Fail to Reject

.4970

.000

Reject

- .0678

.208

Fail to Reject

.5071

.000

Reject

>•'
Region 3--Middle East

-»

--

There was also a rapid increase in GDPM in the Middle East of
1207% (Figure 29, X6 and Figure 30, XG) during the period studied
(Table 9).

The table and graphs show that during the same period

there was an increase in general crime though conventional crime such
as homicide, fraud and minor theft decreased.
unidentified crimes increased.

Major theft and other

While GDPM grew rapidly the rates of

conventional crime where it increased was rather slow, major theft
by 43% total, including unspecified crimes increased by 156%.

t
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The analysis of the relationship between Gross Domestic Pro
duct in Manufacturing using the Pearson correlation shows a positive
relationship for major theft (.45), for homicide (.50) and for total
crime (.32) (Table 43).

The correlation for fraud is not significant.

The positive for homicide is interesting since the actual rate of
homicide has dropped by 59% (Table 9).

This apparent discrepancy is

resolved by a regression analysis which shows whether the change in
homicide is explained by GDPM.

Table 43
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Effects of
Gross Domestic Product in Manufacturing on
Crime in the Middle East and Actions
Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

.4535

.000

Rej ect

-.0422

.304

Fail to Reject

Homicide

.5027

non
,uuu

Roj

Total Crime

.3231

.000

Rej ect

Major Theft
Fraud

Region 4--Sub-Saharan Africa

In Africa GDPM grew by 1800% during the period (Figure 31, Xg;
Figure 32, X6; and Table 11).
increased.

The rates of all crimes have also

The graphs show persistent increases in both GDPM and

all types of crimes.
Analysis of the relationship between GDPM in Africa and crime
shows some positive relationship for crime in general and for all
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the conventional crimes studied (Table 44).

The strength of the

relationship varies from a strong relationship for total crime (.63)
to a rather weak relationship for major theft (.18).

A regression

analysis will be done to show how much of the increases are actually
explained by increases in GDPM.

The null hypothesis is rejected.

Table 44
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Effects of
Gross Domestic Product in Manufacturing on
Crime in Sub-Saharan Africa and Actions
Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

.1767

.015

Rej ect

Fraud

.3606

.000

Rej ect

Homicide

.4109

.000

Rej ect

Total Crime

.6262

.000

Rej ect

Region 5--Latin America

In Latin America the GDPM grew by 458% (Table 13) during the
period, a rather modest increase.

At the same time all crimes

increased, some rather rapidly (Figures 33 and 34).

The rate of

increase of total crime is 150%, fraud increased by 6%, and homicide
by 236%.

The most increase is in major theft by 418%.

Analysis of the relationship between the GDPM and crime in Latin
America using the Pearson correlations shows a positive relationship
(Table 45) for all crimes though not as strong as in region one and
six.

Once again, a regression analysis is done to see how much of

t
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these changes are actually explained by the increases in GDPM.

On

the basis of the Pearson correlation analysis, the table and graph
show the null hypothesis is rejected.

The alternative hypothesis

is supported.
Table 45
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Effects of
Gross Domestic Product in Manufacturing on Crime
in Latin America and Actions
Taken on the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

.3844

.000

Rej ect

Fraud

.2206

.014

Rej ect

Homicide

.5251

.000

Rej ect

Total Crime

.4673

.000

Rej ect

Region 6--Scandinavia

In Scandinavia and New Zealand GDP manufacturing grew by 632%
(Table 15; Figure 35, X6; and Figure 36, Xg) .

The rate of all crimes

increased steadily during the period (Figure 35, Y1, Y2, Y4 and Figure
36, Y3) .

Pearson correlation analysis of the relationship between GDPM

and crime shows a strong and consistent positive relationship between
GDPM and all the crimes included in the study (Table 46).

The null

hypothesis is rejected meaning that the HI is supported.
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Table 46

Pearson Correlation Coefficients of The Effects of
Gross Domestic Product in Manufacturing on Crime
in Scandinavia and Actions Taken on
the Null Hypothesis

Crime

r

P

Action on Ho

Major Theft

.7606

.000

Reject

Fraud

.7867

.000

Rej ect

Homicide

.8678

.000

Rej ect

Total Crime

.8763

.000

Rej ect

Summary

The null hypothesis tested here is that there is a negative
relationship between GDPM and crime.
positive relationship between the two.

It is rejected if there is a
It is not rejected if there is

a negative relationship or one that is not significant.

Not rejecting

the null hypothesis means that either GDPM and crime are related
negatively or that an apparent relationships is not significant.
Analysis of the data shows a strong positive correlation between
GDPM and crime in Europe and North America and in Scandinavia.

The

relationship is moderately positive in Asia for some crimes, but
negative for major theft and not significant for homicide.
moderately positive in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.

It is
In the

Middle East region there is also a generally positive relationship
for crime in general including major theft and homicide but not
significant for fraud.
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In general there seems to be a positive relationship between
GDPM and crime.

However, the relationship is much stronger in the

regions where the level of development or modernization is highest
and where the indicators of modernization used here seem not to be
changing rapidly (Europe/North America and Scandinavia).

It is by

comparison weaker in the region in which the rate of development is
most rapid (Asia). This means that there may be other factors that
are important in explaining the relationships.

Chapter Summary

The purpose of this analysis was to see the extent to which
modernization or development is related to crime.

The central argu

ment of modernization theory of crime is that the social and economic
changes associated with modernization or development are universal
and inherently criminogenic.

This means that the process of develop

ment involves specific social and economic changes which include
urbanization, increased life expectancy, industrialization, attrition
of agricultural labor force, increased national gross domestic product
(GDP), and increased gross domestic product in manufacturing (GDPM) and
that these changes lead to increase in crime.

The attempt made in these

pages has been to examine the nature of the relationship between these
changes, which are used as independent variables, and different crimes
in the six different regions.

Since modernization theory assumes that

the process of development is universalistic and these relationships as
constant, this study posits that the theory is supported if similar
changes in these variables produce similar changes in the rates of
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crime in different regions of the world.
The analysis of the data using the Pearson correlation coeffi
cients shows no consistent relationship between the independent vari
ables (indicators of development) and either specific crimes or crime
in general.

Hypothesis 1 states that there is a positive relation-ship

between urbanization and crime.

The analysis shows that the

relationship is positive for all the crimes studied in Scandinavia,
all the crimes, except homicide in Latin America, fraud only in West
ern Europe and North America, in Asia and in Africa, but not in the
Middle East.

This inconsistency does not support the hypothesis

(Table 47).
The second hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship
between life expectancy and crime.

This is supported for all the

crimes in Scandinavia, for major theft, homicide and total crime, but
not for fraud in Africa, Western Europe and North America.

It is

supported for average total crime in Latin America, but not for the
specific crimes covered in the study.

The variables have a negative

or no significant relationship with crime in Asia or the Middle East.
The hypothesis is not supported (Table 47).
Hypothesis 3 is that there is a positive relationship between
industrialization and crime.

This is supported in Africa for all

the crimes studied, but not for any crime in any of the other regions
(Table 47).

The hypothesis is rejected.

The fourth hypothesis is that there is a negative relationship
between agricultural participation and crime, meaning that attrition
in the percentage of the population employed in agriculture leads to
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Table 47
Summary of Findings on the Relationship Between Different Indicators
of Modernization and Crime in Six Regions From 1960 to 1984

Region

Crime

Western Europe/
North America

Major Theft
Fraud
Homicide
Total Crime

Asia

Middle East

Sub-Saharan
Africa

Latin
America

Scandinavia

Urban
Population

X
4

X

Life
Expectancy

4

.

.

4
4

X
-

X
-

X
-

X

'

Major Theft
Fraud
Homicide
Total Crime

-

X
-

Major Theft
Fraud
Homicide
Total Crime

X
+
X

Major Theft
Fraud
Homicide
Total Crime

Agricultural
Labor Force

X

Major Theft
Fraud
Homicide
Total Crime

Major Theft
Fraud
Homicide
Total Crime

Industrial
Labor Force

GDP
National

GDP
Manufacturing

4
4
4
4

4
4
4
4

4

-

4

4

4

X

X

X

4

4

4
4
4

4

4

-

X

X

-

4

4
4

4
4

X

4
4

4
4
4
4

-

4
4

-

4

4
4
4
4

-

X
X

X
X
.

4

4

4

-

X

4
4
4
4

4
4
4
4

4
4
4
4

4
4
4
4

X
X
-

4
4
4
4

4
4
4
4

4

-

+
4

4

X

-

-

-

+ - There is a positive relationship between given variables
- - There is a negative relationship between given variables
X - There is no significant relationship
.05 -- 1 Tail Test
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increase in crime.

This is supported by the data from Scandinavia

and Africa for all crimes studied, for major theft, homicide and aver
age total crime, but not for fraud in Western Europe and Worth America.
It is supported for major theft and fraud in Latin America and for
fraud in Asia (Table 47).

Once again, the inconsistent findings re

quire the rejection of the hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 states chat there is a consistent positive relation
ship between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and crime.

This is supported

by analysis of data from Scandinavia, Latin America, Western Europe, and
North America for all the crimes studied.

It is supported for all the

crimes except major theft in Africa and Asia and fraud in the Middle
East (Table 47).

This hypothesis is also rejected.

The last hypothesis, number 6, states that there is a positive
relationship between Gross Domestic Product in manufacturing (GDPM)
and crime.

This supported for all the crimes in Scandinavia, Latin

America, Africa, Western Europe, and North America.

It is not sup

ported for fraud in the Middle East, or for homicide and major theft in
Asia.

This hypothesis is also rejected.
The analyses show that there is no consistent relationship between

the indicators of development and either specific crimes or crime in
general in all the regions.

This means that the data analyses do not

support the modernization theory of crime.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The study attempted to accomplish three tasks.

First, the study

examined the relationship between modernization and crime as proposed
by the modernization theory of crime.

The second purpose of the study

was to examine the process and impact of development on trends in
criminality.

The study also purported to underscore the significance

of comparative theories in the study of crime which are sensitive to
unique characteristics of societies studied but which are broad enough
for universal application.

Conclusions drawn from this study are based

upon the exploration of the above purposes.

Modernization Theory of Crime

Modernization theorists presume that "as people form independent
nation states, these states start on a course of development that will
eventually transverse the same stages of development which the reigning
Western European societies have apparently transversed historically”
(Hopkins, 1982, p. 10).

According to these theorists, "there is one

universal, unilinear pattern of development which all nations go
through; consequently, there is a single pattern of crime associated
with modernization, as exemplified by the history of advanced Western
nations" (Horton & Platt, 1986, p. 118).

The modernization theory of

crime sees crime as inevitable product of the process of development
or transition from more primitive to modern social forms.

The theory
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is a descriptive model which assumes that the West European sociohistorical, political and economic developmental processes are
universalistic and must be experienced by the rest of the work
with similar results, and consequences.

Advocates of this theory

conclude that there is not only a similar pattern of development
for all societies, but also a similar pattern of relationships
between the process of development and crime in all societies
(Clinard & Abbott, 1973; Sesay, 1977; Shelley, 1981).
One major conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that
the above assumption is either incorrect or presumptuous.

The process

of development does not seem to follow similar patterns of change with
similar effect in all societies.
This study has shown that the relationship between development
and crime is a complex one.

The industrialized Western countries have

continued to have rapid increase in all forms of crime at rates much
higher than the rates of measurable development.

The study has shown

that characteristics or indicators of the process of modernization have
tended to stabilize in these societies.

Rather than stabilize or slow

to reflect the rate of development the rates of crime have continued
to rise significantly.

These increases can therefore not be simply a

result of increasing development.

Since development has been a major

character of these societies for centuries, the explanation that crime
is a result of the process of development does not seem to apply.
Another conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the
process

of development or modernization does not necessarily lead to

increase in crime.

Some societies that are developing rapidly have
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experienced actual decrease in most crimes.

This especially true

of countries in Asia and the Middle East.
The study also shows that whatever factors are responsible for
increases in crime affect particular crimes differently.

Though

there have been general increases in crime the rate of increase for
fraud in Western Europe and North America (259%) and Scandinavia
(217%) are much higher than comparative increases in other regions.
Fraud decreased by 12% in Asia, and 92% in the Middle East.

It can

be concluded that social, cultural and other societal aspects of
each society contribute to the changes in the rates of specific
crimes.
These findings lead to the conclusion that criminological
theories must be responsive to social, historical, geographical,
political and other cultural aspects of individual societies.
Societies which have developed with less crime are said to have
evolved some differences in their approach to development.

These

societies, while developing, have endeavored to retain some of their
traditions and social characteristics.

Certain characteristics are

common among societies which are developing but have low rates of
crime.

Some of them have traditions which include:

emphasis on

maintaining useful informal traditions such as emphasis on the com
munity rather than the individual, on preserving rather than chang
ing traditions which serve useful purposes, and the combination of
traditional methods of defining and treating offenders with the
development and use of modern jurisprudence.

Group orientation,

traditional social cohesiveness, traditional family systems,
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community emphasis, religious beliefs which emphasize private and
public morality and the integration of new ideas with old ones
rather than simple abandonment of traditional ideas in favor of
new ones and ethnic/cultural homogeneity (Adler, 1983, p. 132),
are major characteristics of the culture of societies with less
crime.
Japan, probably the most rapidly developed country in recent
history, has decreasing rather than increasing rates of crime.
Several explanations are given for this.

The most common reason is

that "Japanese people, for the most part, are homogeneous, sharing a
common history, language and culture.

It is a nation of coexisting

old and new values'' (Chang, 1988, p. 141).

Middle East countries

and other Islamic nations also maintain social homogei.ities based on
religious beliefs and traditions.

The Shariah Law on which these

societies depend is used as a unifying and moralizing agent as well
as a preventive one against crime.

It is used to reform and encourage,

to warn people against evil, to educate and command people to assist
one another, to prevent crime by blocking temptations, the use of
severe punishment for those failing to conform and to prepare people
to resist sinful and criminal behaviors (Souryal, 1988, p. 5).

They

too have lower rates of crime despite their great wealth and rapid
development.
Many of these societies develop and experience inevitable social
and economic changes but they still maintain certain traditional
characteristics (Shelley, 1981) or incorporate them into new ones
(Linbeck, 1974; Scott, 1975) avoiding great increases in crime
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generally associated with development.

It can be concluded from

this that the process of development does not have the same conse
quences in every society.

Therefore, the impact of development on

societies must be determined by social, historical, geographical,
political and other characteristics unique to those societies and
not to simply development itself.

Social characteristics do not

only influence the process of development; they also influence the
impact of development on each society.

Implications of the Study

There are many implications that can be drawn from this study.
Some are based upon what the study has failed to do but some are
based upon what the study found or failed to find that can be useful
for future studies.
parts:

These implications can be divided into four

(1) implications for the nature of development,

tions for the nature of criminality,

(2) implica

(3) implications for comparative

research, and (4) implications for theories of development and of crime.

The Nature of Development

Development is often seen as social change.

The societies which

are considered developed are often assumed to inevitably experience
both structural and social changes which are disruptive and crimino
genic.

Modernization theorists assert that the process of development

in all societies must proceed in the same manner with similar conse
quences for all societies as has been experienced by the Western
societies.

This study shows that this is not necessarily the case.
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Development in certain regions such as Asia and the Middle East
clearly has characteristics and effects on the societies which do
not replicate the system in the Western societies.
Modernization theory of crime suggests that changes associated
with development are inevitable and criminogenic.

It does not tell

us how these changes actually cause crime or how crime sometimes
increases and sometimes does not increase with similar measures of
these indicators of development.

It cannot explain how Japan and

other Asian countries have achieved so much rapid development with
out becoming westernized in structural and cultural characteristics.
Perhaps the best implication is that the study demonstrates nonWestern cultures can be models of development.

The Nature of Crime

One implication of modernization theory of crime is that since
social changes generally associated with development are criminogenic
that these processes affect almost all kinds of crimes similarly.
This study shows that conventional crimes are not necessarily the
crimes societies suffer the most from.

In Asia all the conventional

crimes decreased during the period but homicide actually increased.
In the Middle East most conventional crimes decreased; fraud by 92%,
homicide by 59%, but major theft increased by 43% and total crime
increased by 156%.
ent types of crimes.

Different factors must be responsible for differ
The implications of the above facts is that to

adequately understand the nature of specific crimes one needs to study
each crime specifically.

To understand criminality in any society we
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also need to understand specific cultural and social contexts of
each society in which the crimes occur.
To say that each type of crime needs to be studied specifically
and in the content or society in which it occurs does not preclude
the possibility or necessity of comparative criminological theory
and study.

The implication is that such theories and studies must

include consideration for these factors.

Comparative Research

In his discussion of cross national research as analytic stra
tegy, Melvin Kohn (1987) identifies four types of cross national
research.

The four types are "those in which nation is object of

study, those in which nation is the context of study, those in which
nation is unit of analysis, and those that are transnational in
character" (p. 714).

The type of comparative research used in this

study is one in which nations or regions are contexts of study.

In

this method we are concerned with the relationship between moderniza
tion and crime.

Our focus is on the extent to which nations, as

contexts of development, affect the rates of crime.

In comparative

studies "finding cross-national similarities greatly extends the
score of sociological knowledge.

Cross national similarities lend

themselves readily to sociological interpretation"
p. 716).

(Kohn, 1987,

Studies that have found positive relationships between

modernization and crime have been used readily by researchers to
draw conclusions on the nature of the relationship between them.
In this study we observed that on the average there appears to be
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increases in crime in general in societies which also seem to be
experiencing development.

This has led to the assumption that sim

ilar experience with development leads to similar experience with
crime.

However, "apparent similarities can mask profound differ

ences; what seems to call for a unitary interpretation may actually
require entirely different explanations" (Kohn, 1987, p. 716).

This

seems to be the case in the relationship between development and
crime.

It seems that the process of development results, in some

societies, in social and structural changes which may seem evidently
criminogenic.

Rapid urbanization, individualism, unemployment, social

and economic inequalities, unequal distribution of resources, services
and opportunities, neutralization of public and social morality (which
are characteristic of Western cultures) are considered to be inevit
able results of modernity.

Most attempts at comparison of different

societies tend to assume that, these characteristics occur every time
a society develops.

If this were true, all developed societies would

have similar cultures.

The cultural, social, political, and economic

differences which exist between the United States (and Europe) and
Japan are good indicators of the fact that this is not the case.

The

fact that these characteristics are not typical of all modernized or
modernizing societies leads to the conclusion that the relationship
between modernization and crime, if any exists, is determined by some
characteristics unique to individual societies.

This inevitable

conclusion underscores the need for comparative studies which focus
on the unique characteristics of different societies that influence
both development and crime.
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Profound differences exist within societies that are developed,
rapidly developing and those considered underdeveloped.

Some of

these differences are due to geographical and historical factors but
many are due to economy and culture.

How they cope with their eco

nomic and social problems may depend on these unique characteristics.
Studies of crime in each society by its scholars link the incidence
of crime in the society to unique social, economic and cultural
conditions such as poverty, distribution of wealth and opportunities,
state of morality, the process of defining and treatment of offenders,
and various factors very unique to each individual society.
The study has shown that correlations and total numbers can be
misleading.

The Pearson correlation analysis done earlier in the

study is a measure of association which shows the strength of rela
tionship between variables.

Though correlations are necessary for

causality they do not necessarily imply causality.

Averages of total

numbers indicating development do not give a complete picture of what
happens in individual states.

Averages of increases in crime do not

give a complete picture of what is happening with crime in individual
countries either.

The increases identified in both development and

crime in this study have not included increases in population and
improved methods of documentation and how those affect either of the
rates.

Even then, the study has shown that the patterns of develop

ment and crime are not universal.

They differ from one society to

another.
To understand the nature and process of development and of trends
in criminality it is important to examine the numbers within the
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context of each country or region.

Similar changes of some vari

ables may have different effects for different countries and
regions.

Urbanization has been linked to criminality because in

industrialized Western Europe and North America it is associated
with industrialization.
due to industrialization.

In Africa urbanization is not necessarily
This is important because, unlike in

Europe and America where urbanization and industrialization occurred
together because people moved to the cities to work in industries,
in Africa people have moved to the city to work for government bureau
cracy or to stay with relative who do.

Since industrialization is

rather slow, due to slow technological development, urbanization may
not actually indicate development or progress.
Attempts to explain crime by focusing on the unique character
istics in the society being studied are very important. This is
obviously not easy especially in most comparative studies where there
is a desperate desire to generalize.

It is easy and tempting to want

to understand other cultures using our ethnocentric values and there
fore assume that characteristics and effects we see in our cultures
should be seen in others also.

Theories of Development and of Crime

A look at theories of development and of crime reminds one of
the six blind men of Calcutta who went to "see" an elephant.

Each of

them touched a different part of the elephant's body and came back
with a description of the elephant based purely on the part he touched.
Many theories of development and of crime are based on the perceptions
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of scholars that are based upon their experiences and perceptions
shaped by their individual cultures or societies.
The theories for development and crime discussed earlier pro
vide strong basis for developing comprehensive models for society
which can be integrated to produce a meaningful and effective theo
retical model(s) for studying social phenomena.

The evolutionary

theory which sees development as a natural process may be naive and
simplistic but it correctly calls attention to natural tendencies
to strive for change with different consequences due to unique
characteristics of every society.

It also appropriately acknow

ledges the disruptive nature of change and the social processes
through which behaviors are considered normal or abnormal, desirable
or undesirable and/or criminal.

Comparative studies of social

processes, such as crime and development, much involve some insight
into the evolutionary scenario in each society studied.
The view of development as a strategy moves the evolutionary
process from being automatic and natural to being purposeful and
calculating.

This involves conscious decisions resulting from

evaluations of history, calculating prospects and advantages and
predicting impacts and consequences.

This approach enables the

appreciation of the inevitability of change but also the manipula
tion of the process of change by different social forces.

Behaviors,

including crime are not simply secu as random and productive but as
calculating and often exploitive.
The conflict approach sees development as both the cause and
product of conflict.

The social and economic problems or benefits
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associated with development (including crime) are seen in terms of
how segments of the population are related to power.

These rela

tionships are national, cultural, traditional and differ from one
society to another.

Comparative researchers must not make summary

assumptions about how the process of developments effects citizens
of a country and how the benefits of development are distributed.
As we examine the global nature of progress theories of develop
ment which emphasize the dynamics of international relations become
very important.

Dependency theorists see development as a product

and perpetuation of cultural, political and economic diffusion in
which the developing countries by choice or necessity depend on the
developed nations.

Dependency theory can be appropriately criticized

for not addressing why the less developed nations do not evolve the
mechanism of development or how it evolved in the developed countries.
The criticism does not change the fact that many countries depend on
others for resources necessary for their development.

This dependency

involves the transfer of goods, values, attitudes and behaviors which
become major aspects of the culture of the recipient developing country.
Attempts to understand the process of development and resultant social
problems, including crime in those societies must include perspectives
on the nature of this dependency.
World systems theory as a perspective challenges the dependency
perspective by presenting a picture of a world order in which all
nations progress toward the core.

Problems and benefits in each

society reflects the characteristics of the stage of development.
World system is a descriptive model which emphasizes dependency and
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interrelational dynamics of progress and social problems.

External

pressures rather than the dynamics of change or progress are seen as
being criminogenic.

The perspective is interactional and contributes

to the understanding of political, economic, and social problems of
developing countries.

This means that crime is seen as a product of

their interactional process and the pressures to move to the core.

Integrating Theories of Development With Theories of Crime

The theories for development above differ from each other by their
perspectives on the dynamics of development.
not necessarily contradictory.

These perspectives are

In fact, they collectively present an

integrative model of social progress.

The natural instincts for

survival and pleasure require instinctual craving for creativity and
change.

This may be random or purposeful (or strategic) resulting in

and including conflicts regarding problems (including crime) and
benefits available in the society.

The need to use resources available

and social processes to develop requires the immediate social context,
existing social and economic resources available int he society, and
ones other societies which the society must interact with.
Just as modernization theories attempt to explain modernization
at different levels, criminal behavior must also be explained at
different levels.

Ecological theories of crime focus on immediate

social contexts in which crimes occur.

Though urban and poor neigh

borhoods and other social contexts of crime may have characteristics
conducive to criminality these environments are greatly influenced by
social process extending far beyond the immediate contexts of criminal
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behaviors.
Structural strain theory which sees criminal behavior as a
result of structural processes which influence adaptation those
structural and cultural characteristics are also products the larger
society including diffused cultural elements from other societies.
Control processes which succeed or fail to create and ensure conform
ity in the minority who commit crimes though they succeed with the
majority of the population are both immediate and broad characteris
tics of the total society.

Conflict theorists emphasize social con

flicts in immediate social context, the society and global context
which influence all forms of social behavior including criminality.
The above theories may not individually adequately explain
criminal behavior but integratively they may explain the nature and
incidence of all criminality in all societies whether modern or
ancient, developed or underdeveloped, and rich or poor.

In emphasiz

ing the need for integrating criminological and criminal justice
theories Friday (1988) claims that no criminological theory exhaus
tively explains criminal behavior and that the theories are not
mutually exclusive.

He proposes theoretical integration as means

of increasing criminal explanations.

Summary

There are several implications to this study, all of which are
related to what may or may not be inbred from the study.

Limitations

of the study are many, but its contributions have significant impli
cations.

Among major limitations of the study is the difficulty in
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establishing the exact meanings of concepts used.

The concept of

modernization or development in the study has been used to mean the
extent to which a society is able to meet the needs of the people.
This definition assumes that every society has a fair understanding
of what the needs of its people are, that the people themselves know
and that the social economic and political activities in the society
are directed towards the fulfillment of these needs.
if this is ever the case.

It is doubtful

Indicators of modernization are identified

and have been used as independent variables.

The assumption that

processes such as urbanization, employment, longevity and GDP are
adequate indicators of modernization may be over-assuming.

Countries

like Iceland have demonstrated that living well does not depend on
the kind of economic and social changes seen in other more aggressive
capitalist countries.

In fact, the other societies have pursued a

developmeiit process which does not emphasize rapid growth or increased
surplus productivity, but simply meeting basic needs through central
ized planning.
Another major limitation of the study is that the data used do
not include socialist societies who approach development from a Marxist
and centralized political and economic orientation rather than, free
enterprise market oriented political and economic one.

The study

recognizes the significance of social, historical, cultural, political
and geographical differences among societies.

These differences make

societies so different that current attempts to generalize on social
processes may be misleading.

Despite this, the study uses some

characteristics to compare them.

It is desirable, when doing
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comparative studies, to determine whether and how the societies
compared are similar or different.

This usually is not possible

as beneath apparent similarities there may be very potent differences
(Kohn, 1987, pp. 720-721).

The fact that the study finds no consist

ent relationship between them in the different societies may not tell
us much about the differences or similarities of societies, but it
tells us that the relationships between modernization and crime is
not consistent.

The implication here is that there is a need to ex

plore further the nature of the concepts of crime and development
and how they relate to specific societies before we can attempt to
generalize internationally.
This requires continued examination of the alternative theories
of development and of crime.

The significance of specific social

dynamics in societies as proposed by dependency, evolutionary,
structural, world system and other theories cannot be overstated.
Criminological theories which focus on social and cultural patterns
in the determination, control and evaluation of behaviors need to be
underscored.
The creation of states, the emphasis on the sovereignty of these
states and the recognition of individual, national, ethnic, regional
and other structural differences suggest that more emphasis should be
placed on differences as well similarities in comparative studies.
The desperate attempt to find and draw conclusions on similarities
between and among nations should be changed to include rigorous
studies on the differences that exist and on the impact of these
differences.

Comparative studies which assume and focus on
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cross-national differences and which attempt to draw universal
conclusions are more difficult to design and to conduct, but they
have the most potential benefit in the true understanding of socie
ties and of crime.

This true understanding is only possible when

varied theoretical explanation of these phenomena are integrated
to produce a more comprehensive understanding.
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